THE 


Q] 




Class __i: 

Book 

CopiglitN?_ 



CCKlfRIGHI 0£FOSZD 



THE STOKY OF THE GREAT WAR 



THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 

NEW YORK • BOSTON • CHICAGO • DALLAS 
ATLANTA • SAN FRANCISCO 

MACMILLAN & CO., Limited 

LONDON • BOMBAY • CALCUTTA 
MELBOURNE 

THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, Ltd. 

TORONTO 




HlustTated London News 



Westward Ho — 1620 
Eastward Ho — 1917 



THE 

STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 



BY 
ROLAND G. USHER, Ph.D. 

PliOFESSOK OF IIISTOKY, WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, ST. LOUIS 

AUTHOR OF 

" PAN-(;ERMANI8M," "the rise of the AMERICAN 

PEOPLE," " THE PILGRIMS AND THEIR HISTORY " 

ETC. 



ILLUSTRATED 



THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 

1919 

All rights reserved 






Copyright, 1919, 
By the MACMILLAN COMPANY. 

Set up and electrotyped. Published October, 1919. 



OtC lO 1919 



NortaooB ^rfSB 

J. S. Gushing Co. — Berwick & Smith Co. 

Norwood, Mass., U.S.A. 



©CI,A5Ji69.10 



^0 

MY BROTHER 

CORPORAL ALBERT MORSE USHER 

Company I, 107th U. S. Infantry (Seventh New York) 
Taventy-seventh Division 

who was severely wounded in the assault 

on the hindenburg line, september 29, 1918 

and died in the british hospital at 

camiers, france, on october 28, 1918 



He gave up willingly all that was dear in life 
That he might do his whole duty by God and man 
And find glory and honor in death. 



-"7 



PREFACE 

The justification for this book must be found in a remark once 
made to me by an Oxford professor. I had made a seminar re- 
port and had "demonstrated" that nothing adequate could pos- 
sibly be known about the subject until elaborate research had been 
prosecuted. "Yes, yes," said the professor. "Very good, but 
what are we going to think in the meantime ? Just tell us some- 
thing brief and probable." That is exactly what I have tried 
to do in this book. 

It would be idle to pretend that an adequate history of the war 
can be written so soon after the event or within such brief compass 
as this volume. But it is equally idle to suppose that we who have 
lived and fought the war can afford to wait before we think some- 
thing about it until the historians can complete any portion of the 
monographs upon which any truly scientific notion of the war must 
rest. Surely, it is scant comfort to us to know that our grand- 
children may understand the war. We need to know something 
about it now, for our opinion of its origin and course will be sig- 
nificant elements in every relevant decision we reach on state- 
craft and reconstruction. Nor am I at all prepared to admit that 
the generation who fought the war is entirely in error as to why 
and for what it was fought. Over the details of battles and diplo- 
macy future students ma\' wrangle to their hearts' content, but 
the spiritual truth about the reasons for the conflict, and the 
spiritual forces which won it, I feel sure we correctly apprehend 
now. One of the most essential facts to make clear, I feel, is 
this very spiritual purpose with which we fought the war. Any 



VUl PREFACE 

future impartiality — so called — or present (assumed) idealism 
which leaves out of the story such spiritual elements will falsify it, 
however numerous the details they correct. 

It was tragic that the men and women who fought the war 
were too busy to study it. The greatest peril of the new era is 
that they will still be too busy with reconstruction to devote 
even casual attention to the great event itself, in the light of which 
alone can the decisions be made by which the new era is to be 
shaped. People are weary of working and weary of reading. Yet 
there was never a time when effort was more necessary nor when 
a little would have such significant results upon national and 
international events. 

I hope that this volume may serve the purpose for some at least 
of those who have neither the time nor the inclination to read 
more detailed accounts, and who are not among those hypercritical 
gentry who will reject all present attempts as unscientific and 
necessarily unsuccessful. I have tried to make text, maps, and 
illustrations tell their lesson at a glance, to make that glance 
reveal something important and interpretative, to pack into these 
few pages the gist of the view about the war which has cost me 
much time and effort and which would be the core of any account 
I might write, however lengthy and technical. To say so much so 
briefly meant inevitably the possibility that some portion might 
not be clear and that other parts might be misunderstood. The 
narrative had to be reduced rigidly and much material often in- 
cluded in brief texts had to be left out in order that the inter- 
pretative material might find place. There was danger that the 
latter might fail to carry conviction without a greater area of facts 
about events and people. Such a decision meant in particular 
the complete subordination of the process by which I achieved 
my conclusions and the omission of the whole panoply of qualifi- 



PREFACE ix 

cations so dear to the professional historian. But I felt the gain 
more than commensurate. 

I shall not be disturbed if reviewers and correspondents point 
out that Mr. This and General That differ from me. I am al- 
ready aware that the witnesses are as numerous as the sands on 
the seashore and the divergencies in their accounts are like unto 
the leaves on the trees. A great deal of water must run under 
the bridge before these controversies can be authoritatively 
settled. 

I have devoted almost as much research and thought to the 
selection and preparation of the illustrations and maps as to 
the text itself. They represent a comprehensive survey of 
French, Italian, and German as well as of British and American 
illustrated periodicals and official photographs. They will, I 
hope, repay study. They tell much that the reader will want 
to know, which I felt could be better told in this way than 
by direct description. So far as I know, this book is the first to 
contain any number of illustrations from German sources. I have 
particularly attempted to show how the various nations sought 
to rouse patriotism and stimulate endeavor by graphic methods. 
INIany of the illustrations are therefore in themselves historical 
material, and show better than mere description can the spiritual 
attitude toward the war of the various combatants. 

Washington University, St. Louis, 
June, 1919. 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 

BOOK I 
THE CAUSES OF THE WAR 

' PAGE 

I. The Outbreak 3 

H. The Causes of the War G 

HI. The Lesson of Prussian History 17 

l\. The German Preparations for War 29 

V. Why the War Began in 1914 39 

BOOK II 
THE WAR IN 1914 

VI. The Campaign on Paris 47 

VII. From the Marne to Antwerp 60 

VIII. Why the British Empire Entered the War ... 69 

IX. How THE Germans Made War 74 

X. Sea-power and the Blockade 85 

XL A Bird's-eye View of the War . . . . ' . .90 

BOOK III 
THE WAR IN 1915 

XII. The Campaign of 1915 . 101 

XIII. The Character of Modern Warfare .... 108 

XIV. The Machinery of an Army 121 



XU TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PAGE 

XV. The Personalities of the War » . . . . 129 

XVI. Gallipoli . . , 132 

XVII. With Hindenburg in Poland 138 

XVIII. The Causes of the Russian Military Collapse . 146 

XIX. Frightfulness : the Lusitania ..... 149 

XX. Why Italy Entered the War 155 

XXI. How the Germans Fought the Blockade . . . 159 

BOOK IV 
THE WAR Ix\ 1916 

XXII. The Campaign of 1916 165 

XXIII. Verdun 175 

XXIV. The Battle of Jutland ....... 183 

XXV. Life in the Trenches 188 

XXVI. Belgium — Scornful — Defiant 194 

XXVII. The War in the Air 203 

BOOK V 
THE WAR IN 1917 

XXVIII. The Campaign of 1917 ....... 213 

XXIX. The Russian Revolution 221 

XXX. W^hy the United States Entered the War . . 230 

XXXI. Messines Ridge 236 

XXXII. Italian Fighting in the Alps 241 

XXXIII. Fighting the Submarine ....... 244 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 



Xlll 



XXXIV. Zeebrugge and Ostend 249 

XXXV. The Battle of the Tanks ...... 256 

XXXVI. With Allenby in Palestine .261 



BOOK VI 

THE WAR IN 1918 

XXXVII. The Gerjian Plans for the Campaign of 1918 

XXXVIII. The German Offensive ofr 1918 

XXXIX. The Strategy of Foch . 

XL. The First American Offensive — Cantigny 

XLI. Chateau-Thierry 

XLII. Belleau Wood 

XLIII. Three American Exploits 

XLIV. The Capture of St. Mihiel . 

XLV. The Final Problem . 

XLVI. Breaking the Hindenburg Line 

XLVII. Who Won the War . 

XLVIII. Chronological Tables . 



267 
273 
280 
286 
290 
295 
299 
304 
311 
319 
328 
336 



LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 

Westward Ho — 1620. Eastward Ho — 1917 . . . Front ispiece 



PAGE 



"Our 



An Illustration of the German War Horse in "Our Holy War," 1914 8 

The Triple Entente and Triple Alliance in 1914 13 

German Column Passing tlirough Belgian Town . 

Hate : German Illustration for the Song of Hate, Published in 

Holy War," in 1914 

Proposed Berlin to Bagdad Railway 

Austria-Hungary and the Balkans 

German Map of Invasion of France from " Unser Heiliger Krie"' 

German Courtesy — 1914 

Early Birds in Paris in War Time 

The Battle of the Marne 

Successive Stages of the German Retreat during the Battle of the Marne 

The Shift in the Battle Line from September 6 to October 17 

Map Showing the Successive German Assaults from October, 1914 

to February, 1915; also the Line of Battle in February, 1915 

The Battle of the Marne 

The Visitor — 1914 

A Bit of Testimony about Public Opinion in Germany upon Atrocities 
German Sketch of Great English and French Night Bombardment at 

Senuc September 22-23, 1915 105 

The Gallipoli Peninsula 209 

French Observation Balloon 1 1 1 

Aeroplane Picture of German Trench Lines at Malmaison, December 

1917 ' 113 

Interior View of French Concrete Machine Gun Nest . . . .118 
German Concrete Houses Aboveground on the Hindenburg Line which 

Survived the Final Allied Artillery Attack in 1918 . . . .119 



19 

26 
28 
40 
49 
51 
57 
62 
63 
64 

67 
71 
76 



XVI 



LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 



French Trench with Periscope and Field Telephone . . . . 
British Advance Artillery Observation Post with Perisco|)e and Field 

Telephone ....... 

Sketch for "LTIlustration," Paris, of French Charge in Fall of l'J15 

Poland, 1914 

The Polish Offensive, 1915 

The Beginning and the End of the German Drive 
Aeroplane Photograph of German Gas Attack 
Sketch Showing First British Charge in Gas Masks 
Map Showing the Territory the Italians Desired to Win 
Detailed Map of Allied Gains in 1916 
Battle Line in 1916 and Total Allied Gain in that Year 
Successive German Gains at Verdun 

A Quiet Little Party 

Poster of American Army Camp Show in France . 
Princess Marie of Belgium ..... 
French Poster Designed to Show German Atrocities 

Belgium — Defiant 

British Poster to Arouse Sympathy for Belgian Refugees 

Sketch for " London Graphic " of Aeroplane Attack in Rain Storm on 

German Trenches ...... 

Cooperative Attack by French Tanks and Aeroplanes in Combined 

Formations in One of the Last Actions of the War 

Allied Gain in 1917 in Detail 

West Front in 1917 and Total Gain in that Year . 

Map ShoA\-ing Italia Irredenta .... 

French Caricatures of Bolsheviki — 1917 

Street Barricade, Petrograd, March, 1917 

Russian Mob, Mainly Women, Bearing Red Flag, Advancing on the 

Duma in Petrograd, March, 1917 . 
John Bull Feeding His Dear Little Friends . 
Sketch for "London Graphic" of French Charge behind Barrage (Seen 

in Front of Troops) in 1917 .... 
Italian Trench in Mountains, 1915 
Photograph of Actual Destruction of Submarine by Depth Bomb 

Dropped by U. S. Destroyer 



PAGE 

122 



245 



LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS XVll 

PAOE 

Attack on Zeebriigge . . . . . . . . . . 2ol 

Ostend Harbor ........... 254 

French Troops Charging Protected by Large French Tank, 1918 . . 257 

British Camp in Palestine ......... 262 

British Auxiliary Troops Advancing in Palestine 263 

French Aeroplane Photograph of Advance Attack in Three Waves Dug 

in to Escape Observation ........ 268 

French Temporary Trenches to Stop German Advance, March, 1918 . 269 
French Counter-attack with Liquid Fire diu-ing German First Offensive, 

March, 1918 271 

German Offensive, March-June, 1918 . . . . . . . 274 

British Midnight Coimter-attack during German Offensive, March, 

1918 281 

British Battery Advancing over Plank Road to Stop German Offensive, 

1918 283 

French Official Photograph of American Regulars Leaving the Trenches 

for the Assault on Cantigny ........ 287 

French Official Photograph of American Regulars "Mopping up" 

Cantigny 288 

Aeroplane Photograi)h of American Assault in Three Weeks, 1918 . . 291 
German Machine Gun Nest of Concrete Concealed by Trees and Under- 
brush from Aeroplane Observation ....... 296 

The St. Mihiel Salient 305 

The Four German Defense Lines and First Operations of Foch . . 312 
German Dugout Entrance with Entrances to Officers' Shelters, Hinden- 

bm-g Line, 1918 314 

German Shelter for Large Gim to Conceal it from Aeroplane Observation 315 
French Whippet Tanks Charging with American Troops, 1918 . . 316 
French Charge Liaison Formation : the Final French Military Achieve- 
ment ............ 320 

The Allied Offensive — 1918 321 

Position of Germans during the Fourth Week of October, 1918. . . 324 

The Territory Surrendered by the Germans at the Armistice . . 330 

The Rearrangement of Europe to which the Allies Pledged Themselves 333 



BOOK I 
THE CAUSES OF THE WAR 



THE STORY OF THE 
GREAT WAR 



CHAPTER I 



THE OUTBREAK 



Not in the limp and bleeding body of an Austrian Archduke, lay 
the cause of the great world war. That assassination, the work of 
an obscure rascal in a practically unknown city of southeastern 
Austria, was the formal excuse for the demands made by Austria 
upon Serbia which were the technical reasons for the war's out- 
break. It was the work of men, the Austrians said, who meant to 
destroy Austria-Hungary ; the work of men in Serbian and Russian 
pay ; the result of a secret conspiracy against Austrian unity. 

A scene connected with the assassination occurred in Berlin. 
There, in a splendid room, was a magnificent table, covered with 
damask, glittering with cut glass, spread with a profusion of flowers 
and expensive food. Around it sat officers of the German army, 
clad in their finest uniforms. At the head of the table, none other 
than the Crown Prince himself. He rose in his chair and said, 
"Gentlemen, I toast — To the Day." They leaped to their feet, 
and drained their glasses and cheered again and again. To what 
day ? He meant to the day when war should be declared between 
Germany and England. 

3 



4 THE STOltY OF THE (ilUOAT WAH 

Aiiotlier scene took place in Paris in the official residence of 
the President of the French Republic. The President himself 
stood, quite simply clad, and addressed the German Ambassador, 
also plainly clad. There was here no pomp and ceremony. 
Few words passed, but they referred to the fate of nations. The 
President said very quietly: "You are arming. We know it." 
The Ambassador started to protest. The President raised his 
hand for silence. "We shall not be caught napping a second 
time," he said very quietly. He bowed to the Ambassador, 
signifying that the interview was at an end. 

A man shot in southern Austria ; a toast to a war between 
Germany and England ; Germany arming against France ; what 
connection was there between them ? 

One further scene took place in this chain of events, again in 
Berlin, again in a splendid room. The Kaiser stood, himself in 
full military dress, and received the greatest generals, admirals, 
and statesmen of Germany. He asked them solemnly if they 
could assure him that Russia was preparing her army for war. 
They told him it was true : Germany must arm immediately in 
self-defense. After some hesitation he signed with a gold pen 
the order for the mobilization of the German army. He knew 
and they knew that that order would produce a general European 
war. They all chose to precipitate it. 

And where did the war begin? In Belgium, thirteen hundred 
miles from Serbia, a thousand miles from the Russian frontier ! 
That tiny nation, connected neither with Austria, nor Russia, 
nor France, was responsible for none of their deeds. And yet 
in August, 1914, the first overt act of the war was its invasion 
by the German army — a mighty host of gray-green troops, the 
sun glancing from their bayonets. On they came — company 
after company, regiment after regiment, hundreds of thousands 



TllK OUTBREAK 5 

of them, a line apparently without end, hours passing a given ])()int, 
days marching through any single city ; always marching, marching 
to the shrill music of the fifes, the rattle of the drums, the tramp, 
tramp of iron-shod boots on the pavements. On they came, — 
Bavarians in dark blue, Saxons in light blue, Austrians in beauti- 
ful silver and gray, Prussians in gray-green. 

Why should there be Germans in Belgium because an Austrian 
Archduke had been murdered, because Russia had mobilized her 
army? The reason given by the Austrians for the outbreak of 
the war was a fiction. It did not begin because the Archduke was 
killed nor because the Russians prepared their army for war. It was 
not begun by Germany and Austria in self-defense. Months be- 
fore the murder of the Archduke the war had been decided upon. 
We know it from official documents and from the testimony of the 
men who knew. The decision was reached in April or May, 1914, 
if not earlier. The first preparations came in May and June. The 
murder of the Archduke on June 28 was employed as the best 
excuse they could find for beginning the war in the way most 
favorable for them. The Germans began an unprovoked war. 
Its causes lay deep in German and European history and life. 



CHAPTER II 

THE CAUSES OF THE WAR 

The true fundamental cause of the war was a belief in German 
national superiority. They were better ; therefore they deserved 
more ; being better, they ought easily to be able to get more, even 
if it were necessary to get it with the sword. They believed that 
they understood better than any other nation how to live, how to 
govern, how to manufacture, how to write music, paint pictures, 
clean streets, or grow potatoes. The word Kultur covered every- 
thing. The whole process of life was clearer to them than to others, 
they thought, and hence they were able to organize the community 
better, and to make more progress in industry, agriculture, the fine 
arts, in government itself. As the Kaiser declared, " The German 
people will be the granite block on which the good God will build 
and complete his work of culture in the world." Another im- 
portant German said, "The German race — there can be no doubt 
of it — because of its nature and character, was designed by 
Providence to solve the great problem of directing the affairs 
of the whole world, of civilizing the savage and barbarous coun- 
tries and of populating those which are still uninhabited." 

Upon Germany, then, depended the fate of civilization itself! 
Without Germany civilization was lost. As Treitschke, one of 
their great historians, said, " The greatness and good of the world is 
to be found in the predominance there of German Kultur." Must 
not Germany then be a nation of people, powerful enough to defend 
this Kultur upon which the whole future of the world depended, 

6 



THE CAUSES OF THE WAR 7 

strong enough to spread it to the nations that did not already 
have it? "Germany should civilize and Germanize the world, 
and the German language will become the world language." 

The Germans must also develop their idea of civilization. "The 
German race is called by God to bring the earth under its control." 
To make their civilization permanent, they must make Germany 
powerful. "We intend to become a world power that will overtop 
other world powers so greatly that Germany will be the only real 
world power." Germany must be made the most powerful, the most 
wealthy, the largest, and the most important country in the world. 

But it was very clear to the Germans long ago that Germany was 
not the most powerful country in the world, nor as rich as others, 
nor indeed as well situated as others to become either rich or power- 
ful. She was not able to control the world ; she was not strong 
enough to control even her own destinies. The thought galled 
them inexpressibly. They could not longer endure it. Germany 
must have her Place in the Sun ; she must become a power on the 
sea ; she must have colonies ; she must have everything that 
any other nation had ; she must have more than other nations had. 

All this, certainly, other nations would not yield without force ; 
so much the Germans knew. But if they must have it, if God 
meant them to have it, they should therefore get it as best they 
could and as soon as possible. They must conquer in war the 
nations who refused to recognize what Germany must have. The 
Crown Prince wrote, "It is only by relying on our good German 
sword that we can hope to conquer that Place in the Sun which 
rightly belongs to us and which no one will yield to us voluntarily." 

And what now was Germany's position, about which they com- 
plained so bitterly? Europe is a small continent compared with 
America, Africa, or Asia, but in it live more large nations of people 
than in any of the other continents except Asia. Germany herself 



8 



THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 



had some seventy millions, Austria nearly sixty, Great Britain forty- 
five, France forty, Russia one hundred and eighty millions. Tf wc 




An Illustration of the German War Horse in "Our Holy War," 1914. 
excellent example of the pictorial attempt to rouse the German people. 



An 



leave out Russia, we find these other big nations all crowded 
into an area nothing like as large as the United States and with 
about three times as many people. The land in Europe, therefore, 



THE CAUSES OF THE WAR 9 

was all occupied ; there were already too many people to live 
there prosperously and happily. But Germany was growing very 
fast in numbers, and, if she was to promote Kultur as the Germans 
planned, the population must increase at a still faster rate. She 
must grow also in wealth ; her people must make more to sell, so 
that they might have more with which to buy. But Germany 
could not continue to grow larger without making her people 
poorer. 

One of two things must happen. The surplus people might leave 
Germany and go elsewhere to live, just as many Germans had 
already come to the United States. They would then cease to 
live in Germany and would therefore cease to be a part of the true 
nation, however much they might still feel that they were Germans. 
This was not thinkable. The alternative was that all Germans 
must stay in the Fatherland, which must be made a place where 
all living Germans and all that would be born for an indefinite 
number of years could live in prosperity and happiness. This 
could be arranged only by an astounding development of manufac- 
turing, of commerce, and of colonies. 

But Germany did not have herself any supply of the most im- 
portant raw materials. Clothes cannot be made without wool or 
cotton, and the Germans had no supply of either. Most kinds of 
machinery could not be made without copper and various metals 
of which the Germans had only a very small supply or none at all. 
Electricity plays a very important part in modern life and requires 
a great deal of rubber ; the Germans had none. Gasoline for auto- 
mobiles ; kerosene for lamps and stoves ; and all sorts of petroleum 
products are imperative to prosperity and comfort. But Germany 
had no wells of oil. Without those and a good many other things, 
profitable manufacturing and prosperous living could not be con- 
tinued. 



10 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

And the Germans still lacked customers to whom they should 
sell the new goods they were to make. If they were to make more 
and more goods every succeeding year, they must sell more and 
more each year, and they could not sell any such increase in 
Germany. Customers they found in France, England, the United 
States, South America, Asia. But how could they be sure they 
would continue to buy? Raw materials they found at long 
distances from Germany. Cotton, copper, and oil came from the 
United States, rubber from South America, wool from Australia. 
How could they be sure the supply would continue to arrive ? 

To reach both raw materials and customers, the Germans must 
cross the ocean. Ships must take their exports out and ships must 
bring imports back. Yet neither Germany nor Austria was placed 
on the ocean itself. The greater part of the German sea coast was 
on the Baltic Sea, which had a very narrow entrance controlled by 
Denmark. While there were many rivers in Germany, only one 
flowed into the North Sea, or what the Germans call the German 
Ocean, and Germany had only one good harbor, Hamburg. The 
river Rhine was a very great German river, but it was controlled by 
Holland. The German railroad system, which connected German 
trade with the rest of Europe, really centered in Belgium. All 
German trade, therefore, found itself a long way from its ultimate 
market. 

Other nations were in a position to prevent the Germans from us- 
ing the sea and thus could stop the stream of raw materials into Ger- 
many and of manufactured goods out. Those German ships which 
must go through the Baltic might meet opposition from Russia. 
All German ships must go through the English Channel, controlled 
by England on one side and by the French, Belgian, and Dutch 
coasts on the other side. The Germans had no coast on the 
Channel and no harbor there. 



THE CAUSES OF THE WAR H 

When the German ships got into the open ocean, they found it 
controlled by the British navy. Being the largest fleet, it con- 
trolled as well all water highways which German ships must take 
going to America, South America, and Asia. If they wished to go 
through the Mediterranean, they found it in the hands of the British 
and the French, and the Suez Canal, through which ships going 
to India and China passed into the Red Sea, was held by Great 
Britain. If they sailed around Africa, they found the Cape of 
Good Hope controlled by the British. If they went to the Gulf of 
Mexico, they found the Panama Canal owned by the United 
States. No water routes which the Germans must use to reach 
the necessary raw materials or their own customers were within 
German control. 

But were the Germans unable to get raw materials in these coun- 
tries or to sell to customers in England or in America, in India or in 
South America? Did any German ships ever fail to get through 
the English Channel or to reach a port across the Atlantic because 
of opposition from the British, the French, or the Americans? 
The Germans never claimed that any such case had occurred. Ger- 
man ships sailed where they pleased; Germans had customers in 
every country in the world, and they had never sold so many goods 
as in the ten years before the war. They were doing proportion- 
ately more business in fact than any other nation. 

Where then was the trouble? What were they complaining 
about ? They said that the nations who did control the sea and its 
approaches might close it and might refuse to let German ships go 
through. The British might close the Suez Canal, or the United 
States might refuse the Germans the use of the Panama Canal. 
The British might close the English Channel, and the Germans 
would not be able to go around the British Isles because there were 
so many rocks and storms that a ship was almost certain to be 



12 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

wrecked. Their customers in these nations might also refuse 
to buy German goods, not because they did not want the goods 
but because they wished to hurt Germany. The fact that Ger- 
many was great, that other nations were jealous of her civilization 
and did not wish to be taught by Germany how they ought to live, 
would cause them to injure Germany by refusing to sell to her raw 
materials or to buy of her manufactured goods or by closing the seas. 
The Germans must therefore create a situation which would make 
it impossible for any nation or any number of nations to prevent 
Germany from getting as many raw materials as she wanted or 
from selling as many goods as she could make. Germany must 
not depend upon the good will of other nations nor conduct a trade 
which others had it in their power to stop. 

The difficulty was that in Europe Germany had enemies. There 
were many people, the Germans felt, who hated them. They were 
surrounded by enemies. There was France on the west, and Rus- 
sia on the east. South of Austria-Hungary was Italy. Beyond 
the Channel were the British Isles. See, implored the Germans, we 
lie between two enemies. On one side is France, whom we defeated 
in the war of 1870 and from whom we took Alsace-Lorraine, for 
which the French have ever since longed to revenge themselves 
on us. Then on the other side is Russia, millions of people oc- 
cupying a huge country, with vast resources. How can we cope 
with both France and Russia ? 

We have, they complained, no frontiers to defend us, no moun- 
tains to stand between us and the Russians and the French, no 
deep rivers which they cannot cross. Germany lacks a defensive 
frontier. The only protection we have is the German army, and if 
we should be attacked on both sides at once, we probably could not 
defend ourselves at all. 

The Germans therefore took extended measures to deal with this 



THE CAUSES OF THE WAR 



13 




14 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

peril which they believed menaced them in Europe. They made an 
alliance with Austria and Italy that was to provide them with help 
in case either France or Russia should attack them, for then Italy 
would attack France and Austria would attack Russia.^ Of course 
they also agreed that if Russia attacked Austria or France attacked 
Italy, they would help in their turn. But they were more con- 
cerned about themselves than they were about others. They 
built a great fleet of merchant ships so that goods going to Germany 
might not wait on the shore somewhere for transportation because 
the British refused to carry them in their ships. They then 
built a great navy literally to frighten the British and prevent 
them from closing the English Channel, the Mediterranean Sea, 
or the various ocean roads which the German ships followed. 

They then concluded that a country to be great must have colo- 
nies. They had established long ago a few in Africa and some in the 
Pacific, but had failed to make money out of them, or to find them 
valuable customers. They must create a great colony which would 
provide not merely customers but also raw materials and which 
would not be open to attack from the sea. The British fleet was 
so large and so capable that the Germans were afraid they might 
never be able to defeat it. Hence they must locate their colony 

1 This was the Triple AlHance, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy, 
first made in 1883 and ruptured by Italy at the outbreak of the war in August, 
1914, pursuant of reservations made by the Italians at the outset. It was 
followed by the Dual Alliance of France and Russia in 1892 ; by the Anglo- 
French Entente of 1904 ; and by the Triple Entente of France, Great Britain, 
and Russia of 1907. An alliance is a written engagement ; an entente is an 
informal understanding, the vital portions of which are commonly verbal ; 
the terms of an alliance are precise, those of an entente vague ; the alliance 
binds the nations under certain conditions, the entente is subject to further 
agreement before it is operative. Neither term, Triple Alliance or Triple 
Entente, was used during the war period, for the former at once became some- 
thing less and the latter something more. 



THE CAUSES OF THE WAR 15 

in some place which they could reach by land and which the British 
could not reach by sea. 

They selected Mesopotamia. There had been some of the great- 
est empires of history ; there some of the wealthiest of peoples had 
lived ; there should rise a New Germany. They thought that they 
might raise cotton, grow wool, and perhaps cultivate rubber. 
Petroleum existed there and copper they would find in the moun- 
tains. There too was room for millions of Germans to settle and 
create a community which would produce for sale in Germany what 
Germans wished to buy and which would buy from Germany what 
the latter made and wished to sell. 

And it was out of the reach of the British fleet ! The Germans 
themselves would reach it by means of the Bagdad Railroad. This 
would run from Berlin to Vienna, down through the mountains to 
Constantinople, and then through Asia Minor to Bagdad. It 
would provide them w^th transportation. But they must not 
forget to protect it. Bagdad was a long distance from Berlin and 
the railroad passed through many countries which the Germans 
did not control. The British fleet, too, might land troops in Syria, 
a very short distance from the railroad and Bagdad — and Berlin 
and the German army would be too far away to help. A new 
state must be created to protect the railroad and the new colony, a 
federated state created out of many states. Austria would be an 
all-important part ; Turkey too must become an ally of Germany 
and a part of the new state, for the Turks owned the territory 
in which Mesopotamia was situated and most of the territory 
through which the railroad ran after leaving Germany and Austria, 
But there were two states between Austria and Turkey, Bulgaria, 
with whose king the Germans and Austrians easily made an alliance, 
and Serbia. But Serbia declined their offers. Pleading, urging, 
threatening failed. To control the section of the railroad that 



16 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

ran through Serbia, Austria must seize Serbia itself. They must 
have Serbia. They must control Belgrade and the crossing of the 
Danube. So Serbians feared and hated Austria ; so men could be- 
lieve in 1914 that a Serbian would kill the Austrian Archduke. 

These alliances and conquests once complete, a great empire 
would have been created, strong enough to be independent of 
Europe and of the rest of the world, strong enough perhaps to dom- 
inate the rest of the world without having to conquer it. For the 
Germans truthfully said that they would prefer not to be compelled 
to conquer the world in order to Germanize it. This great empire 
would also be able, they thought, to destroy the British Empire. 
A land attack on the Suez Canal would deprive the British of their 
connection by sea with India and Australia, and compel them to go 
around Africa. Meanwhile, the Germans themselves would pro- 
ceed by land along the Persian Gulf, reach India first, and conquer 
it. They even thought that they might afterwards conquer the 
whole of Asia. This is the true Pan-Germanism. It began with 
an attempt to keep German those who left Germany and went to 
live in other countries like the United States ; hence the name, All- 
Germans, meaning that all Germans in all parts of the world should 
stay together and cooperate with one another. But the plan 
grew from that quite simple idea into this vast scheme of world 
conquest and dominion. 



CHAPTER III 

THE LESSON OF PRUSSIAN HISTORY 

It is quite as significant to see wli}- the Germans felt that they 
could change the balance of power in the world as it is to appre- 
ciate the extent and meaning of the scheme itself. They meant 
in effect to deprive other nations, without their consent, of territory, 
of influence in the world, of the practical right to decide the 
conditions of life in their own countries. No conqueror of an- 
tiquity had ever attempted to accomplish so much. Not even the 
great Napoleon in more modern times sketched out such an ambi- 
tious plan. But the Germans were convinced that it was feasible 
and the fact which convinced them was nothing less than the 
history of Prussia. 

There is no more dramatic story in the world's annals. A tiny 
state, surrounded by powerful and hostile neighbors, somehow 
survived them all, absorbed several of them, and succeeded in 
dominating northern Europe. The rapid rise of Prussia con- 
vinced the Germans that they might accomplish anything. 
Consequently Germany challenged the world itself in 1914 and 
held out for more than four years before she was beaten. The 
first troops who went to Belgium wrote with chalk on the doors 
of the railroad carriages, "William II, Emperor of the World." 
There was the true German touch. 

We have only to go back in imagination to a time when America 
was not yet discovered to see in northern Germany the tiny state 
of Brandenburg, so small and unimportant that it was conferred 
c 17 



18 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

by the Holy Roman Emperor upon a certain prince of Hohen- 
zoUern. This was in the thirteenth century and for four centuries 
the growth of this state was very gradual. Then, about the time 
when a good many English people came to New England and there 
began to be something resembling civilization here, the Great 
Elector (1640-1688) became the ruler of Brandenburg. A remark- 
able man with insight and executive ability, he analyzed the 
position of his state and its problems and defined Prussian policy 
for his successors. It was a small state, and because there was no 
more land, only a few people could live on it compared with the 
population of the neighboring hostile states. The soil was poor 
in quality, and as agriculture was then the main occupation of 
European countries the people themselves were poor. This small 
area of poor land was in the middle of a plain, no mountains sur- 
rounded it, no deep rivers protected it from invasion. Sweden 
and Poland on the north and east. Saxony and Austria on the 
south, France in the west were large, hostile, and aggressive. 

To defend such a state, the Great Elector concluded every man 
must become a soldier and that the whole life of the country must 
be organized around the army. The entire physical force of the 
little state might conceivably defend it; its entire economic 
strength might sustain its army ; nothing less could possibly suffice. 
The population was small and its resources relatively' so inadequate 
that nothing but the most complete utilization of both could pro- 
vide it with security. 

The only real solution of the country's future was growth — 
not in wisdom but in size. For even at that relatively remote 
period the beginning of Prussian national conceit was apparent. 
There must be more land, so that there might be more people, 
and more people so that there might be more soldiers in the army. 
More land meant more food for more soldiers and so it must go 



20 THE STORY OF THE GKEAT WAR 

on. More land, more men, more food, more soldiers. The 
better and stronger the army, the more land could be captured, 
and, as the physical strength of the state increased, its chances of 
growing still larger would be correspondingly better. It must 
fight for existence. It could only survive if it conquered its 
neighbors. 

The land to be conquered was necessarily that occupied by 
friends and rivals of Brandenburg; waste land ther'e was none. 
To all of the surrounding states the Elector was bound by treaties, 
agreements, promises, avowed or implicit. The country could 
grow only at the expense of others, only in defiance of the rights of 
others, and, it might be, only by breaking explicit treaties and 
promises. To accept such a principle as the binding character 
of treaties was to accept the limitations of Prussia's position and 
to renounce all plans for growth and security. This to Prussian 
kings has been unthinkable. The safety of the state was greater 
than the obligation of any written agreement. It was unfortunate 
but unavoidable. 

The other principle which the Great Elector laid down as the 
result of the experience of his predecessors was the necessity of 
offensive campaigns by his army. He must never wait to be 
attacked. A successful defense in the absence of geographical 
frontiers could only be conducted on foreign territory. To 
allow the enemy to begin the war was to be defeated before the 
war began. Even, therefore, in a purely defensive war, his armies 
must take the offensive if possible. 

The Great Elector had the ability and the opportunity to 
apply these principles. He organized his estates, built up a 
competent army, systematized taxation and administration, and 
increased more than considerably the area of his state. His 
successors continued to tread the path he had mapped out for 



THE LESSON OF PRUSSIAN HISTORY 21 

them. In 1701, the title King of Prussia was assumed. They had 
been kings in Prussia for a century and more but only Electors 
in Germany and they wished now to have the title of King in 
Germany. Brandenburg is not Prussia, for Prussia proper is 
located far to the east along the Baltic, nor are the people of 
present Prussia the Prussians in a historical sense. 

Then came to the throne in 1740 Frederick the Great, who 
reigned until the year before the adoption of the Constitution of the 
United States. The Great Elector had left Prussia in three 
pieces — one around Berlin, Prussia itself, some distance to the 
east with Poland in between, and far off in the west along the 
Rhine, two or three tiny bits of territory. The object of his 
successors was simple in the extreme : to tie those pieces together 
by getting the land in between. Frederick the Great tied Prussia 
and Brandenburg together and added to the south the very large 
and rich district of Silesia. The Napoleonic wars worked havoc 
with Prussia but in the end at the Treaty of Vienna Prussia was 
strengthened and gi^'en territory on the south from Saxony and in 
the west from Holland and smaller German states. 

After a period of slow and quiet growth and apparent humility, 
there came to power Bismarck, one of the ablest of all German 
statesmen. He undertook to unite all Germany around Prussia, 
and if necessary was ready to conquer Germany in order to compel 
it to act in concert with Prussia. Scarcely anything in history 
ever seemed to the people who lived through it more like a tale 
of the Arabian nights, like the rubbing of some lamp or the turning 
of some ring, than the growth in a moment of a great state and the 
creation of the German empire. 

When Bismarck came to power, Prussia was reputed the weakest 
of the European powers, the least able, the least dangerous, the 
least well organized. Disraeli declared it ripe for partition. 



22 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

She had been humihated by Austria repeatedly and it used to be 
said that it was idle to ask questions about Prussian policy in 
Berlin ; one must go to Paris or Vienna for information. Appar- 
ently Prussia was hated and distrusted by the other German 
states ; she lacked access to the Atlantic ; her industrial develop- 
ment was rudimentary, and the poverty of the people great. 

Within ten years, the situation had been revolutionized. Aus- 
tria had been excluded from Germany by a rapid and successful 
campaign, and compelled to recognize the reorganization of 
Germany by Prussia in Prussian fashion. For a thousand years, 
Austria had been the most important German state. In 1850 
it had seemed as if she might remain the most important for at 
least a century, and in 1866 she was excluded from Germany by 
force. At that same time the northern German states, who refused 
to come to terms with Prussia by agreement, were practically 
conquered and compelled to join the North German Confederation. 
Prussia took possession of Kiel, Hamburg, and the mouth of the 
Elbe, and laid the foundation of future naval power and commercial 
development. In 1870 war was accepted with what was supposed 
to be the most powerful and formidable nation in Europe, an 
overwhelming victory was won, and an enormous money indem- 
nity was extorted. The offensive strategic position in Europe — 
Alsace-Lorraine — was taken from France and annexed to Germany, 
and the German Empire, uniting all German states under one 
extremely powerful and autocratic government, was created. In 
1861 Prussia was hardly considered a great power. In 1871, the 
German Empire w^as clearly the arbiter of the destiny of Europe 
and likely to remain so, men thought, for half a century. There 
was the miracle which astounded the world, which thrilled the 
German people and gave them, for the first time in a century, 
supreme confidence in their strength and capacity. Then began 



THE LESSON OF PRUSSIAN HISTORY 23 

the talk of German destiny to rule the world, of German su- 
premacy, of super-man, of the superiority of Kultur over all other 
ideas of civilization. 

Then followed a miracle almost greater. The lamp was rubbed 
a second time, and lo ! the German state, already powerful and 
feared, became wealthy. Ever since the Thirty Years' War, 
Germany as a whole had been poor, collectively and individually, 
and now came wealth. The railroads, the new machinery, now 
introduced into Germany systematically, compulsory education, 
all directed and developed by Bismarck, pushed Germany ahead 
in economic growth at a pace which was literally marvelous. 
The goods produced doubled and trebled in volume and value, 
and doubled again. The yield of farms doubled and doubled 
again. German ships weighed down the ocean. Presently, the 
German navy became formidable. German commerce, once 
scarcely known outside of Europe itself, now reached to the very 
confines of the globe. Had not the despised stone become the 
head of the corner? Had not the downtrodden become the 
favored of God? Did not such achievements demonstrate to 
the naked eye and the dullest brain the latent force in the German 
people? The extraordinary potency of their political and in- 
dividual formula? What was left to be done? Was there any- 
thing left that could be done worthy of such a people who had 
achieved within the lifetime of a single generation such a political, 
diplomatic, economic transformation? 

The result consecrated the method. The army had made 
possible the war w^ith Austria and German unity; it had made 
possible the war with France and the domination of Europe. The 
two had fathered the economic development and made possible 
national wealth. The Empire was an autocratic militaristic 
government which did in truth cramp and fetter the individual. 



24 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

which led rather than followed. But had it not led to a purpose, 
had it not achieved that end dearest to German hearts? 

Bismarck had at first been opposed by the all but unanimous 
opinion of the Prussian people ; he had pushed forward his plans 
despite them ; he had worked in secret but his achievements had 
been public and the end had been glorious. The people became 
accustomed to the idea that they would not understand all that 
transpired, that they might never know at any time what the 
state planned to accomplish. They came to feel that it was not 
wise to ask to know ; better far to accept the guidance of the men 
who had achieved so much, better to obey without question. 
They shuddered to think of what might have happened during the 
sixties as a result of the acceptance by Bismarck of the opinions 
they had then held. 

This attitude of the German people toward the German govern- 
ment made easy the planning of Pan-Germanism, guaranteed its 
acceptance by the people in advance without examination of its 
merits. The result of the previous generations' success made it a 
foregone conclusion that the German people would believe what 
was told them from Berlin ; would accept the version of European 
politics which the state provided. 

England, they were told in the schools, in magazines, in news- 
papers, and novels, was a hateful, hostile enemy doing its best to 
strangle Germany. France was better but faithless, always 
ready to undertake a war of revenge to recover Alsace-Lorraine. 
Russia was dangerous because of her size, but to be despised for 
her stupidity and incompetence. The real text was the greatness 
of Germany, the mission of Kultur, contempt for the rest of man- 
kind, and the contention that the other nations of Europe were 
leagued together to destroy the results of Bismarck's success, to con- 
quer Germany, cramp her, make her poor and humble once more. 



THE LESSON OF PRUSSIAN HISTORY 25 

Indeed, Germany had accomplished so much wliich was clearly 
contrary to the rights of others that the Germans became sus- 
picious of all their neighbors. In every international event they 
saw subtle schemes to undo their greatness, but most of all they 
visited their hatred and suspicion upon England. She, most of 
all, they felt would gain by their downfall and by the ending of 
their era of prosperity. Soon after the war broke out a common 
method of greeting in Germany was the phrase "God punish 
England." And a chant of hate was written which was sung and 
recited with extraordinary demonstrations of approval at public 
meetings and theaters. 

French and Russian, they matter not, 
A blow for a blow and a shot for a shot ; 
We love them not, we hate them not, 
We hold the Weichsel and Vosges-gate, 
We have but one and only hate, 
We love as one, we hate as one, 
We have one foe and one alone. 

He is known to you all, he is known to you all, 

He crouches behind the dark gray flood, 

Full of envy, of rage, of craft, of gall. 

Cut off by waves that are thicker than blood. 

Come let us stand at the Judgment place, 

An oath to swear to, face to face. 

An oath of bronze no wind can shake, 

An oath for our sons and their sons to take. 

Come, hear the word, repeat the word. 
Throughout the Fatherland make it heard. 
We will never forego our hate, 
We have all but a single hate. 
We love as one, we hate as one, 
We have one foe and one alone — 
England 1 



26 



THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 




Hate : 



German Illustration for the Song of Hate, Published in "Our Holt 
War," in 1914 



In the Captain's Mess, in banquet-hall, 
Sat feasting the officers, one and all. 
Like a saber-blow, like the swing of a sail, 
One seized his glass held high to hail ; 



THE LESSON OF PRUSSIAN HISTORY 27 

Sharp-snapped like the stroke of a rudder's play, 
Spoke three words only : "To the Day ! " 

Whose glass this fate ? 
They had all but a single hate. 
Who was thus known ? 
They had one foe and one alone — 
England ! 

Take you the folk of the Earth in pay, 
With bars of gold your ramparts lay, 
Bedeck the ocean with bow on bow, 
Ye reckon well, but not well enough now. 
French and Russian they matter not, 
A blow for a blow, a shot for a shot, 
We fight the battle with bronze and steel, 
And the time that is coming Peace will seal. 
You will we hate with a lasting hate, 
We will never forego our hate, 
Hate by water and hate by land. 
Hate of the head and hate of the hand, 
Hate of the hammer and hate of tlie crown. 
Hate of seventy millions, choking down. 
We love as one, we hate as one. 
We have one foe and one alone — 
England ! 



2S 



THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 




CHAPTER IV 

THE (iEKMAN PREPARATIONS FOR WAR 

When the Germans had planned an aggressive war against 
France and Russia with the eventual object of crushing England, 
they knew at the outset that they must make such complete prep- 
arations that they would be sure to win. To fail would be the 
greatest catastrophe in German history. They simply must not 
fail. They must therefore calculate' upon meeting the worst 
possible circumstances ; they must prepare for every possible 
contingency ; they must be as ready as their enemies were unready. 
They must begin the war at the moment most advantageous to 
them and most disadvantageous to their enemies. And they 
must strike the first blow. 

The guarantee of victory was to be the superiority of German 
organization for war and must be the product of foresight and 
long years of preparation. All Germans must be made into 
soldiers, and all soldiers must be equipped with everything that 
could be thought of. They must be thoroughly trained in all the 
things that it might become essential for them to do. An army 
could not be made in a hurry, the Germans claimed, and it would 
therefore take a generation to get ready. That very fact would 
make them sure to win, because if their enemies must take as 
long a time to prepare, they would be crushed before their prep- 
aration had been begun. 

They trained their men to stand the fatigue of long, forced 
marches, for they knew that only men who had gone through 

29 



30 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

extreme fatigue many times would ever be able to execute the 
sort of a movement on Paris with which they intended to begin 
the war. Artillery and infantry practiced marksmanship without 
ceasing, and the cost was enormous, but they did not propose to 
have the army learn how to shoot after the war began. Every 
pleasure automobile and taxi-cab made in Germany had the holes 
ready bored in its chassis for the changes necessary to transform 
it into a military auto ; its new equipment had been prepared ; 
and its owner and chauffeur had at all times instructions exactly 
where to take it the moment a certain order was issued. 

There would be no time to waste when this aggressive war was 
launched. For every gun put into array use, a duplicate was made 
and put in the reserve ; for every rifle were made so many thou- 
sands of extra rounds of ammunition ; for every soldier so many 
extra uniforms and pairs of shoes. Germany must be ready to 
begin the war with a rush, but she must not count on ending it 
at the outset. She must be as well prepared with the material 
means of continuing it indefinitely as with those for beginning it 
instantaneously . 

Knowing in advance that they were to fight a war with France 
and with Russia, the High Command decided in advance which 
officers should lead the troops and then sent men like Hindenburg 
to study the geography of Poland and men like Von Kluck to 
study the geography of France. These men could not of course 
travel as military officers, but the French noticed great numbers 
of German tourists walking through the country, large numbers of 
German artists making sketches of the French country, Germans 
with cameras taking pictures of hills, trees, and rivers. We know 
what they were doing. Some of them were generals planning 
their campaigns. Others were artillery officers making the 
calculations which should tell them exactly how to hit certain 



THE GERMAN PREPARATIONS FOR WAR 31 

objects with their great guns when the time came. Others were 
infantry officers who were going to lead their troops across that 
country. 

Quite as important as the complete preparation of the German 
army would be exhaustive knowledge about the armies of possible 
enemies. In Berlin they should know more about the French 
army than was known in Paris, more about the English army than 
was known in London, more about the Russians than the Tsar's 
own generals knew. They proposed to learn exactly who the 
officers of these various armies were, what had been their training, 
their probable ability. They knew how many more might be 
enlisted. They not only made lists of the factories making war 
materials, but also of the factories that might be transformed 
at the outbreak of the war for that purpose, and the volume of 
output which they could probably turn out in any given period. 

Then skilled workmen would be needed. How many were 
already skilled in France, England, or Russia in making war 
materials ; how many might become skilled ; how long would it 
take to train them ? They must thus find out in advance just 
how great a force the German arm}' would be likely to meet in 
the first week of the war, what in the first month, and what in 
every succeeding month or year. They could then compute the 
exact size of a German army needed to insure victory. Victory 
would not be a matter of chance ; it would be a mathematical 
calculation, and, if only the work were well done, it ought to be 
infallible. 

They would then provide at the elbow of every British, French, 
and Russian general an invisible soldier of the German Empire. 
In the Councils of the French Premier and of the British Ministry 
there should be an invisible Councillor of the German nation. 
These were spies, men who were not known to be in German pay, 



32 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

selected with the utmost care so that they might send on to Berlin 
regularly the plans of Germany's enemies. Thus the German 
leaders would always know what was going on elsewhere, whom 
they must meet, what was being done to offset their plans. If 
possible, the spies should steal important military and naval 
secrets. If a great battleship was being built by the British, they 
must find out just what its construction would be and if possible 
get the plans. Should the French invent something, some spy 
must be detailed to steal the secret. 

The cleverness of these spies and the elaborate system which 
they devised was extraordinary. In order to prevent them from 
betraying each other, each man knew only the man above him 
and the man below him in the chain. If one man, therefore, was 
caught, or sold what he knew, he could not tell much. The men 
at the top were known to so few and the few were so very carefully 
chosen that betrayal was not possible. There were German 
spies, therefore, to be found in the greatest houses in France and 
England, in the confidential councils of the state, in the army, in 
the navy, and in business houses. Fashionable men and women 
were paid to pick up conversation in London and Paris drawing 
rooms. 

The methods of reporting were extremely complicated. Most 
of the German spies operated as business agents and would write 
a letter to some German firm ordering a certain number of steam 
engines or so many dozen dishes. A hundred dinner plates might 
mean that one hundred guns were being made in a certain place. 
An extremely cle\'er letter was constructed by drawing a straight 
line from one corner of the paper to the other, making a cross. 
On each one of the lines was written a word and in the middle was 
written a fifth word. The five together made the message. Then 
around those five an innocent letter was written dealing with 



THE GERMAN PUEPARATIONS FOR WAR 33 

something else. Invisible ink was also used to write between 
the lines of letters. 

One clever spy, who had stolen a long report about French 
preparations during the war, was puzzled to know how to get that 
report back to Germany. She knew she would be searched, that 
every scrap of paper she had would be taken away from her, tested, 
and probably destroyed, and every object she had would be 
examined in the most thorough way. One thing only was safe. 
She was posing as a Swiss citizen returning home, and the French 
government had given her a passport to let her through the lines. 
The passport they would have to leave with her. She therefore 
copied the document she had stolen in invisible ink between the lines 
of her own passport. But the French were as clever as she. They 
put the passport into a bath of chemical to find out whether she had 
done precisely that trick, and the lady finished the war in prison. 

It became indeed so difficult for the German spies to conceal 
what they were doing that they began to write upon the back of 
the spy in invisible ink messages too long to be learned. The 
Allied searchers could then take every scrap of his clothing off, 
burn all his papers, and the message would still go through. But 
they soon began to give suspected people baths of chemical, 
which brought out the invisible ink. So that failed, too. 

The Germans thought nothing of going to the trouble of planting 
a man and his family in a place where they wanted a spy, of 
creating a business for him and having him live there for ten or 
fifteen years without spying on any one or reporting anything. 
This was frequently done in the United States and more commonly 
in France. By that time they calculated that any possible suspi- 
cions the police might have about him would have been thoroughly 
dispelled by the simple fact that he had done absolutely nothing. 
Then he would begin his series of reports to Berlin. 



34 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

They also realized that if he were to have visits from particular 
individuals at stated intervals, or if he saw certain strangers from 
time to time it might attract attention, and they therefore pro- 
vided that the reports should not be sent by mail, and never to 
any one individual. On a certain day the spy would go down to 
the railroad station and take a train for some other place, indicated 
in advance. He would there get off his train. Presentl}^ another 
train would come in from some other place and a man would get 
off of it, never the same man, never coming from the same place. 
Sometimes the man who was making the report would drop a 
newspaper, walk away, and the other man would pick it up. 
Sometimes he would secretly hand him a letter. Again he would 
merely shake hands with him and exchange a few words anybody 
could overhear but which contained the secret message. Thanks 
to these spies, to the cleverness of this system, the Germans did 
get an immense amount of information about the nations with 
which they went to war, which did make it easy for them to 
prepare, and which did make it difficult for the French, the Bel- 
gians, the English, the Russians, yes, and the Americans, too, to 
resist the German attack. There seems to be no doubt that there 
were as many German spies in America as there were in France. 

The Germans now applied to their own people and to their own 
resources the same methods they had applied to their enemies and 
catalogued every man, woman, and child in Germany, found out 
what they could do to help the war, and taught them how to do 
it. They listed all the horses, cows, and pigs in Germany ; every 
acre of land and what could be raised upon it ; all the mines from 
which metals could be gotten for making guns. If they knew 
something was going to be needed when the war broke out, they 
created a factory to make it, appointed men to work in it, collected 
the raw materials it would need. 



THE GERMAN PREPARATIONS FOR WAR 35 

All this was imperative. If they went to war with Great Britain 
— and they must prepare for that emergency, however much they 
might hope she might not join in the war — the British fleet would 
probably blockade Germany and prevent her from getting supplies 
of all sorts from the outside world. Germany must therefore be 
ready to produce all the food, all the guns, clothes, shoes, and 
everything else that the army or the people at home might need 
during the war. They must be ready to keep up the war in- 
definitely. 

They thought it would not be a long war, but if they planned 
to fight a short war and made preparations for that only and then 
something went wrong, and the war lasted a little longer than they 
had planned, they would lose it simply because of that error in 
calculation. There must not be any error. There must be food 
to eat as well as guns to shoot with. There must be enough 
horses to draw the plow or machinery to do the plowing in their 
stead, as there must be enough horses to draw the cannon. They 
must have cattle and chickens because they must have milk 
and eggs. 

To be sure, they did not imagine that the British fleet could 
blockade Germany effectively. They expected to smuggle in a 
great deal of material through Holland, Denmark, and Sweden, 
and for a long time they did. But the British and the French 
protested to the Dutch and the Danes about this smuggling, and 
compelled investigation. The steamers, sailing from Holland up 
the Rhine into Germany, had the space between walls of the state- 
rooms filled with rubber, copper, and medicines. The cushions 
on the window seats were filled with raw cotton, and the life 
preservers had had the cork taken out of them and had been filled 
up with rubber. The life boats on the ship all had compart- 
ments which were meant to make them float even if they upset. 



36 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

The flooring had been taken up and the compartments had been 
filled up with things valuable to Germany. Down in the hold 
even what looked to be great piles of coal, were really great piles 
of copper with a little coal on top, just enough to get the ship to 
Germany. 

The Germans also calculated that much of importance could be 
done toward winning the w'ar by their spies in England, France, 
Russia, and the United States. They did corrupt a number of 
high officials in Russia, The Minister of War himself at o'ne time 
was in German pay and saw to it that the food was sent where it 
did not belong, that the guns went to one division and the ammuni- 
tion to another, that the left shoes went to one place and the right 
to another, so that it was not possible in some cases to fight the 
campaign for lack of material. Officers were also bought who 
directed the Russian artillery so that it killed Russians instead of 
Germans. Regiments were sent out to attack the German lines, 
no aid was sent to them, and they were all killed. 

In France and in Great Britain considerable attempts were made 
to blow up factories and to create strikes so that the British and 
French should not be able to prepare. In America, in particular, 
where many contracts were made as soon as the war broke out to 
make munitions for the British and French, German agents created 
strikes or spoiled the shells and rifles. Ammunition was made 
just too large to fit the guns or the shell was arranged so as not to 
explode or so as to explode too soon. Agents in the Red Cross 
workrooms put poison and powdered glass into bandages, and 
others in the factories where food was canned put poison into the 
cans just before they were sealed. All this was planned before 
the war broke out and made the authorities in Berlin very sure 
that they were going to win. 

This forty years of preparation and the character of the prep- 



THE GERMAN PREPARATIONS FOR WAR 37 

arations Is the best proof that tlie Germans meant to begin an 
aggressive war. Their claim that they were really defending 
themselves breaks down when we see that their own preparations 
were based upon the idea that the P'rench, the Russians, and the 
British could not conceivably meet them. That shows very 
clearly that they did not really believe that the French or the 
Russians could have attacked them in 1914 w^ith any chance of 
success. They fully expected in 1914 that they would win the war 
so soon that neither the British nor the Russians would ever be 
able to get ready, and that even the French might never be able 
fully to mobilize their army. 

This length of German preparation will again show why the 
war lasted so long, why the Germans were apparently winning the 
war for the first three years, why it seemed even in 1918 as if they 
might still win it. Time was needed for the British, French, and 
Americans to make up that handicap of forty years of prepara- 
tion. We could not get ready in a hurry. The Germans were 
right; modern armies cannot be made in a moment. Only time 
can create big guns, officers, competent troops. 

But the Germans were wrong in one thing. They could not be 
beaten except by a competent army which was prepared ; but the 
Allies had such an army — the French army. The Germans could 
be beaten only by excellent artillery; but the Allies had such 
artillery — the famous French 75's. Generals again, the Germans 
were quite correct in believing, could not be trained except through 
long years of effort. But the French realized long ago, as the 
British and the Americans did not, what the Germans meant to do, 
and French generals and staff officers were ready to fight when the 
war began. Otherwise the German calculations would have been 
infallible. They would have won the war before any of their 
enemies could have been ready to fight it. But the French army 



38 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

was capable enough, devoted enough, brave enough to hold the 
Germans in check while the British and the Americans got ready 
to come to their assistance. The story of the war, therefore, was 
that of staving off defeat from month to month and from year to 
year while this tremendous handicap in preparation could be 
overcome. 



CHAPTER V 

WHY THE WAR BEGAN IN 1914 

The Germans began the war in 1914 not because they were 
attacked in that year but because they thought that their enemies 
were so peculiarly unprepared and so singularly unable to fight 
at all in that year that it was the most favorable moment for an 
aggressive war in fifteen years. Such a good chance might never 
return. If they waited they might lose it. The nations they 
intended to attack were beginning to realize the extent and mean- 
ing of the German preparations and might make some of their own 
which would prevent the Germans from winning a prompt and 
crushing victory. 

There had been in the years just preceding 1914, several crises 
during which the Germans had felt out the attitude of the French 
and the British, and they had concluded that both of those nations 
were afraid to fight. They did not think they would dare to 
accept the issue of war. Here again is clear proof that the Ger- 
mans began an aggressive war. They had really come to believe 
that, short of being actually invaded, neither the British nor the 
French would dare to begin a war. There had been an occasion 
in 1908, when Austria had annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina 
without the consent of the Powers, when they thought it quite 
possible that a general war might result from that act. 

The Germans and Austrians exulted when the French and 
British did not compel them to fight. In the next five years 
there were several other chances for the French and British to 

39 



40 



THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 



have begun a war if they had wanted to. Were they not so much 
afraid of Germany that they would always yield rather than 
accept the issue of war? The Germans therefore proposed to 
ask them to make one after another the vast concessions that they 



1 y>"^m^ f. 







UKKBJPtS 



s 



Austria-Hungary \ 5 
"•—-•1, / ., -»• < 



r\rrm Jill 




Current Hist. Mag. A'. 1'. Times Co. 

AUSTKIA-HVNCJARY AND THE BaLKANS 

had in mind, each time asking as much as they thought they 
could without compelling the British and French to fight. 

The German spies reported in 1914 that there had never been 
a time when the French, British, and Russian armies had been as 
little ready to fight. The British army was then very small and 
attempts to increase it had repeatedly failed. Its equipment, 



WHY THE WAR BEGAN IN 1914 41 

the Germans thought, was very poor and attempts to make it 
better had been defeated. The majority of the Russian army 
was not equipped at all. It lacked shoes, clothing, and even 
rifles. There were no factories in Russia in 1914 adequate to 
maintain it in the field, though the state was proposing to build 
some very large factories. 

The French had the best of the three armies, but charges were 
made in the French Chamber in July, 1914, that the French army 
was not ready for war. One of the senators, Humboldt, who is 
now believed to have been a German agent, charged the Minister 
of War with incompetence. The forts were old ; the guns were 
antiquated ; the troops without shoes. There was not enough 
ammunition and what there was was old. The Minister was 
compelled to admit there was much truth in what he said. The 
Germans concluded that not merely was the French army not 
ready, but that the French nation would have no confidence in 
it because of these revelations made at the very moment when 
the war was about to begin. 

That Great Britain would join the war the Germans thought un- 
likely, but they believed that a much more important fact was 
true. They did not think Great Britain could join the war in 
August, 1914. There was a great quarrel going on in Ireland. 
It seemed possible that civil war might break out over the issue 
of Home Rule. A bill had been passed by the British Parliament 
concerning the government of Ireland, and a certain section of 
people in the north of Ireland, living in Ulster, had declared their 
intention to fight if the act was put into operation. They pro- 
cured rifles and ammunition, organized a government, and prac- 
tically defied England. There was grave doubt whether the 
British army would attempt to coerce them. 

Then there was a quarrel between Canada and South Africa 



42 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

and the Hindus which made the (lerinans think that the British 
Empire would not join England, if EngUmd joined PVance against 
Germany. In Paris at this time a trial was going on of the wife 
of a former Premier of France, INIadame Caillaux, for the murder 
of a newspaper editor. All sorts of scandals w^ere brought to light 
about important men in French life, until it looked as if there was 
in all France scarcely an honest or a patriotic statesman. So the 
Germans thought, at any rate. The Russians had not yet re- 
covered, they calculated in Berlin, from the war with Japan in 
1905, and would be very slow to enter any new war. As for the 
United States, from which of course Great Britain and France 
might get considerable assistance, it looked at that time as if 
the United States would go to war with INIexico. 

There could not therefore have been a moment, certainly there 
had not been for many years a time, when the enemies of Germany 
seemed weaker and in greater trouble than they were in July and 
August, 1914. The Germans and Austrians therefore made up 
their minds to pick a quarrel with Serbia over the murder of the 
Archduke. They would present demands which they thought 
the Serbians would be absolutely certain to refuse. They would 
then claim that war was necessary. They fully expected the 
Russians to come to the aid of the Serbians and they knew that 
the French had signed a treaty with Russia which compelled them 
to come to the aid of the Russians. This w^ould begin the war in 
just the way they wanted it begun, at just the moment they 
wanted it begun, and with the kind of issue they could present 
to their own people and claim that the war was begun in self-de- 
fense. We know definitely now that the Germans had planned the 
war as early as April or May, 1914, and began it really in a frenzy 
of fear toward the end of July lest some compromise or yielding 
on the part of the French or the Russians should postpone it. 



WHY THE WAR BEGAN IN 1914 43 

There cannot be any doubt that tliey wanted the war. Some 
of them were even honest enough to confess it, although the 
majority insisted that the war had been forced upon them by their 
foes. But one of the best-known German writers, Maximilian 
Harden, wrote as follows about the beginning of the war. "Not 
as weak blunderers have we undertaken the fearful risk of this 
war. We wanted it. Because we had to wish it and could wish 
it. May the Teuton devil throttle those whiners whose pleas 
for excuses make us ludicrous in these hours of lofty experience ! 
. . . Germany strikes ! . . . We are waging this war not in 
order to punish those who have sinned, not in order to free en- 
slaved peoples. . . . We wage it from the lofty point of view 
and with the conviction that Germany, as a result of her achieve- 
ments, and in proportion to them, is justified in asking, and must 
obtain, wider room on earth for development and for working 
out the, possibilities that are in her. . . . Now strikes the hour 
for Germany's rising power!" 

And with what object then did the Allies enter the contest? 
With what purpose did they fight for four years against the 
tremendous preparations of Germany? President Wilson stated 
on August 27, 1917, the aims of the Allies: "The object of this 
war is to deliver the free peoples of the world from the menace 
and the actual power of a vast military establishment controlled 
by an irresponsible government, which having secretly planned to 
dominate the world, proceeded to carry the plan out without 
regard either to the sacred obligations of treaty or the long-es- 
tablished practices and long-cherished principles of international 
action and honor ; which chose its own time for the war ; delivered 
its blow fiercely and suddenly ; stopped at no barrier either of 
law or mercy ; swept the whole continent within the tide of blood 
— not the blood of soldiers only, but the blood of innocent women 



44 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

and children also, and of the helpless poor. . . . This power is 
not the German people. It is the ruthless master of the German 
people. ... It is our business to see to it that the history of 
the rest of the world is no longer left to its handling." The Allies 
therefore accepted the gage thrown down by Germany with high 
resolve, and eventually the United States joined them. They 
determined to stake their all to protect democracy and civilization 
as they existed in the world; to preserve French, British, and 
American society, threatened by the Germans with extinction. 



BOOK II 
THE WAR IN 1914 



CHAPTER VI 

THE CAMPAIGN ON PARIS 

The key to the German plan of campaign was the decision to 
begin an aggressive war, directed by a nation fully prepared 
against enemies not prepared to fight at all. It was again an 
aggressive war begun by a power located between France on one 
side and Russia on the other, without natural boundaries, like 
mountains or deep rivers, to assist her in defense. But the Ger- 
mans had a tremendous advantage in strategic position. On 
the west they held Alsace-Lorraine, which contained the military 
defenses of France : they were already at the outbreak of the war 
inside the French defenses. To the north of Alsace-Lorraine lay 
Luxembourg and Belgium. In Belgium was Liege, another vital 
portion of the military frontier between France and Germany. 
If it was not in German possession, neither did France own it. 
Both had been rendered neutral by the Treaty of 1839 and France 
was precluded from using either to attack Germany. In any case 
the Germans were certain to reach them first. They could there- 
fore begin an aggressive war against France with absolute con- 
fidence that the advantage was in their favor. 

On the east, in Poland, the situation was extremely favorable to 
Germany. Poland is flanked on both sides by Prussia and Galicia. 
It is as if the Russian army stuck its head into the lion's mouth. 
If the lion can close his jaws, he will bite off the Russian's head. 
The lion, on the other hand, has to beware. If the Russian can 
force his jaws further apart, he will break them. If he can get 

47 



48 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

his head in far enough between them, he will crawl down the 
lion's throat and strangle him. But on the whole the advantage 
lay with Germany. The Russians must attack in Prussia on the 
north and in Galicia on the south, before they could move in force 
from Warsaw on Berlin. This meant that the German position 
was extremely strong on the defensive. 

The Germans also planned the war on the assumption that the 
inside position was one of great strength for an army beginning 
an aggressive war, just as they had concluded for centuries that 
it was a position of weakness for an armj' fighting on the defensive. 
They and the Austrians were ringed around by their enemies, but 
they might strike at them from any part of the circle they wished 
without giving their enemies as good a chance to strike back. 
The Germans could campaign on either front at will ; they could 
shift the same army rapidly from France to Poland and back 
again. The French and Russians could not help each other. 
Tremendous preparations were made so that the German rail- 
roads should be adequate to ship any number of thousands of 
men back and forth across Germany at maximum speed. The 
combined French and Russian armies were immense ; far greater 
than the German and Austrian armies; but the Germans felt 
that if they took the initiative at the beginning of the war they 
would control the situation, could fight on one frontier at a time 
only, and on either frontier they chose. 

They determined to attack France, and the reason was simple. 
The French army would be ready long before the Russian and 
was of admirable quality, which the Germans never underrated. 
They supposed it would take the French at least ten days to put 
their full strength into the field. They knew that the utmost 
speed of Russian mobilization could not make possible a cam- 
paign for six weeks. The distances in Russia which the troops 









-^ 


N 


^^^^^ 


^ 


^ 






B 






^J^^ 


^2 


C 

c 


1 M 






\ 




*^i^ 








:3 


o 


13 C 




<h 


E\ 

- C 


k 






/} 


S 


SC 






(^ 


x<l. 


iip'*"'?.^.. 




^ 


\ — :3 "C 


\" 




■ 


D 1^^ 


,/->. 


J^ 


CO 


^ 


•. 


^ 


'^ 


f iC CO X 


^ 


■1 




5 /-^ «) 






ll 




y 






■ 


^v 




c 


c 










Sh 




^h ^ 




.-; 


/ 


</j> 


r 




:0 

o 


■5 


c 

?! 

3 








Qb 


L**e< 


(T 




••o 


^ 


^ 




■o 




19 








C t 


v^ 


^^B 






p 


\y 


rvj 


0)"! 


B / 


c 
o 
E 
^^'^^^.^ 
o 

a. 


(0 

TO 




! 


UJ 


£ 


'% 






■ i 

E 
J 


1 


1 "S 


Sir- 


5^ 




-^ 


c 
a. 




*'w' 


"•W^^ 


\ 




• 






■^ 


i^ \ 


\ 


"c*** 


X. '.^XS 
















, — 


Tl X 


\ 










< 






: 




f 


feK . 


v. 


0^ 


\J^^ J 


^ 


^r 


^ 


^\^ 




.•; 




r J n X > 


>< 


^* 


1 /^ 


C^ 


/^ 


r^ 






;'|- 


i 


ly- lit^-^ 


**<i^ 


'^■^ 


"^^^-^ 


r 


A « 


) 






/I 


r 


•JW\ zVI ^ 


^vSJi 


"^N^^ 


^y^<^ 


■^ 


^^1^ 


'S 






; c 


J 






->* 






Vat^ 


5 








«^ 






1^ 




t 


*-^ 


c 

8. 

E 

°5 


_j^ 


y 








c 
So 


oj 3 




2 


■^f 


f 




^ 


^ 


L^^ \ UO.S ^\ 


^^j -1 


-1 


1 •" 1 ^- 


^ 


""s* i'' 


1 






^ 0> 
















V 






1| \ -o 




V V—A^i t^ \p 


"'**"«®\ T^ 




/^^^^^ 


\ 


c / 














^^V-\? 








/ 7 


o 






\p«i 




\ .^^ ^^^ 


^NJLJ 


r\ 


"r« \ 


CI 


^ ( 


c 




f,yJ^ 


i 








^ 


4^ 


^ 


y 


> 

e 
a 






1 


V 














5^ 






1 \ 


I c **■ 






\ 






car 






ill! 

1 II!'; 




> .^ 






\ 


^ 


w 


<r 






I 


y 


L 5 


-^ < 






^ 


'& 










™ 


ffivO x7 








^ 








11 , iiiiiii 

1 'li 


Hill 


HlillliilWlllllilHlJIt 


K 




J 


r 








c£> 


iiiiiali 


k 




^ 










•a3 



50 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

must travel to the frontier were great, the distances supplies must 
be sent were greater, and the railroads were few. Obviously the 
Germans had six weeks in which to attack France without danger 
of real interference from the Russians. They could therefore 
afford to throw the great bulk of their army upon the French and 
would thus so outnumber them that they fully expected to de- 
stroy the French before the Russians were able to move. They 
would then return victorious and end the Russian menace for 
all time. 

But how should they get at France? There were three roads 
on Paris. Two led through Alsace-Lorraine, and had been 
fortified with great care and skill by the French. While the 
Germans knew that their great guns would destroy any fort then 
existing in Europe, they also knew that such a campaign meant 
time, and time was the essential element in the assault. Speed 
was the important thing; if they could only get at France quickly 
enough they might be able to disperse the French army before 
it had assembled. 

The third road crossed the Rhine at Cologne, passed into 
Belgium at Liege, joined the road coming north from Alsace- 
Lorraine and passed on through Belgium into France by a great, 
broad, natural gateway without mountains or rivers to obstruct 
an army's march. It was admirably equipped with railroads for 
the army's use, and, because of the treaty of neutrality, was en- 
tirely unfortified by France. If the German army was to move 
in a hurry, it must march, and must march where the marching 
was good, where the roads were easiest, and the best time could 
be made. Belgium was too small to resist effectively, and, once 
through Belgium, all roads to Paris were open. The invasion 
of Belgium was the only plan to consider from a military point of 
view. 



THE CAMPAIGN ON PARIS 



51 



The Germans worked on a time schedule, determined by the 
average speed of men actually detailed in time of peace to walk 
from the German frontier to Paris. In four days the army should 
be through Belgium; in six more it should reach Paris. That 
was not more rapid marching than the Germans had repeatedly 




L'lllusiratton, Parts 



German Courtesy — 1914 



done. If they could carry out such a schedule, they would in- 
fallibly be upon Paris before the French army could mobilize. 
It was also to be remembered — a very important and striking 
fact — that by some misadventure they might not destroy the 
French army in the first fortnight and might be compelled to 
fight longer. It was important to compel the French to con- 
tinue the war at a maximum disadvantage. 

The Germans knew the French were not ready to fight and 



52 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

that the continuation of the war would require an immense volume 
of supplies which would have to be manufactured. Moreover, 
this very area, which the Germans would overrun at the outset, 
was the industrial section of France. Here were the most im- 
portant factories. Here were great coal and iron mines upon 
which French industry relied and upon which the French army 
would have to depend. Assuming the invasion's failure the 
Germans would still force the French to conduct the war in a way 
so difficult for them that, without very prompt and considerable 
assistance, they might not be able to continue it at all. 

All this determined the diplomatic arrangements at the be- 
ginning of the war as well as the first military movements. The 
war must be sprung as a surprise and time must not be wasted 
in negotiations. Once the intentions of Germany and Austria 
became clear to their enemies, not an hour should be lost. The 
whole campaign would fail if they allowed the diplomats to write 
and talk about causes and purposes. Both Germany and Austria 
therefore fairly tumbled over each other at the end of July, 1914, 
to get the war actually begun. They seem to have been terrified 
lest in some way it should be averted, lest the favorable moment 
should pass without the beginning of the campaign. All attempts 
to postpone it, to explain the issues, or to compromise them, were 
therefore rejected as fast as they were made. Austria declared 
war on Serbia four days after the first note. Three days later the 
German ultimatum was delivered to France and Russia, and four 
days after that the German armies were in Belgium. Twelve 
days sufficed for all the preliminary moves of the greatest war in 
history. 

Austria declared war on Serbia on July 28 ; Russia began 
mobilization on the Hungarian frontier on the following day ; 
on July 30 Austria began the bombardment of Belgrade and 



THE CAMPAIGN ON PARIS 53 

general mobilization was ordered in Russia. Germany accord- 
ingly presented ultimatums both to Russia and to France on the 
last day of July and declared war on Russia on August 1, Italy 
promptly declaring her neutrality. August 2 saw German armies 
in Luxembourg and the German demand to march unopposed 
through Belgium. August 3 brought the Belgian refusal and the 
German declaration of war on France. The next morning, 
August 4, found the German armies in Belgium and that night 
at midnight Great Britain declared war on Germany. 

How now should the attack be met? What could the Allies 
do, unprepared as they were, to meet the thrust which the Ger- 
mans had calculated would be irresistible? They saw that the 
German campaign was based on two factors : first — on time ; 
second — on crushing the French army. When the Germans 
asked the Belgians to allow them to march unimpeded through 
their territory, the latter knew that if they agreed to that request, 
Paris would be lost and the independence of Belgium would 
become a thing of the past. Only France and England could 
in the end save Belgium from annexation ; but neither France 
nor England could possibly save Belgium from invasion at that 
moment. 

Yet only Belgium could save Paris from capture, protect the 
French army from immediate defeat, thus eventually save the 
cause of the Allies, and by this first blow win in the end its own 
independence. Unless the Belgians wished to become the slaves 
of the Germans, they must resist. It would be the struggle of a 
small boy against a large and desperate man. The Belgians must 
fight for time, they must delay the Germans as long as possible. 
They would in the process be defeated, slaughtered, crushed, 
maimed ; that much they knew. The real extent of what the 
Germans would do to Belgium was little suspected. 



54 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

If the Belgians succeeded in delaying the Germans long enough 
for the French to mobilize, the latter must then keep out of the 
Germans' way. There is still some confusion of opinion as to 
the original French plan of campaign, and there is reason to be- 
lieve that they hoped to strike successfully from their prepared 
positions in Lorraine at the German left and thus compel the 
evacuation of France and Belgium. However that may be, the 
defeat of the first preliminary assaults in Alsace, the steady rush 
of the Germans through Belgium, showed the futility of such 
strategy, and caused Joffre to adopt the plan which eventually 
won the first and greatest Allied victory. He must at all costs 
not be beaten. That, he saw, must be the key to his defensive 
campaign. 

He must draw the Germans further and further into France and 
further and further away from Germany. He must compel them 
to march as far as possible, as fast as possible, to transport their 
supplies as long distances as possible, and thus maneuver them 
into an unfavorable position. On no account must he stand still 
to be crushed ; that alone could give the German campaign a 
chance of success without giving France the same chance to defeat 
it. Joffre therefore ordered the armies to retreat and to continue 
retreating. Meanwhile, the Allied plans provided that the 
British were to rush over such troops as they had ready, however 
few they might be. Every man, every rifle, every horse might 
be enough to check the Germans and prevent an immediate Ger- 
man victory. ]\Ieanwhile something might happen. 

Last and not least, inasmuch as the German calculations assumed 
that the bulk of the army could be sent to France because the 
Russians could not move, the latter should invade Prussia at 
once. Even if the troops walked barefoot with nothing but 
clubs in their hands, the armv must move. It would not be 



THE CAMPAIGN ON PARIS 55 

prepared to attack with success but the Allies knew that the 
Germans would not be prepared to meet an assault in Poland. 
They would have to send troops from P'rance to stop it and in 
that way the Russians would save Paris. 

And so at Liege, the Belgians held the forts desperately against 
wave after wave of German attacks and resisted the great advance 
step by step until resistance was no longer possible. For three 
days the Germans were checked entirely, — three precious days ! 
Then the Belgian army was stamped flat on the ground and over 
its body tramped the great columns of troops marching to Brussels 
and Paris. But the Germans were not four days but sixteen days 
going through Belgium, Sixteen days and Paris was saved ! 
The British and French armies had had time to get to the Belgian 
frontier, not in full strength, but in enough force to show the 
astonished Germans an amount of resistance they thought abso- 
lutely improbable. 

Then began one of the marvelous retreats of history. The 
Allied troops, French, Belgian, and British, fought gallantly and 
retreated superbly, but, without reinforcements, they grew more 
and more weary and footsore, less and less able to fight. No 
army was harder pressed than General French's gallant little 
British force around ]\Ions. 

They fought in the morning, they fought at noon, they fought 
at night. The officers kicked the men awake, fell asleep them- 
selves, and were kicked awake in turn. There were men dragging 
and carrying their officers, horses falling dead in their tracks, 
and men harnessing themselves to the guns in order to save them. 
Motor transports moved toward the rear driven often by men 
sound asleep. "For forty-eight hours no food, no drink, under 
a hot sun, choking with dust, and marching, marching, marching, 
until even the pursuing Germans gave it up, and at Vitry-le- 



56 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

Francois the Allies fell in their tracks and slept for three hours, 
men, horses, and guns — while the exhausted pursuers slept be- 
hind them." Thus the British retreated from Mons after one 
of the most gallant and obstinate actions in history. It played 
almost as important a part in delaying the German advance as 
the resistance of the Belgians at Liege. 

Behind the armies the roads were full of French fugitives fleeing 
from the war. Pitiful and terrible sight! Here a whole family 
trudging along on foot, carrying in their hands a few little articles 
from their homes, and driving the cow before them. There a 
woman had piled what little she could save on a wheelbarrow and 
had perched the baby on top. Here two little children were tug- 
ging at their mother's skirts while she directed a little cart drawn 
by the dogs used in Belgium and northern France for drawing 
light burdens. There children who had lost their fathers and 
mothers sat crying by the wayside until some of the fugitives 
noticed them and carried them on. Other more fortunate families 
with horses and carts or with automobiles were pushing on to 
Paris more rapidly. The roads and villages in all directions were 
full to bursting with a people compelled at a few hours' notice to 
flee for their lives. It was such a spectacle as men had thought 
would never again be seen in history. 

In those first days it was difficult not to believe that all was 
lost, that the Germans had calculated too well to be beaten. How 
could nations, however powerful, but without time to prepare, 
resist such a foe? Something like despair spread throughout 
France and England. Then suddenly there came a change. The 
British and French troops were no longer afraid. They retreated 
still, but their hearts were light, for they had come to feel that 
God and His angels in the truest sense were fighting with them. 
Men told wonderful stories of what they had seen. At one time 



THE CAMPAIGN ON PARIS 



57 




L' lUuiirallun, Parin 



Early Birds in Paris us War Time 



58 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

there was a great gap in the Allied line. There were no troops 
to fill it and meet the advancing Germans. Suddenly in that 
gap there stood — English archers with bows and arrows, knights 
in armor, figures which seemed to the Germans absolutely real, 
but which the Allied soldiers believed to be the ghosts of the bold 
warriors of Agincourt, the men of the Hundred Years' War come 
back to save France and England. 

Others at other points of the line told of seeing Germans and 
more Germans, in solid columns, pouring over the top of the hills. 
Suddenly between them and the advancing foe came a flash of 
brilliant light and then right before them rode "a tall man with 
yellow hair and golden armor on a white horse." It was St. 
George, the patron saint of England, come to rally the troops, 
come to show them that the powers of peace were with them and 
that the Germans were the powers of evil ! The French troops 
also declared they saw at the moment when all seemed most 
desperate that same blinding flash of light. When it disappeared, 
there before them in the field, clad in full armor, riding a white 
horse was Joan of Arc, brandishing her sword high in air and 
shouting, "Forward!" The troops answered with a rallying 
shout, and, dashing forward behind her, threw back the Germans. 
Did St. George, Joan of Arc, and the dead of the Middle Ages 
actually appear? No one can say, but thousands believe that 
they saw them. 

And so, day after day, the British and the French retreated and 
retreated and finally in the first week of September, the people of 
Paris heard one after the other the distant boom of the explosions 
. blowing up the bridges on the Marne. Still another Allied division 
had crossed the river. The Germans were just behind. By 
September 5, the Germans had also passed the Marne and were 
within a few miles of Paris. Indeed orders had been issued to 



THE CAMPAIGN ON PARIS 59 

many German divisions to wear full dress instead of their field 
uniforms, so as to be ready for the formal entry into the French 
capital. Many of the officers had already in their pockets the 
orders directing them in what houses their troops were to be 
quartered the first night in Paris. But the Germans were never 
to enter Paris except as prisoners. They had been not ten days 
but a full month getting within sight of the city. The great scheme 
had failed. The French army was not crushed. The French 
army had mobilized. The French were ready to fight, and the 
British had joined them. The war, far from being won by the 
Germans, was indeed at that moment on the point of being lost. 



CHAPTER VII 

FROM THE MARNE TO ANTWERP 

The strategy of Joffre had then permitted the Germans to 
proceed as far as Paris. He had retreated in order to draw them 
into France, to compel them to extend their lines. Thus he made 
it as difficult as possible for them to maintain the attack and 
rendered its weight less every mile they proceeded away from 
Germany. It was just as if an open door, with the hinge at 
Verdun and the end of the door out on the Belgian frontier, had 
gradually shut as the Germans pushed, and finally closed tight 
on Paris. There was then a strong French line from Verdun to 
Paris, which General Joffre proposed to hold. As the Germans 
got further from their bases of supplies and reinforcements, they 
became fatigued with the rapid marching and fighting. They had 
no troops to put into the battle except those who had marched the 
whole distance. The French were continually receiving the aid of 
fresh troops of their own, which had seen no fighting, and, therefore, 
every mile the Germans advanced in France they became weaker 
and the French became stronger. They became more and more 
fatigued, while the French armies as a whole really remained fresh. 

But General Joffre was counting in particular upon the great 
Russian attacks in East Prussia and Galicia. The Tsar had 
promised that his army should move west at all costs. That meant 
that German troops would have to be drawn from France to defend 
Prussia. The Russians launched a great cavalry attack the first 
week of August, which was extremely successful. It was indeed 

60 



FROM THE MARNE TO ANTWERP 61 

one of the most daring raids in history, but it could not maintain 
its ground and it was not until August 18 that a movement in force 
took place. This too was astonishingly successful. It swept the 
German forces out of East Prussia in a hurry and compelled the 
Kaiser to send for General Hindenburg, who had spent his life 
studying that territory, and to give him command of troops drawn 
from the army in France. 

In two tremendous battles, Tannenberg, from August 26 to Sep- 
tember 1, five whole days, and the Masurian Lakes, lasting from 
September 6 to 10, five more days, he defeated the first and second 
Russian armies, crushed, and then destroyed them. In the mean- 
time, however, the third Russian army had made tremendous 
gains in Galicia, had captured Lemberg, and had already rendered 
perilous Hindenburg's position in the north. The victories elated 
the German people, but they weakened the German army in 
France to such an extent that Joffre was able to begin the battle 
of the Marne on September 6 with many more men than the Ger- 
mans had to meet him, placed in a much better position, and in 
far superior condition. 

What Joffre proposed to do, despite the tremendous scale on 
which the battle was fought, was particularly simple. He pro- 
posed to turn the German right flank and by driving it back compel 
the whole German line to retreat. He would thus relieve Paris 
from danger and continue the war on a field much more favorable 
to the French. The Germans had felt so sure of the superiority 
of their army and of the success of the drive on Paris that they 
had left a great area of unoccupied territory between their right 
wing and the coast. Their right wing was therefore unsupported 
and could be attacked anywhere along the line from Paris to Brus- 
sels. If the French could get in behind it, they would break the 
German formation. Only an army continually successful could 



62 



THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 



maintain such a position. Of this overconfidence Joffre took 
advantage. 

He now enveloped the German right wing with French and 
British troops, so that the Germans were between the blades of a 
pair of scissors. The French then attacked, and moved towards 
each other, thus closing the scissors, and the Germans barely got 



■^ Allixs 




The Battle of the Marne 
From a sketch by the Author 

out from between in time to avoid being cut in two. Their right 
wing having been compelled to run, the German center was left 
unprotected, with the now victorious French and English on its 
flank and in danger of getting in behind it and attacking it in the 
rear. The German center, therefore, also had to retreat, and the 
rest of the German line, in order to avoid a similar fate, had to go 
back with it. They retreated many miles and intrenched them- 
selves on the hills north of the river Aisne, which runs about 
parallel to the river Marne. The German army at the beginning 
of the battle was well south of the Marne and at its end was well 
north of the Aisne. Their loss in territory, therefore, was great. 



64 



THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 



One of the most picturesque and dramatic movements of the war 
was the daring charge of General Gallieni's army in Paris to the 




The Shift in the Battle Line from September 6 to October 17 
From a sketch by the Author 

battle field of the Ourcq. As Von Kluck had continued his pres- 
sure upon the French left, he turned early in September southeast 
to separate Joffre from Paris and make the investment of the city 



FROM THE MARNE TO ANTWERP 65 

a certainty. Gallieni saw the enemy escaping him and possibly 
overwhelming Joffre for want of the aid of the hundreds of thou- 
sands of men gathered in Paris for the expected siege. " If they do 
not come to us," he said, "we will go to them with all the force we 
can muster." He gathered all the taxicabs, automobiles, and mo- 
tor omnibuses in Paris, thousands of them, loaded his army upon 
them and started for the battle front at fifty miles an hour, leaving 
Paris unguarded. Suddenly Von Kluck found a great army as- 
sailing his right along the Ourcq, where a couple of hours before 
there had been not a French soldier. Thus began the great victory 
of the Marne. 

At another most critical moment of the battle. General Foch, 
in the center of the French line, was being assailed by tremen- 
dous forces, and received from Joffre the order to retreat. He be- 
lieved he detected a weakening of the assault, saw a rift in the 
German line due to some error or misunderstood order, and instead 
of retreating ordered an attack. He pushed his army between 
two German armies, flanked them both, and the rout of the Ger- 
man center was complete. This was the turning point of the 
battle of the Marne and the decisive moment of the first years of 
the war. However great the credit due to Joffre, history will 
give the real credit for the victory to the judgment, initiative, 
and courage of Foch. 

The Germans, however, were by no means safe. Their right wing 
was still a long distance from Brussels ; and their reinforcements 
might still be flanked exactly as during the battle of the Marne. 
This General Joffre attempted. The Germans, in order to meet 
his movement, kept on extending their line toward Brussels. So 
day by day the chase went on to see whether the Germans could 
occupy certain territory before the French could get around their 
right wing. They succeeded, but had to extend the trench line all 



66 THE STORY OF THE UUEAT WAR 

the way from the Aisne into Belgium. In order to have a secure 
base from which to protect the northern end of it, they proceeded 
to besiege Antwerp. They could not leave a strong fort like 
that in the possession of the Belgians, for the English navy might 
land a great army there and attack the German rear. 

The fall of Antwerp was one of the surprises of the war. It 
had been fortified by talented engineers, and, while not considered 
the greatest fortress in Europe, was supposed to be able to resist for 
a considerable length of time any assault likely to be delivered. 
Only a prolonged siege could capture it, the Belgians had thought. 
But Antwerp fell, not in weeks, but in days (one might almost say 
in hours), after the first serious German assault. Here, for the 
first time, the Germans used one of their surprises — the 420 
centimeter gun, the largest gun in the world, throwing an enormous 
shell filled with high explosives. One single shell was sufficient in 
most cases to destroy one of the Antwerp forts. Some were blown 
wide open ; some were turned upside down. It was clear at once 
that every fort in Europe was w^orthless. 

The final scenes at Antwerp were dramatic in the extreme. Great 
shells set fire to the city. The boom of the enormous cannon, 
the bursting of shells, the rain of explosives were continuous. 
Vast plumes of dense black smoke rose from great oil tanks burning 
along the river. And in the red glare of the burning city, under this 
great black pall, hundreds of thousands of people fled in boats 
down the river or on foot along its banks, carrying what little they 
could in their hands, but otherwise homeless, penniless, starving. 

The Germans could not rest content with a line bent back from 
Paris to Antwerp and delivered in October and November their 
first great drive along the coast on Calais. They were eager now 
to do what they should have done before, occupy western France, 
shorten the trench line by many scores of miles, and deprive the 



FROISI THE MARNE TO ANTWERP 



67 




••"on - - - 



HON TAROIS 



-r JB CLAI-IECY V. V- ."^ t' 

> JT^-a JTso I \ f OIJON 



Current History Mag. N. Y. Times Co. 

The Numbered Arrows Show the Successive German Assaults from 

October, 1914, to February, 1915. The Solid Line is the Line of Battle 

IN February, 1915 

British of the Channel ports as harbors in which to land their army 
and the great stream of men and equipment which must maintain 
it. All but a tiny little strip of Belgium fell into their hands but 



68 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

they did not reach Calais. The Channel ports were safe; the 
communications of the British army were safe; the submarines 
would not be able to assail Allied shipping from bases on the 
Channel itself. 

The war now settled down in the west to a deadlock, and, with 
small changes, the trench line remained substantially the same 
until 1918. It will therefore be clear that the battle of the Marne 
did not win the war, for the war went on four years. But the 
battle was the turning point of the war, not so much because of the 
territory won from the Germans, but because of its moral effect 
upon the French and British nations. Everywhere the correspond- 
ents went after the battle they found the French quiet, silent, 
confident, talking about the "good news," les bonnes nouvelles. 
The legend of the power of the German army had been destroyed. 
It had seemed for six weeks as if the Germans could not be beaten ; 
that they must infallibly win the war. But the moment the 
Germans had been beaten, the French and British became con- 
fident that, however long the war might last, they would in the end 
win it. 



CHAPTER VIII 

WHY THE BRITISH EMPIRE ENTERED THE WAR 

The Germans had miscalculated ; the war had not been won In 
the first dash on Paris. They had foreseen miraculously well every 
possible physical factor ; their greatest errors had been psychologi- 
cal, and throughout the war the same factor continued to upset 
their calculations. They had believed that the Belgians would 
yield in very terror and offer no resistance. They had supposed 
that the French would not fight because their army was not ade- 
quately prepared. They could not conceive that the Russian army 
would march bravely forth to certain death. But greatest of all 
was the German failure to analyze the Anglo-Saxon temperament, 
both in England, in the British colonies, and in the United States. 
The British were slothful, lazy, venal, cowardly. Such was the 
German conclusion before the war; such was the version of the 
British which German newspapers and comic weeklies presented 
throughout the war. 

The failure of the English people and of the British colonies to 
take the place assigned them in the German formula was almost 
as deadly a blow to Pan-Germanism as the battle of the Marne. 
Home Rule was forgotten. Men ready to spring at each other's 
throats a few days before remembered only that they were all 
British and that the Germans were in Belgium. The honor of the 
nation admitted of but one course; immediate assistance to Bel- 
gium and France, the prosecution of the war with every man and 
every penny till the German menace had been destroyed. Money, 

69 



70 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

trade, business jealousies played no part in the popular decision. 
It would cost money, not save it; it would destroy business, not 
create it ; it would disorganize trade throughout the world in ways 
that might continue to cost British profits for a generation to come. 
War was not profitable ; war was not desirable ; but honor com- 
pelled men to choose many alternatives, both perilous and disagree- 
able, as preferable to life with dishonor. 

But it was none the less known to British statesmen, if not 
to the people, that the war was really directed by the Germans at 
Great Britain herself, that its true object was to destroy England, 
once France was beaten. To allow France and Belgium to fight 
Britain's battle was cowardly and unworthy of a great people. 
It was also inexpedient in the extreme. If they should be beaten, 
England would then be forced to fight alone. Unless the British 
therefore proposed to surrender to the Germans, they must begin 
the war at the beginning or they might never begin it at all. 

Nor was there any doubt from the outset in Great Britain that 
the German system intended the destruction of liberty and civiliza- 
tion as the British understood them. Militarism and autocracy 
the British had abhorred for a thousand years. The German 
claim that all nations in the world must be forced to live in ac- 
cordance with German Kultur, the British could never accept. 
Secret diplomacy, too, of the German type, the dishonoring of 
treaties and the declaration of the German Chancellor that the 
Belgian treaty of neutrality had been nothing but a scrap of 
paper was also contrary to everything for which Great Britain 
stood. There could be no temporizing with Germany or with 
German Kultur; there could be no compromise. The British 
notion of civilization was diametrically contrary to the German 
and one or the other must perish. 

One of Germany's most cherished beliefs had been the idea 



WHY THE BRITISH EMPIRE ENTERED THE WAR 71 







< 03 

« --3 
a » 



72 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

that the British Empire would fall apart the moment war was 
declared. They could see no reason for the support of the mother 
country by her colonies and were convinced that the latter would 
prefer to stand aside. But the colonies on the contrary responded 
magnificently. They all declared war immediately and promised 
their utmost support in men, in ships, and in supplies. Enlist- 
ments proceeded with extraordinary rapidity in Canada, in 
Australia, in South Africa. From no port of the world indeed did 
a larger proportion of men enter the service nor did any troops 
acquit themselves with greater gallantry than did the Canadians at 
Ypres, Vimy Ridge, and at Lens, or the Australians and New 
Zealanders at Gallipoli. 

In South Africa a revolt had been planned by the Germans with 
full expectation that the Boers would take the control of South 
Africa out of British hands. The German colonies on either side 
of the British South African colonies would furnish points of at- 
tack and bases of supply. An internal revolt should aid them and 
in a few days or at most weeks the entire south of Africa should be 
in German hands. To their amazement, the Boers, whom the Brit- 
ish had defeated in the Boer War, proved loyal to Great Britain, 
a result of the statesmanlike work of the British after the earlier 
war had been won. The Boers themselves put down the revolt 
and in addition captured all the German colonies in South Africa. 

In India, too, a tremendous conspiracy had been planned by the 
Germans and for a time the danger was extreme, but the British 
were soon satisfied that the number of people implicated was not 
considerable and that India was loyal. They were right. Hindu 
troops went to France with great enthusiasm, where they acquitted 
themselves with great bravery. The white British troops were 
withdrawn for service in France and the guardianship of India 
itself intrusted to Hindus. Yet throughout the war every con- 



WHY THE BRITISH EMPIRE ENTERED THE WAR 73 

spiracy launched by the Germans failed. India remained not 
merely loyal but aided the prosecution of the war in every way 
possible. 

One of the reasons why the Germans began the war was the 
belief that the British Empire was so weak and disloyal that it 
could not resist assault. One of the reasons why the Germans 
were defeated in the war was the loyalty and strength of the 
British Empire. The Germans were sure that the war would 
create a new Empire surpassing in extent and power any of the old 
Empires. They were right; the war has created a new British 
Empire, stronger, more unified than ever before, a real state whose 
importance in times to come will be incalculable. 



CHAPTER IX 

HOW THE GERMANS MADE WAR 

When the long gray-green column of German troops approached 
Brussels, with bands playing and flags flying, they entered the city 
with the famous goose-step, as if on parade. Their object was to 
impress the Belgians with the discipline and strength of the German 
army. But as they proceeded down the gay streets in the beautiful 
sunshine, the Belgians saw, strapped to the stirrups of two cavalry 
men, two Belgian officers, their arms bound behind them, their 
hands handcuffed and chained, dragged hither and thither as the 
horses jumped and stamped. It was in this way that the conquer- 
ors of old, in Egypt, in Greece, and in Rome, in the days when there 
were really barbarians, used to lead their captives in triumphal 
procession. Here was Belgium, in chains, dragged at the stirrup 
of her conqueror ! 

On the street-curbing in the main square of Brussels stood a lame 
hawker with a tray of flowers which it was his custom to sell to the 
passers-by. In his eagerness to make sales on this day, when there 
were so many in the streets, he stepped from the curb into the 
street and offered a flower to an officer riding by on horseback. 
Without changing a muscle in his face, the officer spurred his horse 
and rode over him, pitching the poor lame man into the gutter and 
scattering his flowers over the street. " Let no Belgian so much as 
lift his hand towards a German soldier !" was the lesson which the 
Germans meant the Belgian nation to learn. 

Another incident showing how the Germans made war occurred 

74 



HOW THE GERMANS MADE WAR 75 

in the triumphal entry of the long column into Antwerp. On they 
came, toiling infantry, clattering cavalry, rumbling artillery, 
regiments, divisions, one after another for hours at a time; and, 
in the rear of more than one division, came a great carriage, stolen 
from some Belgian, drawn by splendid horses, and filled, not with 
officers, nor yet with guns, but with bottles of champagne and 
violins ! The Germans were conquerors, — and should they not 
feast ? They were victors, — should they not drink and be merry ? 
The Belgians should know that they were to celebrate the conquest 
of Belgium. 

Let us follow the German army in its march upon Paris. They 
came to the little village of Aershot; they found thirty Belgian 
soldiers there ; they led them out of the town and, without trial or 
investigation, shot them. Those who were not killed outright 
were kicked to death or brained with the butts of the soldiers' 
rifles. In the public square, while the Germans were completing 
their arrangements for the occupation of the town, a shot was heard. 
Immediately the Germans fell into a panic and began to shoot at 
random into the various houses. Then, by order of the officers, all 
the people who could be found were brought out of the houses into 
the streets ; every third person in the line was taken out, marched 
beyond the village, and shot. The remainder were compelled to 
dig a ditch to bury the bodies. One hundred and fifty were 
killed ; nearly four hundred houses were burned. The Germans 
marched out, eventually, over pavements spattered with blood and 
littered with broken wine bottles. ; 

Here is a description of an action against the French, written 
by a German officer: "By leaps and bounds we got across the 
clearing. They were here, there, and everywhere, hidden in the 
thicket. Now it is down with the enemy ! and we will give them 
no quarter. . . . We knock down or bayonet the wounded, for we 



76 



THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 




HOW THE GERMANS MADE WAR 77 

know that those scoundrels fire at our backs when we have gone by. 
There was a Frenchman there stretched out, full length, face down, 
pretending to be dead. A kick from a strong fusilier soon taught 
him that we were there. Turning round he asked for quarter, 
but we answered : Ts that the way your tools work, you — ,' and 
he was nailed to the ground. Close to me I heard odd, cracking 
sounds. They were blows from a gun on the bald head of a 
Frenchman which a private of the 154th was dealing out vigor- 
ously ; he was wisely using a French gun so as not to break his 
own. Tender-hearted souls are so kind to the French wounded 
that they finish them with a bullet, but others give them as many 
thrusts and blows as they can." 

The Germans came to the wonderful city of Louvain. Beautiful 
old wooden houses lined its streets, in its great square stood a 
wonderful construction, the Town Hall, built by the magic of deft 
hands in the Middle Ages. There was a University, famed for the 
beauty of its buildings, for the learning of its professors, the splen- 
dor of its library. The Germans entered and took possession. 
Not long after, in some way, — the Belgians say by the carelessness 
of some German soldier, — a gun was discharged. At once the cry 
arose, "The Belgians are shooting, they are firing on Germans"; 
and, as usual in such cases, the German troops in the city fell into 
a terrible panic. Machine guns were placed so as to rake the 
streets, and every one who ventured out of the houses was shot 
down. 

It was evening, and presently a red glare and a great volume of 
smoke showed that the Germans had fired the town. Doors were 
broken in with the butts of rifles, the people dragged into the street, 
and shot. One old man captured by a German was being con- 
ducted as prisoner and could not run fast enough to suit his captor. 
Prodded on with the sharp bayonet, presently he stumbled and 



78 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

fell ; without hesitating, the soldier ran his bayonet through the 
body and hurried on, leaving him lying in a pool of blood. In 
some cases, the people were thrust back by the German soldiers into 
their own burning houses, from which they were seeking to escape. 

Presently, their first panic of fear over, the soldiers began to loot 
the homes, hunting everywhere for wine, and becoming, of course, 
extremely drunk. They decked themselves in women's clothes, in 
curtains torn from the windows, in table-covers snatched from 
parlor tables. When some band of these drunken men would 
approach the house of some wealthy Belgian, which had not yet 
been sacked, one would call out, " There was firing from here," and 
they would all then burst out into tremendous guffaws of drunken 
laughter. The officers stood on the street corners, roared with 
laughter at this splendid joke, and calmly watched the men tear the 
house to pieces and pitch the property of the Belgians into the street. 

In many cases, the Belgians with whom the Germans were 
offended were packed on cattle trucks or open flat-cars as close as 
they could stand and shipped into Germany. They were given no 
food and no water, had no chance to sleep, and, if they made the 
slightest complaint, were likely to be shot or bayoneted. As they 
passed through German towns, the train would be drawn up in the 
railroad station to allow the German women and children the pleas- 
ing spectacle of the Belgians who had resisted the Germans and who 
had been consequently punished for it. The women reviled them, 
called them bad names, cursed them, and very often spat in their 
faces. One Belgian priest, a remarkably holy man, was repeatedly 
slapped and buffeted. 

The German officers were quartered during the nights in the 
finest houses of the Belgians, and later of the French, dining in the 
evening in the most splendid rooms of these houses, many of which 
were historic buildings occupied in the past by princes and even by 



HOW THE GERMANS MADE WAR 79 

kings. Their furniture was a priceless relic of past civilization, 
and the ornaments and tableware were heirlooms. Almost in- 
variably after the dinner was over, the German officers became 
drunk, broke all the mirrors and windows by throwing bottles 
around ; stamped the seats out of the chairs, cut the curtains to rib- 
bons with their swords, and broke the crockery on the table. That 
the owner should have no doubt that it was done intentionally, the 
pile of fragments was neatly collected at each man's place; the 
lighted end of his cigar was allowed to burn holes through the table- 
cloth into the mahogany beneath, and the officer's visiting card 
was placed on top of the broken china. 

This was "The Day" which the Germans had so often toasted. 
This was their method of celebrating its arrival. The greatest 
generals — and even the Crown Prince himself — were not above 
this sort of practice, and each commonly sent off every morning 
to Germany a great wagonload of pictures, statuary, and china 
which they coveted and therefore did not allow the officers to 
smash. Again, that there might be no doubt as to the purpose of 
this vandalism, the general wrote his name on the wall on the spot 
which the picture had covered. 

It is not difficult to understand the looting of the homes of 
the wealthy, filled with precious heirlooms, but it is hard to see why 
the German troops should have looted so many of the little school- 
houses in Belgium and France. What pleasure did they receive 
from smashing the wooden desks at which children of six and eight 
had been sitting, of breaking the flower pots in the windows, tearing 
the blackboards from the wall, pouring ink over the books, and 
scattering the chalk on the floor and tramping on it ? That was no 
mere purposeless raging, nor a readiness and desire to destroy. 
They meant to leave nothing behind that would be useful. 

There were thousands of such incidents; hundreds of towns 



80 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

burned to the ground ; thousands of people slain in cold blood or 
tortured to death. Hundreds of women killed without reason ; 
hundreds of little children destroyed for, so far as we can see, the 
offense of getting in the way of some German soldier. Did you ever 
see a dog killing a kitten ? It was so that the German army dealt 
with Belgium and northern France. 

There was, in France, a great city in which stood one of the 
most wonderful of the great cathedrals, built during the Middle 
Ages with a skill which men no longer possess. The Cathedral at 
Rheims was one of the most remarkable of its kind. It had been the 
scene of the coronation of many French kings. There Joan of 
Arc knelt before her king whom she had at last crowned. There 
his successors had been anointed. Hardly a detail of the great 
building but was admitted by architects to be extraordinary. It 
was one of the greatest legacies of the past. 

After the trench line had been established, the great Cathedral 
stood in sight of the German lines and within range of their guns. 
They declared that they saw French artillery officers, with their 
glasses, on the towers of the Cathedral, using it as a station from 
which to direct the fire of the French guns. To the Germans, this 
justified the destruction of the great building by shell fire. There 
were no French officers on the Cathedral. The greatest care was 
exercised by the French because they were particularly anxious not 
to give the Germans any excuse for injuring it. Certainly, after 
the first two or three bombardments, even the Germans must have 
known that the French were not using it, and yet shell after shell 
was thrown into the great building, until it was set on fire, 
the magnificent wooden roof burned, the windows destroyed, 
statues demolished, much of the delicate stonework thrown to the 
ground, and nothing more than a mere skeleton left to show the 
frightfulness of German methods. 



HOW THE GERMANS MADE WAR 81 

On the first day of the bombardment of the city, when it was not 
yet clear that the Germans would fire on the Cathedral, the French 
carried into the building a great number of wounded German 
soldiers whom they wished to shield from the frenzy of the mob 
of French citizens who wished to take vengeance upon them for the 
sort of deeds just described. The mob was about to attack the 
French soldiers defending the church when the German shells 
began to fall upon it. Above the crash of the roof, the broken 
glass, the fall of statues, and the distant thunder of the German 
artillery, came suddenly the voice of a French priest standing on 
the steps of the building. " Stop, " he said to the mob ; " remember 
the ancient ways and chivalry of France ! It is not Frenchmen 
who trample on the maimed and fallen foe ! Let us not descend 
to the level of our enemies. " 

The French were different from the Germans. They did not 
burst into the Cathedral and slay the German wounded ; they could 
not do to the Germans what had been done to their own loved ones. 
Most of the wounded Germans were carried amidst the flying 
stone and fragments of shell from the burning building to a place of 
safety, but a good many of them were slain, while they lay on the 
floor, by the falling stones and by the German shells. And there 
is to-day upon the pavement of that great church, and there will 
be as long as the ruins stand for men to see, a great dark stain — 
the burnt blood of the German wounded, slain by the barbarism of 
their own countrymen who fired upon the church to which these 
wounded had been taken as a place certainly safe. That great 
splotch will remain to subsequent generations as a stain upon 
German honor that will not be washed out, a permanent reminder 
of the way in which the Germans made war. 

But it must not be supposed for a moment that such deeds as 
these were isolated instances or due merelv to drunken soldiers. 



82 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

They were the execution of a set policy. It is that which makes 
them so frightful. They were systematically committed by the 
men under the orders of the officers. They were repeatedly done at 
the suggestion of the officers, though without their orders; con- 
stantly done before officers who made no attempt to stop them. 
The dreadful purpose of these atrocities was to terrify the French 
and Belgian people so that neither would dare to continue the war 
against Germany. The French government published after the 
armistice a letter written by the Kaiser, William II, with his own 
hand to his ally, the Emperor of Austria, early in August, 1914. 
" My soul is rent, but everything must be put to fire and sword, the 
men and women, old people and children slain, nothing must be 
left standing, neither houses nor trees. With such methods of 
terrorism, the only means of striking at a race as degenerate as the 
French people are, the war will finish in two months or earlier, 
whereas, if I consider humanitarian principles, it may drag on for 
many years. In spite of my repugnance, I have therefore been 
compelled to adopt the former system, which will, notwithstanding 
appearances, prevent such bloodshed. ..." 

When it became clear that the French would not thus be fright- 
ened, the atrocities were continued to terrify the majority of people 
in Belgium and in northern France into working for the Germans. 
They could till the ground and raise food for German soldiers. 
They could work in factories and make things German soldiers 
needed. They could be sent to Germany and work in the fields 
and factories there. They must help the Germans carry on the 
war. They refused. They preferred to die. 

A third purpose, more terrible than either of these, was the 
German intention to kill so many Belgians, French, and Poles in 
Poland, where this same terrorism was used, that the Belgian and 
Polish nations would be destroyed, and the French so weakened 



HOW THE GERMANS MADE WAR 



83 



that when the war was over no resistance to Germany would ever 
be possible. There is no doubt of these facts ; we have the German 
War manuals describing this and positively ordering it. We have 
the original orders of the German generals ; we know from witnesses 




Das zerscfiossene 
Dorf 



Kiinstlerische Modellierbogen 

&^:^ Ein Dorf - 7 zerschossene Gebaude darstellend. 



L'lUustralion, Paris 

A Bit of Testimony about Public Opinion in Germany upon Atrocities 
An "artistic" toy prepared for children! "The Bombarded Village" 

that the officers carried them out ; we have diaries found upon dead 
German soldiers on the battlefield, telling why they committed 
such deeds. These methods of making war were adopted by the 
Germans consciously; they were not the disorderly conduct of a 
few men of whom their officers had lost control. 

If it had not been for the immediate assistance of the American 



84 THE STORY OF THE GUEAT WAR 

people, organized by Herbert Hoover through the American Com- 
mittee for the Relief of Belgium, for the work of the American Red 
Cross and other organizations in northern France, for the most 
part within the German lines, it is probable that there would to-day 
be few left of the Belgian people. When these dreadful facts became 
clear at the outset of the war, the American nation demanded the 
privilege of saving the Belgians, and the Germans, bad as they were, 
could not in decency refuse, although they did what they could to 
obstruct the work of the Committee. America fed Belgium 
through the war ; it clothed the Belgians ; and of that fact we have 
every right to be proud. In a sense, it made the United States a 
participant in the war from the beginning. 



CHAPTER X 

SEA-POWER AND THE BLOCKADE 

One of the most significant events at the very opening of the 
war was one of the quietest and least known. The British Grand 
Fleet was collected in the waters of the North Sea in anticipation 
of trouble, not so much because the British wished to fight as 
because they knew that part of the German plans involved a 
dash upon England. Each captain had in his possession a sealed 
envelope of orders, to be opened only after receipt of a certain 
signal. When it became clear that the war was a fact, the Ad- 
miralty sent out several hundred messages by wire to various 
ships, each of them consisting of a single word, "go"; within 
an hour the exact number of replies came back, "gone." No 
greater promptitude of action was displayed during the war. 
No more extraordinary case is known in history. 

Sea-power had in past wars proved the decisive factor. 
Napoleon was defeated by the British navy ; sea-power decided 
the American Civil War ; and it was clear that the influence of 
sea-power in this war might also be decisive. As a matter of fact, 
it was. The British navy silently, quickly, without fighting a 
major battle, in a sense won the war. 

The war was really won by a good many factors, not one of 
which could have been omitted. Thus, the Belgians in their 
first resistance saved France and therefore won the war; the 
French in the battle of the Marne threw back the Germans and 
decided the issue of the war ; at the same time the Russians, by 

85 



86 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

sacrificing their army in Poland, compelled the Germans to send 
troops east, and this allowed the French to win the battle of the 
Marne. The coming of the British army and of the American 
army were both events without which the war could not have 
been won ; but, in a real sense, all of these must have failed 
but for the blockade established by the British fleet. 

The great weakness in the German position, the very thing the 
Germans were fighting the war to correct, was their lack of raw 
materials necessary for German industry in peace or war. Nor 
could they collect in time of peace a sufficient store of cotton, 
wool, rubber, and copper without advertising their intention to 
fight a war. Some months' supply they might have on hand when 
the war broke out, but not more. A time would come, therefore, 
when it would be extremely difficult for them to get along without 
new supplies or without changing entirely their whole basis of 
living. They knew that if the British joined the war they would 
at once blockade Germany and stop the stream of supplies from 
outside. 

It meant a complete transformation of German industry. 
Everything in Germany would have to support the war, because 
Germany would have to make everything she needed. Nothing 
should be made that the Germans could not themselves use, for 
otherwise it could not be sold and would therefore become waste. 
Substitutes they thought they could find for some things ; enough 
supplies of others they thought they could smuggle through the 
British blockade with the help of the Dutch, the Danes, and the 
Swedes, who could claim rights, as neutral countries, to import such 
things for their own use, and who would then of course ship them 
to Germany. At any rate, the Germans thought their army would 
win the war before this economic pressure created by the sea- 
power could cripple them enough to bring the war to an end. 



SEA-POWER AND THE BLOCKADE 87 

They might have to get along without some things, eat food they 
did not particularly like, but there would be enough to eat and to 
wear and to fight with, and the end would be glorious. The British 
should be made to pay when the war was over. 

The Germans thought it possible, however, that they might 
forestall the blockade. Their own fleet should slip out before 
the British fleet sailed, and once on the open ocean it could give the 
British a chase — perhaps meet and defeat them. It would get 
its food and coal from the United States and other neutral coun- 
tries ; and by dividing the British fleet prevent the blockade of 
Germany. Fast German ships should be also equipped to capture 
British merchant vessels, and they would thus reduce the stream 
of supplies going to England, which was no less dependent than 
Germany upon raw material from outside if she was to continue 
the war. It might be that they could in this way, by these com- 
merce raiders, sink enough ships to make a difference. 

Then there were the submarines. They should attempt to sink 
battleships and thus break the blockade ; sink transports carrying 
troops across to France, steal into British harbors and sink the 
ships at anchor. If German ships could not sail the seas, it would 
then become a simple thing to loose thousands of floating mines. 
They would float along below the surface and, if a ship should touch 
one of them, it would explode and sink her. They would be 
carried by the tides and currents down upon the British fleet and 
sink it. 

Everything depended for the British upon the successful work 
of the fleet. It must keep open the ocean so that the supplies 
could reach England on which the continuation of the war 
depended. The food of the British people, clothes for the soldiers, 
everything necessary for the war, depended upon the British 
merchant marine and the ability of the fleet to protect it against 



88 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

German cruisers, submarines, and mines. The whole issue of 
victory depended upon the adequacy of the work of the fleet. 

At the outset the British were too quick for the Germans. The 
famous order described at the beginning of this chapter sent the 
British into action just in time to prevent the German escape. 
The German fleet was bottled up in its own ports before the war 
really began. There were a few German warships in Pacific 
and South American waters. Several German merchant ships 
were transformed into commerce raiders and for some months 
these were able to elude the vigilance of British and Japanese 
ships sent in pursuit. The Emden had a particularly thrilling 
and adventurous career. 

But by Christmas of 1914 the German warships had been cap- 
tured and sunk, and all commerce raiders had been rounded up. 
Meanwhile, the great harbors had been protected and a steel net 
had been erected across the mouth of the Thames River strong 
enough to resist submarines. This was a great engineering under- 
taking and its success meant much. Similar nets were created 
at once for the other British harbors, and one was even built 
practically across the Channel so as to stop mines floating down into 
the passage between England and France. These nets were 
composed of movable sections which could be opened at will. It 
became necessary — such was the cleverness of the Germans — 
to change the passage through the nets very often, because sub- 
marines would be waiting to sneak through the moment the net 
was opened at the former spot. 

Thousands of British ships were transformed into mine-sweepers 
to clear the sea around the British Islands, a very dangerous and 
difficult w^ork. Patrol boats to watch for submarines were sent 
out by dozens and then by hundreds. A screen of destroyers 
steamed up and down in front of the Grand Fleet practically 



SEA-POWER AND THE BLOCKADE 89 

throughout the duration of the war to ward ott" sul)inarin(^s and 
raiders. Week after w^eek, month after month, tlie steady 
patroIHng went on. The work of the submarine in sinking ships 
on the open ocean we shall have to tell about as the story goes on, 
but the success of the British fleet was complete. The entire 
British army, millions of men, was transported back and forth to 
France, practically w^ithout the loss of a man. Never for a 
moment was the army in France, or the French army (also 
dependent upon the British navy), without food, clothes, or 
ammunition, because of lack of transport. Despite the enormous 
number of ships sunk during the course of the w^ar by the sub- 
marines, the British factories never stopped work, night or day, 
because of a failure of raw materials with which to continue. 

In Germany, on the other hand, the blockade was so successful 
that things w'ent from bad to worse. As the war grew longer, the 
measures which the Germans had originally invented to create 
substitutes or to reorganize industries became less and less ade- 
quate. While probably few actually died of starvation, civilians, 
and even soldiers, were wearing clothes and shoes made of paper, 
and were not getting enough fats and sweets to keep up health. 
The war came to an end with the German army beaten and practi- 
cally in flight. It could hardly have been brought to that situation 
without the pressure of the blockade. The work of the British 
fleet was one of the most important single factors in winning the 
war. 



CHAPTER XI 
A bird's-eye view of the war 

This war was so different in character from those that preceded 
it that most people find it difficult to understand. They do not at 
first watch for the right thing. This was in particular a world- 
wide war. By Christmas of 1914, it was being fought in Europe, 
on the sea, in Africa, in the Near East, and in the Far East. 
There was in France a long double trench-line, six hundred miles 
long, every yard of it occupied by men. In Poland and all down 
along the Carpathians, there was a similar trench-line with 
Russians on one side, a ad Germans and Austrians on the other. 
Again, for a couple of hundred miles, down in the Balkans and 
around Constantinople were more trenches, more troops. 

The British and French fleets were down in the IMediterranean, 
getting ready to attack Constantinople. British fleets were fight- 
ing the Germans oft' South America. The Japanese were helping 
the British capture the Germans all through the Pacific. The 
Turks were fighting the British around the Suez Canal and down 
in Mesopotamia in the district of the Bagdad railroad. Up in the 
North Sea, amid the fogs of Scotland, was the Grand Fleet, 
hundreds of vessels, constantly steaming back and forth to prevent 
the German fleet from getting out or other ships from getting in. 

The most important thing to grasp is that the fighting was 
continuous on all these fronts almost from August, 1914, to the 
day of the Armistice on November 11, 1918. This was not so in 
past wars. There would be fighting here and then fighting there. 

90 



A BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF THE WAR 91 

There would be months, and sometimes years, when in any 
particular district there would be no fighting at all. Indeed, 
even in such long wars as those fought by Napoleon, the steady 
fighting was short, confined usually to a few months. A whole 
campaign, with all its preparations and marching, might consume 
only a few weeks, and the actual fighting between the armies be 
only a few days during the whole period. 

But in this war the fighting never stopped anywhere, night or 
day. Over every foot of the hundreds of miles in France, for 
four years or more, there was never a moment's real interruption. 
The fighting became simply more or less intense. Instead of 
sending over an occasional shell every little while to make sure 
that the enemy did not go to sleep, they might send over hundreds 
or thousands of shells within an hour, but the firing never wholly 
stopped. We have therefore not one story to tell, but half a dozen 
continuous stories to follow. 

The firing was moreover simuUqncous on all these fronts all 
the time. While we are describing what goes on in France, some- 
thing was at that same moment happening in Poland, very often 
of even more importance. Something else was taking place in 
Italy ; other things in the Balkans, in Asia Minor, in the North 
Sea with the Grand Fleet. Everyone of them may have had a vast 
influence on the history of the war and its outcome. It is im- 
possible to tell about them all at the same time, but we must not 
forget that important things are happening in several places at 
once. This is particularly essential, because the fundamental 
plan of the Allies was to fight the Central Powers on all fronts, at 
the same time, for long periods. The Allies had more men than 
the Central Powers and they expected thus to wear them down by 
what General Joft're called "nibbling." Very often the main 
point of the campaign was not merely an attack in one place, 



92 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

still less the fact that there was an attack in any place, but a 
simultaneous attack in France, in Poland, and in Italy. 

The real trouble with understanding the war is this manifold 
character. "It" is multifold. There were really hundreds of 
wars, all of them as big as any of the past conflicts, hundreds of 
heroes, hundreds of experiences. The war cannot in any true 
sense be described. It was too big to see, in a sense too big to be 
understood. There was too much in it to be told in a single 
volume. Besides, we need to know at once everything that went 
on everywhere, and it is impossible to describe more than one 
thing at a time. 

The bigness of the war was appalling. Here in Flanders were 
men making trenches in the mud, piling up sandbags, building 
timber walls to keep back the mud and to keep out the water ; 
up to their waists in water, much of the time. Then there were 
men on the hills of the Aisne, where they had solid ground under 
their feet, and could make trenches with concrete some thirty 
feet and more deep in the ground. Up in the Vosges and in the 
Alps were men fighting in the mountains, with deep precipices in 
front of them and high mountain crags behind them, compelled 
to climb about like goats in order to reach such positions at all. 
They must drag great cannon up the mountain sides, and often 
have ammunition and food sent up on cables or elevators. Down 
in the sand about the Suez Canal were men fighting in the heat. 
Up in the ice around Archangel at the same minute would be men 
fighting in the cold. The ice in the harbor was broken daily 
with dynamite in order that ships might get in, at the same time 
that men were shivering in the mud of Flanders, stamping their 
feet in the snows of the Alps, and suffering with thirst in the heat 
and sand of the desert. Negroes in Central Africa, Hindus in 
India, the Japs in China, were also fighting the war. 



A BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF THE WAR 93 

Throughout the world, far from battle fronts, were millions of 
people also fighting the war. Some were raising beef and chickens, 
others were planting wheat, making automobiles, or weaving cloth. 
All were essential to keep the war going and were also as important, 
though in a different way, as the continual fighting in the trenches. 
Indeed, the people in France who baked the bread in bakehouses 
where a million loaves were turned out in a day ; the women who 
sat hour after hour sewing sandbags, thousands of which might be 
needed at any moment to repair some trench broken by a German 
shell; or the men and women engaged in making shoes for the 
armies ; all of these were in a strict sense fighting. 

That is a new idea to most people, for certainly such occupations 
would have not been considered fighting in past wars. Even 
mending shoes — millions of them — was a part of the business 
of war, just as the selling of bonds, the buying of thrift stamps 
by children, subscriptions to the Red Cross, the making of 
bandages. The world worked like a beaver. Every man, woman, 
and child for over four years did something whicTi played its part 
in fighting the war on one side or the other. A moment's thought 
will show how impossible it is that any one mind should ever be 
able to see all that happened in detail, or that any one book could 
ever say more than that the stupendous affair took place. 

The real fascination of the war for most people who fought in it 
was due to this very sense of bigness. It was a greater game than 
had ever been played before in the world. There had never been 
so many millions of men all trying to do the same thing at the 
same time. It had never been so important that no one of these 
millions should fail to do his task in the proper w^ay. Over hun- 
dreds of miles of trenches, every one must be alert. Battles lasted 
months. Single incidents consumed a week. 

The dramatic quality of the old wars came from the individual 



94 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

exploits. There are few who do not thrill to read of Richard, the 
Lionhearted, clad in full armor, spurring his charger into the 
midst of the Saracens. Joan of Arc, dashing forward on horse- 
back at the head of the charge, or Henry of Navarre, with a white 
plume in his helmet so that his men might see how far ahead of 
them in the press of the enemy the king was, are figures which 
kindle one's imagination. Their exploits were frequently the 
important fact of the battle. All was being lost, when some 
one individual, like the king, would do something which made 
the difference between victory and defeat. It became therefore the 
essential thing in the battle to describe. 

But thousands of men in the present war have done things which 
required a great deal more courage than any of these exploits of 
the past because they incurred a much greater risk of death ; but 
they do not sound so dramatic when described and really did not 
affect the issue of the battle as a whole, and therefore did not affect 
the outcome of the war. In this war no incidents or personal 
exploits form an important part of its history. The real conflict 
took place in movements so big that the individual was lost and 
his exploits were not even incidents. One hundred thousand men 
were very often concerned in a movement occupying perhaps a 
week's time, which will appear eventually in history as a very minor 
incident of a battle consuming months of time. We are indeed to 
watch charges made by a million men, more magnificent by a 
thousand times than the old charges of a few thousand, but too big 
for the mind to grasp, for the eye to see, or for the historian to 
describe, so that an ordinary imagination, which works in terms of 
individuals, can take it in at all. The campaigns of this war 
were in reality many times more exciting than those of past wars, 
but there were so many men concerned in them that they lose their 
personal appeal. 



A BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF THE WAR 95 

At the same time, the history of the war is very simple and not 
at all difficult to understand. There is really no more to describe 
in the movement of the armies in its whole four years, in France 
certainly, than Napoleon frequently accomplished in six weeks. 
In the American Revolution, Washington's armies were moving 
constantly, and five thousand men in the course of a single year 
gave the historian more to describe which is intelligible to the 
reader than the whole of the last four years in France. Battles then 
were battles of movement. Napoleon would march so many miles ; 
meet some army ; a battle would take place ; there would be a fur- 
ther shift of operations ; all of which is interesting to read about. 

But the war in France was like a great football game where the 
two elevens fell into a scrimmage in the fall of 1914, and, without 
ever stopping the scrimmage, pushed and pushed for four years, 
neither side gaining much ground or losing a great deal. If we 
look at the movements in France over the battlefields as a whole 
and over the four years as a whole, it looks very much as five 
minutes of a football game might look, when the teams moved 
back and forth across the center of the field, first one a little in the 
other's territory, then thrown for a loss, and presently gaining 
again. 

The dramatic quality of the war was due for the Allies to the 
consciousness of its rightness. In no war in history had more been 
as clearly at stake. Every Frenchman, every Englishman, and 
most Americans felt that the whole future of the world was in 
jeopardy. To most of them the war was a great crusade. When 
the men in the trenches felt that the war was dull or dangerous, 
they would remember the starving Belgians, beaten and abused 
by the Germans, the little children slaughtered by German soldiers 
simply because they got in the way. They would remember the 
face of a child floating in the green floods of the Atlantic after the 



96 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

sinking of some ship by a submarine. Immediately their fear 
and fatigue would fall from them. 

Or they would remember the Zeppelins dropping bombs upon 
London, killing innocent children, old men and women, or they 
would think of the German aim to conquer the world and compel 
all people to copy German methods. The war would become 
important, exciting, and a glorious thing. A young French soldier 
and art critic, a man of extraordinarily sensitive mind and hatred 
of bloodshed, wrote to a friend soon after he went into the war : 
" I have no wish to die, but I can die now without regret ; for I 
have lived through a fortnight which would be cheap at the price 
of death, a fortnight which I had not dared to ask of fate. History 
will tell of us, for we are opening a new era in the world." "A 
splendid thing it is to fight with clean hands and a pure heart 
and defend divine justice with one's life." 

The general movement of the war was so simple that it can be 
told in a few paragraphs, although it is so complex that perhaps 
the world will never understand it. There was for four years in 
France this deadlock of the two trench lines which shifted only a 
few miles one way or the other until the very end of the war. 
Tremendous attacks were delivered by both sides, often for 
months at a time, without shifting the position of the line to a 
perceptible degree. That was one phase of the situation. Simul- 
taneous with it we have a succession of tremendous German vic- 
tories in eastern Europe. In 1914 and 1915 Poland was conquered 
and the Russian army really broken. In the fall of 1915 Serbia 
was crushed and laid waste; in 1916, Rumania ; and in 1917, Italy 
was invaded. In the east, in the course of four years, all was 
lost to the Allies. The Russians, defeated and disorganized, 
ceased to be a factor in the war at all ; so of the Rumanians and 
the Serbians. The Italians were badly beaten and forced back 



A BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF THE WAR 97 

into a dangerous position ; but Italy was never crushed nor de- 
feated, though for a time in very grave peril. 

Outside Europe proper the war also went on for four years, 
and, although the Germans and the Turks at first seemed to have 
won in Mesopotamia and Asia Minor, they were at the very outset 
thoroughly beaten in South Africa, in Egypt, in India, and in 
China. Then eventually in the latter years they were beaten in 
Armenia and about Bagdad and Jerusalem, and at the very end of 
the war Constantinople would have been captured, if the Turks had 
not surrendered. So for the four years the Germans seemed to be 
able to hold their great gains at the beginning of the war in France, 
to pile victory upon victory in eastern Europe ; but were beaten 
everywhere outside of Europe. 

On the sea, the Germans were defeated at the outset. The few 
warships outside German harbors were promptly destroyed or 
captured ; the few commerce raiders were taken by the British 
and Japanese ; and the blockade by the British fleet was made 
effective. Once or twice, the German fleet ventured out for a few 
miles, but found the British so extremely vigilant that it scuttled 
back into the harbor a good deal faster than it came out. The 
British in the last two years of the war did their best to tempt the 
Germans out by sending forth small squadrons of weak ships, 
apparently not protected or supported, in the hope that the 
Germans would try to capture them. Preparations of course had 
been made to pounce upon the Germans with a great force if they 
did come out, but the Germans were too wary. Eventually, 
the great German fleet sailed forth and surrendered without as 
a whole having fired a gun or fought a battle. It was one of the 
most colossal demonstrations of supremacy on the sea the world 
has ever seen. The Germans admitted British superiority to be 
so great that they did not dare to try the issue in battle. 



98 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

Then in 1918 the Germans made a very great attempt to break 
the Allied lines in France, which nearly succeeded. The Allies 
attacked in their own turn in July, 1918, broke the German line, 
followed up the German retreat so fast and won so many battles 
that the Germans were forced to surrender. It would almost seem 
as if everything which happened outside of France had not been 
able to affect the end of the war at all. Whatever the Germans 
did in eastern Europe, they could not win. The important part 
of the war in France seemed like one long draw of four years, and 
then two battles, each several months long. We must therefore 
watch a great many things in a great many places, but remember, 
for all that, the important thing is the fact that the war was 
continuous and that the war was simultaneoiis. It was fought in a 
great many places in the world and it was fought all the time and 
at the same time. 



BOOK III 
THE WAR IN 1915 



CHAPTER XII 

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1915 

The first months of the war had absolutely upset all the German 
calculations. Their original plans were useless. Those same 
months had given the Allies courage and confidence.^ Indeed 
both Germans and Allies were now positive that they held the 
upper hand, could take the offensive with decisive effect whenever 
they might choose. This belief on the part of both that they could 
now proceed to lay their plans for the final campaign is the key 
to this year of the war. First we must describe the German plan 
because they fought the war throughout as an aggressive war. 

They had failed in their design of overwhelming France before 
Russia should move. They were now face to face with a problem, 
which they had always felt most difficult — a war in the west and 
east at the same time. Their desire was, as always in the past, 

1 Properly speaking, the term, "Allies," which was so commonly used 
during the war, included the French, British, Russians, Belgians, and Italians, 
all of whom were allied together against the Germans and Austro-Hungarians. 
The latter came to be called the Central Powers. But in practice the terms 
" Alhes" and " Allied Armies " referred only to the French, Belgians, and British 
fighting in France, and included of course such other troops as were fighting 
there — Portuguese, a Russian division, Italians. The reason was that the 
Russians fought really only in the east, and the Italians in force only in the 
south for the greater part of the war. Similarly, it was common to speak of 
the "Germans" when writing of the Polish and French fronts and of the 
"Austrians" when writing about Italy, though there were Austrian divisions 
in France, Germans in Italy, and Austrians and Germans always in Poland 
and Galicia, and Jlungarian and Slav divisions in all parts of the Austrian 
army. 

101 



102 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

to fight on one front at a time. But which should it be ? Their 
real enemy they felt was Russia. There on the east were one 
hundred and eighty millions of people who would always be hostile 
to Germany. France was already only half of Germany's size 
and could never be in the future dangerous. At the outset it 
had been desirable to crush France before meeting Russia, because 
the Germans had thought that France could be crushed quickly 
and they knew that the Russians could not. They would now 
therefore leave France alone, fight a defensive war in the west, 
and throw their strength in eastern Europe. If they could beat 
Russia they felt that even defeat in the west would be of no conse- 
quence. They would have gained so much that, even if they 
lost territory to France eventually, the war would have been worth 
while. 

As for England, they had been developing during the long years 
of preparation two instruments which they believed might of 
themselves win the war. The one was the Zeppelin ; with it they 
would terrify the English. For hundreds of years no hostile 
shots had been fired on London ; for hundreds of years no enemy 
had crossed the English Channel, and the English had begun to 
believe themselves so absolutely secure that the Germans believed 
they would be terrified, and perhaps give up the fight, when the 
bombs began to fall in the London streets. On what other basis 
the Germans supposed the Zeppelin raids would influence the 
result of the war it is hard to see. They certainly could not expect 
to transport an army on the Zeppelins and thus invade England. 
Perhaps they might have hoped to destroy the fleet, but at any 
rate they meant the English to learn that they were no longer safe 
in their "snug little isle," as they loved to call it. 

The other weapon was the submarine. With it English battle- 
ships should be sunk ; English harbors raided ; merchant ships 



THE CAMPAIGN OF 1915 103 

captured ; food and supplies sunk. The enthusiastic Germans 
saw the English starving and in a few weeks ready to surrender. 
They therefore proclaimed a war zone around the British islands 
which should be blockaded by German submarines and should be 
traversed by ships only at their peril. They saw now that the 
war must go on for a while at least. The submarine and the 
Zeppelin would subdue England while they held France at bay 
with one hand and destroyed Russia with the other. 

The Allied plan of operations for 1915 assumed that the German 
bolt had been shot, that the German strength had been exhausted, 
that the German military strategy had been defeated, and that 
the initiative in the war had passed to the Allies. This proved 
not to be true and was in part responsible for the Allied failures 
in this year. What, they asked themselves, was the thing the 
Germans feared most? A simultaneous attack in Poland and in 
France. The Germans had always said that they would not be 
able to meet such an assault. Very well, said the Allied generals, 
let us deliver one. Let us begin it early and keep it up late. 
We shall not at first make much progress, but a steady pressure, 
compelling them to fight everywhere at once, must in the end 
succeed. They therefore proposed a great attack in France, a 
great assault by the Russians in East Prussia, and a great assault 
by the Italians upon the Austrian rear near Trieste, along a little 
river called the Isonzo, which formed the boundary between 
Austria and Italy. This involved inducing Italy to join the Allies, 
and in May, 1915, Italy did enter the war. 

None of these campaigns, however, on account of the weather 
could be begun early in the year. There was another thing most 
essential to accomplish if the war was to continue. The Allies 
knew that, although Russia had plenty of men, she had few 
factories for making cannon, ammunition, and clothes, and it 



104 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

was clear that without adequate supplies, she could not continue 
the war indefinitely. There would come relatively soon a time 
when there would be nothing more for the Russian army to wear 
or to shoot with. Indeed at that moment not all the troops had 
rifles. But the Germans had blockaded Russia. Their fleet 
at Kiel bottled up the Baltic, which was the only way to reach 
Russia on the north unless one went as far as Archangel in the 
Arctic Ocean. This was tremendously far oft', was frozen solid the 
greater part of the year, and its use compelled the Russians to 
haul the goods by rail for hundreds of miles before they could get 
them into Poland. But it was not possible to open the Baltic 
while the German navy existed and refused to fight. 

On the south the waterways to Russia lead from the ocean into 
the jNIediterranean and thence into the Black Sea. This was, 
however, blockaded by the Turks, whom the Germans had brought 
into the war for this purpose. Constantinople controls the mouth 
of the Black Sea, and is itself approached by two narrow straits, 
the one called the Bosphorus and the other called the Dardanelles. 
A ship trying to get to the Black Sea had to pass first through the 
Dardanelles, a very narrow rocky strait, some miles long, where 
swift currents made navigation difficult. It was protected on both 
sides by forts, mounting very large modern German guns. A ship 
then passed into a small sea, the Sea of Marmora, and must then go 
through the Bosphorus, another narrow strait, only a few miles 
wide, protected by the great forts at Constantinople. The British 
thought that the Dardanelles might probably be forced by the fleet, 
which carried guns fully as large as those in the Turkish batteries. 
They might thus open a waterway to Russia and be able to supply 
Russia with the guns, ammunition, and clothes that she needed 
so badly, and would be able themselves to get from Russia what 
they also needed, wheat and petroleum. 



106 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

There was another purpose. Austria was the most vulnerable 
of the Central Powers and on the south could be easily attacked. 
Her southern boundary was occupied by the Balkan States, as they 
are called, and at this particular time, the three important states, 
Bulgaria, Greece, and Rumania, were still neutral and were very 
obviously waiting to see whether the Central Empires or the Allies 
were more likely to win. Nobody doubted that they proposed 
to join the victor, if they could only find out which side would win. 
If now the Allies could defeat Turkey and open the Dardanelles, 
they thought the Balkan nations would all join them. A French 
and British army would then be able to attack Austria from the 
mountains with complete success and so end the war. There were 
a great many in London and in Paris who felt this was the only 
way the war could be won. 

If the Balkans should join Germany and the Allies should have 
to fight their way through the mountains, the majority felt such a 
campaign was impossible. It would cost too much and take too 
long. The Germans would probably win in France while the 
Allies were getting through the mountains. A great deal there- 
fore depended upon the attack upon the Dardanelles. If it 
succeeded, the Allies might win the war in 1915. If it failed, the 
war might go on indefinitely. But if the Dardanelles were opened, 
if the Russians and the French should attack simultaneously, 
and if Italy entered the war, the Allies thought it possible that they 
might reach Berlin during the summer, but certainly would cele- 
brate Christmas there. 

It is possible to tell much more briefly what the results of the 
year's fighting were and it is essential to see them in this brief 
way, if they are to be understood. The Germans opened the 
year with Zeppelin raids on England, which failed absolutely to do 
anything except stimulate British recruiting. By this time the 



THE CAMPAIGN OF 1915 107 

British had undertaken to create an army of several milHon men. 
The submarine also began its operations, and with some effect. 
The great attack delivered by the British and French fleets in 
February and March on the Dardanelles failed. Then, in that 
same month, the British and French delivered great assaults in 
France, which the Germans, in accordance with their plans, merely 
tried to defeat and in which they were successful. The Germans 
themselves in April began a tremendous campaign in Poland, and 
another in Galicia in May and June, all of which were so successful 
that on August 4, the Kaiser entered Warsaw in triumph. Poland 
was conquered, the Russians crushed. 

Meanwhile, Italy had entered the war at the end of May and 
had delivered an assault upon the Austrians at Trieste ; but this, 
too, failed. Bulgaria now, in the autumn, joined the Germans. 
Having succeeded so well, the Germans and Austrians felt that 
they could take a little time to complete the conquest of Serbia 
and occupy territory so essential to the control of the great railroad 
from Berlin to Bagdad. They attempted to exterminate the 
Serbian nation. Their object was to leave behind a body of 
people too small to hope in the future ever to oppose their designs. 
Greece was kept from joining the Germans only by the landing 
of an Anglo-French army at Saloniki. So ended the campaign of 
1915. The cause of the Allies looked more hopeless than before 
and victory farther away on the horizon. 



CHAPTER XIII 

THE CHARACTER OF MODERN WARFARE 

The reason why the Allies failed in 1915 was the extremely 
complex character of the new warfare. They at first did not 
understand it, partly because it was new and partly because it 
was so complicated that it took time to analyze it. What the 
Germans had needed thirty years and more to think out, it was 
not to be expected the Allies would understand in a few months. 
What the Germans needed thirty years to get ready to do, the 
Allies could not prepare to duplicate in six months. That is 
the chief reason why the war lasted four years. The Allies had 
to fight under the new conditions. They were able at once to 
prevent the Germans from winning, but how to win themselves 
was not a thing so easy to learn. In fact, it was not until 1918 
that they worked out a successful technique for the offensive! 
Much of the history of the war therefore is a story of experiment, 
of experience, of relative success, and relative failure. There are 
new methods and new weapons. The Germans invent one, and 
the Allies neutralize it! The Allies create one, and the Germans 
offset it. 

This was the first great war fought with the new weapons which 
science had provided. The Russo-Japanese War had, to be sure, 
tried them out somewhat and the Boer War had shown some 
things, but in the main the result upon warfare of the new artillery 
and the new rifle was not fully appreciated even by the Germans. 
One of the discoveries was shrapnel. This was a shell, thrown 

108 



110 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

from a short-range gun — and a gun firing no more than three 
miles was short-ranged — timed to burst in the air and scatter 
over a wide area a great number of bullets or jagged fragments 
of iron. Flesh and blood could not resist it. 

One of the great German surprises was the high explosive shell 
loaded with one of the super-powders or super-dynamites. The 
explosion was so tremendous that one shell falling upon a regi- 
ment would annihilate it ; landing upon a trench it would simply 
wipe it out. Houses crumbled like cardboard and the most 
elaborate steel forts in Europe were turned upside down. There 
was only one way to meet that kind of shell and that was to keep 
out of the way. Then there was the machine gun, sending forth 
a stream of bullets, covering a wide area as fast as a man could 
turn a crank. The bullets were deadly and the stream was con- 
tinuous. 

The new cannon projected these shells and bullets astonishing 
distances. Rifles hitting at more than a mile were common ; 
shrapnel was effective at great distances; and high-explosive 
shells could be shot with accuracy from five to ten miles. Even- 
tually the large guns threw projectiles twenty miles or more, and 
one German freak cannon hit Paris from a distance of over seventy 
miles. 

The result was that fighting in the open simply came to an end. 
Men in the open would positively be killed. A body of troops 
advancing across a field miles away from the German lines could 
be wiped out by high-explosive shells, if they were seen from a 
German aeroplane or balloon. Once they came within eyesight 
of the German batteries shrapnel could annihilate them, and loi)g 
before they could get near enough to take a German trench, the 
machine guns could kill them all. They could not escape the 
three. At the end of the battle of the jNIarne, both armies were 



THE CHARACTER OF MODERN WARFARE 



111 



digging furiously to get into the ground out of sight. Nothing 
but Mother Earth could protect them from the new artillery. 
There came to be, therefore, in France, and to some extent in 
eastern Europe, nothing but a trench line from the mountains 




f'Tencti Pictorial Service 

French Obsekva-^ion Rai,loon. Note transport wagons, horse lines, cemetery, 
etc. The picture gives multifold details about the area behind the lines. 



to the sea, in which both armies burrowed like moles in a desperate 
anxiety to get as far out of sight as quickly as possible. 

It may be interesting to give a typical description of an approach 
upon the battle line from the open country at the rear. The 
first thing we come to is the army of supply which supports and 
keeps alive the army in the trenches. It is a city of huts and 



112 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

horse tents something like a mammoth circus. Passing through 
long stretches of it we come to the supply lines. Here we find the 
roads filled with motors, carrying all sorts of things, and small 
railroads, with little dummy trains puffing back and forth on 
tracks running out here and there like veins in the landscape. 

Far away on the horizon, miles away, is a ridge with a row of 
charred trees, standing out gloomily etched against the sky. 
That is the battle line. We do not hear anything, but we see 
some fleecy balls of smoke. Those are the exploding shells. 
Suddenly from above comes a roar of noise and we see an aero- 
plane, or perhaps half a dozen of them, starting out for a trip 
across the lines or coming back from one. Up in the air out in 
front of us are floating around a number of fat sausages. They 
are observation balloons, in each one of which is a man with a 
glass trying to see where the German batteries are. 

On we go an interminable distance, several miles perhaps, and 
we come presently to a plain which was once a wood. A battle 
was fought here some time ago. The trees have all been mowed 
down as if by some giant scythe or tremendous mowing machine ; 
here and there a solitary tree trunk, which somehow was missed, 
sticks out of the ground. Presently we come to a sort of slit in 
the ground and begin walking downhill. Now the surface of the 
ground is up to our knees, presently it is up to our waist, and 
pretty soon over our heads. 

We do not march straight forward, because the trench is not 
straight. It curves and zigzags and goes round sharp corners 
until we are dizzy and have lost all sense of the way in which we 
are going. That is so that a machine gun of the enemy would 
not be able to flre the whole length of the trench, in case they 
should happen to get in front of it. It also protects the people 
walking along the trench from the tons of chance bullets which 



THE CHARACTER OF MODERN WARFARE 



113 



the Germans and Allies were both continually shooting at each 
other in the hope that one of them might kill a man. Nothing 
but large masses of Mother Earth stops bullets. 

We come presently to a line of trenches that runs at right angles 
with the one we have come through. These are the support 
trenches and there are sometimes several lines of them. We 
proceed from one of these lines to another, all of them more or 



^'' *'-''" 




^o 






^w^^ 

^ 


90^^9^ 


k¥^<«^^^^^^ 


m 



Underwood and Underwood 

Aeroplane Picture of German Trench Lines at Malmaison, December, 

1917 



less parallel, by means of communication trenches which zigzag 
back and forth from one to the other. No one sticks his head 
above ground if he can help it. He would be likely to lose it. 

The front trenches are like the others, except that they are 
worse. Every once in a while a German shell blows out a section 
of them. In front of these a mound of earth has been thrown up 
or sand bags have been piled to make a sort of low parapet. 
Through cracks in this a soldier looks out to see if the enemy is 
coming, or he uses a periscope, exactly the same as the submarine 
uses. It is really an arrangement of mirrors, and is intended to 



114 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

allow one to look around a corner or over a wall. Looking through 
the periscope we see outside in front, a few yards away, a series 
of barbed wire fences. They are Allied entanglements to stop 
or delay a German charge. Some further distance off, in some 
places a long distance, in others only a hundred or two hundred 
\ yards, are other fences. Those .are the German wire fences. 
t-, ^ "*/ 'pjjg ground in between looks as iuit had been stirred with some 
giant egg beater and churned up into mud. It is pitted all 
over with enormous holes where the high explosive shells have 
struck. 

There in these trenches in the ground, looking through peri- 
scopes, sit the Allied soldiers, watching another series of holes 
where the Germans are sitting. A certain amount of shooting 
is going on all the time and the humming of rifle bullets and the 
scream of shells is constant. Then will come a great scream, 
announcing the arrival of a big shell. All the noise in the world 
seems concentrated on that spot and the earth shoots up like corn 
popping in a pan. 

At night the trench line looks like a continual display of fire- 
works. Darkness is the most useful thing in modern warfare 
because at night it is more difficult to see people. Then the 
soldiers come out and repair the barbed wire, mend trenches, and 
go back and forth to the rear without much danger. In the day- 
time even an automobile moving along a road so far away that 
the cannonade sounds like little more than a rumble is in danger 
of being hit. To prevent the enemy from rushing, the trenches 
both sides keep sending up lights called star shells. Little balloons 
also are sent up carrying lights which float around and burn a 
long time. Some of these are so very brilliant that they light 
up whole sections of the line almost like daylight. When the 
artillery fires at night, the flashes make a magnificent spectacle. 



THE CHARACTER OF MODERN WARFARE 115 

In the daytime trench warfare is not very picturesque; at night 
it is magnificent. 

This was all the result of the necessity of getting out of sight 
and it at once transformed warfare. The old battle had been one 
of movement. One formation of troops marched against another. 
One general tried to get his army on the flank or in the rear of 
the other general's, and it was always possible because there was 
plenty of open ground to move over. But the number of troops 
engaged in the present war was so enormous that they spread 
out over miles of ground. The German invasion advancing into 
France was over one hundred miles broad, and when that number 
of men began to dig into the ground to get hidden, it took an 
extraordinary number of miles of trenches to hide them. The 
battle line started in half as wide as France and presently was 
continued all the way to the sea. 

Movement in the old sense became impossible : there were only 
two ways to move. One was forward and the other was back, and 
both sides only wished to go forward. This meant that the only 
possible attack was a direct frontal attack upon prepared posi- 
tions. The only thing either side could do was to charge straight 
at the other and attack the enemy exactly where he was expect- 
ing to be hit, exactly where he had concentrated his guns, was 
ready to do the most damage, and receive the least injury. 

The Germans at first believed (as the Allies also did) that, if 
only enough men were sent out to rush the enemy trenches, they 
could capture them. It would cost a good many lives but it 
could be done. But presently the idea had to be given up. There 
were too many ways of checking the charge long enough to kill 
every man who started. The big guns could begin with the charge 
when it first left cover a long distance away, the shrapnel could 
continue the work as they came nearer, and then the machine 



116 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

guns could open up. The barbed wire would effectively prevent 
their getting at the front trenches until they had been riddled with 
bullets. Hand grenades, or small bombs thrown by hand, could 
be tossed out into the advancing troops by the defenders and 
would kill numbers of men. Then mines could be laid out in 
front of the trenches and exploded by electricity when a whole 
regiment of the foe was standing on them. Flesh and blood could 
not overcome such resistance. Some other method of attack 
had to be found. 

Spreading the men out on the field instead of allowing them 
to advance shoulder to shoulder was promptly tried. The diffi- 
culty here was that more men got through out of those who started, 
but that not so many could start, and the weight of the charge 
was likely to be lost. It is just the same problem as that of a 
football eleven which spreads out five feet apart and then runs 
at its opponents. The men cannot go so far as when massed 
together. 

Then the accuracy of the artillery fire became so great as the 
first months passed that a sort of attack which was very suc- 
cessful at the beginning of the war was destroyed before it had 
gone a hundred yards after the war was a year old. The shrapnel 
fire became absolutely accurate, the machine gun fire sure death 
to anything within range, and even the big guns, miles away, soon 
were able to hit a moving object with great frequency. It was 
difficult to get out of the trenches without being annihilated ; 
it was almost as perilous to stay in them. Both sides experienced 
the same trouble. 

It was clear that the decisive factor in the new warfare was the 
artillery and that the large artillery played the most important 
part. It was absolutely imperative to defend the Allied trenches 
from the German artillery by keeping it back out of range. The 



THE CHARACTER OF MODERN WARFARE 117 

big Allied guns must be sufficiently prompt and accurate to wipe 
out all small German guns which were likely to fire upon the 
infantry at short range. They would never be able entirely to 
clear them out, but unless they demolished a considerable num- 
ber, the Allied trenches could not be held. Of course, small guns 
of all sorts and kinds could be kept, and soon were, within the 
battle area by both sides, provided they did not reveal themselves 
to the foe by firing. This came gradually to be the rule : guns 
within range of the enemy's big artillery must be thoroughly 
concealed or must keep quiet until an infantry attack should 
take place. Then the enemy's large guns must stop firing to 
allow his own infantry to move into that area. 

On the offensive, the artillery was absolutely the essential 
factor. It must first accurately blow out of the ground the 
barbed wire entanglements of the enemy. Otherwise the Allied 
troops would be held up and killed. It must also destroy the bulk 
of the machine guns and small artillery within the entire area the 
Allied troops were to attack. If it did not succeed, they were 
absolutely certain to be killed. If the artillery did its work 
properly, the infantry could then move forward and occupy as 
much territory as the artillery could "prepare," as the phrase 
went. It was demonstrated early in 1915 that it wa3' perfectly 
easy to destroy any section of the enemy front line by artillery 
fire and then occupy it at some cost of life so long as the infantry 
kept within the protection of their own artillery. 

It was merely a question of the amount of ammunition which 
had to be fired in order to destroy the enemy defenses. To be 
sure, that amount turned out to be extraordinarily large, but the 
real cost of taking the other lines was ammunition, not lives. But 
if enough ammunition was not spent, the price in lives was sicken- 
ing. Even after proper artillery "preparation" it was not at 



118 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

first possible for the infantry to go forward more than a few hun- 
dred yards. Every step they advanced beyond a certain short 
range, they were leaving their own guns behind and running into 




French Pictorial Scrricc 

Interior \'iew of French Concrete Machine Gun Ne.st 

the range of the German artillery which their own guns had not 
yet been able to destroy. ; - 

It was soon clear that the artillery could not move forward as 
fast as the infantry did, but it was also clear that the infantry 
would be exterminated the moment they went faster than the 



THE CHARACTER OF MODERN WARFARE 



119 



a^tille^J^ It was easy to go a short distance, but not particularly 
worth while. Days and months were necessary by this method 
to move into the enemy's defense for a few miles, and the trenches 
were of such a simple nature that he could dig new ones almost as 
fast as the Allies could take the old ones. A zone of trenches 
several miles wide, the 
Germans calculated, 
would be a perfect 
defense, if prepared in 
advance and protected 
by artillery. Human 
beings could not enter 
it and live. 

The Germans now 
began to systematize 
the new warfare. If 
the game was to de- 
stroy the trenches, the 
machine guns, and 
small artillery within 
a certain area so that 
the infantry could then come over and occupj^ it, the answer was 
simple. Even the largest shells did not penetrate into the earth 
more than a few yards. If, therefore, fortifications were built of 
concrete and timber thirty or forty feet underground, the Allies 
might pound them with as large shells as they pleased. They 
could not destroy them. Protection was merely a question of 
depth. When the Allied artillery began to fire, all the Germans 
needed to do was to retire to the underground forts and wait, 
playing phonographs, eating, or sleeping until the enemy should 
get through. The Allied guns would have to stop firing to allow 




French Pictorial Service 

German Concrete Houses Aboveground on 

THE HiNDENBURG LiNE WHICH SURVIVED THE 

Final Allied Artillery Attack in 1918 



120 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

their own infantry to advance, and, when the silence began, the 
Germans would know that the Allied infantry was coming. They 
could then climb upstairs and annihilate them with machine guns. 
Of course, it was true that the Allies could and did play this 
same game. By it, they could prevent the Germans from winning 
the war, but by it, undoubtedly, the Germans could also prevent 
them from winning. Modern warfare had produced a deadlock. 
Neither side seemed to be able in 1915 to make any progress nor 
did either of them make in France any real progress for three 
years. 



CHAPTER XIV 

THE MACHINERY OF AN ARMY 

The most complex thing in the whole world is a modern army. 
In order to keep alive at all it has to do for itself everything that 
the ordinary community does, and it then organizes, in addition, 
a machinery for fighting which is as much more exact and complex 
than anything else any nation does as it is possible to conceive. 
Most governments in the world are satisfied when they get a part 
of the things done that are desirable and when they do them fairly 
well. But it became clear at the very outset that the army could 
not be satisfied with any such standard. The omission of any- 
thing, however small, might cost anywhere from ten to ten thou- 
sand lives. A moment's carelessness or heedlessness or forget- 
fulness on the part of a single man, even no better than a private, 
might allow some German attack to succeed. 

When the armies dug in out of sight and began to take elabo- 
rate measures to conceal "themselves, a successful defense, to say 
nothing of a successful offensive, depended upon seeing something 
of what the enemy was doing and where he was. There was only 
one eye that the army could use which was of any value, and that 
was the aeroplane. To a man standing on the ground and looking 
across country there would be absolutely nothing in sight. The 
trenches themselves would not be visible. All the guns could 
be easily concealed by screens of trees or leaves. Indeed, at 
times while a battle was raging, it was not possible in the day- 
time to see anything except scenery and absolutely not a sound was 

121 



122 



THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 



to be heard. Yet along the hills and valleys there might be half a 

million men watching each other, waiting for each other to move. 

But when an observer rose in an aeroplane and flew over the 

enemy's lines, a great deal became perfectly clear. The trenches 

could not be concealed com- 
pletely. There was always that 
tremendous weapon, the cam- 
era, and a picture faithfully 
reproduced everything. It 
could be developed and en- 
larged, and then, with a micro- 
scope and a ruler, the officers 
could determine the exact lo- 
cation of nearly everything 
the enemy had prepared. Bal- 
loons were also sent up from 
which an observer could see 
several miles and from which, 
of course, the enemy batteries 
within close range could be 
detected by the puffs of smoke 
when they fired. The man in 
the balloon would identify the 
spot on his map and then tele- 
phone the location to his own 
batteries beneath him. 
All this machinery of aeroplanes, balloons, observers, telephones, 
and wireless was absolutely essential to hit anything, whether 
for defense or offense. Of course, an aeroplane flying over the 
enemy lines could see whether the trenches were full of men, and 
therefore ready for an attack; discover whether or not large 




French Trench with Periscope and 
Field Telephone 



THE MACHINERY OF AN ARMY 



123 



numbers of reenforcements were coming up, and therefore give 
the only warning which was at all dependable of the time and 
whereabouts of an assault. 

The function of the aeroplane was also to put out the enemy's 
eyes. It must prevent his aeroplanes from cruising over the 




French Pictorial Service 



British Advance Artillery Observation Post, with Periscope and Field 

Telephone 



Allied lines. It must shoot down his balloons; it must kill his 
observers. Obviously, if either side could get complete control of 
the air for a time, it might win a great victory, and perhaps the war. 
When the army came to consist of millions of men, an ordinary 
voice became useless for giving orders and any of the older methods 
by dispatch riders became impossible. Ordinary ears were no 
longer useful. The war was necessarily fought by wire, by tele- 
phone, telegraph, and wireless. From the slightest thing up to 
the most important order, everything must go over the wires, 



124 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

and the electrical department of the modern army was its most 
important factor, because it was its voice and its ear. Head- 
quarters looked like a telephone exchange. It would probably 
be located in some perfectly quiet village quite out of range of any 
possible gun fire, and even during a great battle no sound would be 
heard there but the song of the birds and the humming of insects, 
the low tones of the officers, and the buzzing of the telephone. 

No aeroplane was without its wireless, no balloon without its 
telephone or telegraph, no listening post was created out toward 
the enemy lines without its wire. And the artillery observer, 
crawling on his stomach to the top of some hill miles away from 
his own battery, or perched on top of a tree somewhere, carried 
with him the invariable wire ; otherwise he was lost. But with 
that wire he might talk to the commanding general himself. 
The ears of the army spread in all directions and a whisper from 
the front trenches could reach anywhere. 

It was imperative, too, when millions of men went into the field, 
that the brains of the army should be multiplied. Xo one man 
could remember everything ; no one man could attempt to make 
all the decisions; nor would he dare be responsible for every- 
thing. An apparently simple order from the commander-in- 
chief would involve hundreds of detailed orders for its execution, 
and the execution of that order was the important thing. Foch 
might decide to attack with a million men on a certain morning. 
It was the business of the general staff to get a million men there 
and see that they attacked. The number of orders and details 
involved was simply incredible. No civilian can possibly im- 
agine what it meant. 

The general staft' of every army was therefore composed of a 
great many officers, each of whom had charge of certain parts of 
the work. Some of them made a specialty of knowing the map ; 



THE MACHINERY OF AN ARMY 125 

others of watching the location of troops; others had charge of 
the railroads or of the artillery. Outwardly, the general staff 
consisted of a little group of gentlemen, living quietly in an in- 
conspicuous house in some perfectly peaceful place miles away 
from anything that looked like war. The modern general never 
leads the attack. He is not even within sound of the battle. 
Indeed, his real work is probably done a week or a month or more 
before the battle is fought. Hours and days may go by without 
there being any occasion for him to change an order. He is merely 
waiting until certain things already decided upon can take place. 
In the meantime he occupies himself as best he may. He plays 
tennis or golf or goes fishing. He has to eat his meals and get his 
sleep even if the battle is going on. He is always in touch with it 
through the telephone, but he has to see and hear by wire, and he 
has a general staff whose duty it is to do most of the listening 
and watching. ' 

The legs of an army of millions cannot be physical. Where 
the battle line covers hundreds of miles, there is no time to wait 
while men walk from one part of it to the other. Steam and 
gasoline were the legs of the army, and in the summer of 1918 the 
question of victory became almost the question of gasoline. If 
the supply could be increased, the movement of the army could 
continue ; if the supply gave out, the great oflFensives which were 
driving the Germans out of France would come to an end. The 
gasless Sundays and holidays in America in the summer of 1918 
played their part in crushing the Hun. The motor car was one 
most important leg of the army; the other was the railroad. It 
was not merely true that everything the army had came by rail 
or motor car and that it could not be maintained without them ; 
the fact was that the moving of troops in actual fighting from one 
place to another was made by motor cars and railroad trains. The 



126 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

American Marines charged on motor cars from a point over seventy 
miles distant from the battle line. 

The stomach of the army, as Napoleon pointed out in a famous 
remark, was its most important organ. "An army fights on its 
stomach," said he. A hungry soldier cannot fight well and he 
certainly cannot fight long. If the modern battle was to con- 
tinue for weeks and months, it was essential that the men should 
be carefully fed and carefully rested during the battle itself. 
There must be no interruption in the supply of food and it must 
be hot food. Think of the amount of food that a million men 
would eat three times a day and the extent of an organization 
necessary to deliver that food to each man, wherever he might 
be, hot and appetizing. 

That was one of the greatest tasks that the modern army had 
to perform It meant the baking each day of tons of bread, the 
cooking of tons of meat. Whole railroad trains full of supplies 
were consumed daily. Bakeries covering acres of ground had to 
be erected. Storehouses, literally miles in length, with acres of 
space, were built and the task was done and well done, both by 
the Germans and by the Allies. One of the most remarkable 
things the American army did was the institution in a few weeks 
of a great supply department adequate to care for the hundreds 
of thousands of men whom the United States was rushing to the 
battlefield in 1918. 

The important thing, however, which the French and British 
had to learn at the beginning of the war, was the need for abso- 
lutely exact cooperation between every part of the service. The 
infantry and the artillery must act together. Every infantry 
division must cooperate exactly with every other division and 
with every artillery division. Nothing could go wrong; not a 
man must fail to perform his task. Not a battery of the artillery 



128 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

must fail. The eyes of the army must see and see accurately. 
The ears must hear and they must not make mistakes. The 
voice must repeat over the telephone the exact number and not 
something else. The brain must be infallible; the legs must 
never get tired; the stomach must always be full. Otherwise 
the attack would fail, and because in 1915 all of these various 
elements of the army did not work together as one organization, 
some of the attacks did fail. 

It would take time, the French and British saw, to perfect the 
machinery of the modern army and yet nothing short of per- 
fection would suffice. "Muddling through" would not do; 
"pretty nearly right" was fatal; doing something "to-morrow" 
probably meant the death of thousands of men. The watches of 
the generals and the watches of the lieutenants must all read 
exactly the same and must correspond with the watches of the 
artillery. If a certain thing was to be done at exactly five o'clock, 
every watch of every man cooperating in that movement must 
correspond. For one set of guns to be a minute too early or a 
minute too late might throw the whole movement into disorder. 
For an infantry company to leave its trench a minute too soon 
might result in the death of every man. Literally no detail, 
however small, could be forgotten. 

All these matters were more important and more diflBcult 
to achieve than the Allies thought in 1915. They were also more 
difficult than the Germans thought at this same time. That is 
one reason why the war lasted four years. So elaborately exact 
a movement on the part of so many millions of men, in which 
the failure of one man to do exactly right any one of twenty things 
might be fatal, took years to learn what to do, years to learn how 
important it was that it should be done. That part of the history 
of the war is extraordinarily difficult to appreciate, yet upon it 
depended the eventual victory. 



CHAPTER XV 

THE PERSONALITIES OF THE WAR 

This war will seem to many to lack the personal element, but 
no one can study its history in detail without being impressed with 
the fact that the war itself was so huge that it became impersonal. 
It is possible that another Napoleon, Luther, or Bismarck might 
have dominated its events, as they did the great periods of the past, 
but to the men who lived through the war there was on neither side 
a man of that supreme caliber. To the extent that those men 
directed the trend of events no individual controlled them. Great 
men we have had, perhaps in some number, among whom certainly 
our own President Wilson will rank with the foremost, but in 
general opinion, the man of transcendent genius did not appear. 

It is probably true that the war was this time too extraordinary 
in its scope for any single individual to play a truly dominant part 
in it. Modern society is now too complex in its organization ; it 
requires the cooperation of too large a number of men to accomplish 
anything to allow events to be influenced decisively by a single 
personality. The democratic organization of the Allied countries 
was, alas, suspicious of power or responsibility in the hands of a 
single individual. In Germany, where such power might have 
been entrusted to one man, there was the fear that the individual 
might not possess sufficient ability to decide wisely. 

The war indeed was not fought by individuals but by com- 
mittees, by multiple executive bodies, called cabinets, councils of 
state, ministries, general staffs, many of them composed in their 
K 129 



130 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

turn of committees. While, therefore, men like Lloyd George, 
ClemeAceau, and the Kaiser had a larger personal influence than 
others, the real political decisions in all countries were the result 
of the thought of many men. So too of the generals. President 
Wilson and Marshal Foch perhaps had a greater power to act in 
matters of importance than any other individuals and both 
properly exercised it upon occasion. But Marshal Foch himself 
said, " The whole war has been one giant orchestra — I merely 
happened to hold the baton, to be the orchestra leader." At the 
peace conference President Wilson seemed to some the dominant 
character, but others declared vehemently that he was only one 
of many. No one man in this war has been able to decide, as Napo- 
leon did, the issues of war and peace for himself. In writing, 
therefore, a book as brief as this, it seemed better to reproduce 
the impersonal quality of the war, rather than to attempt to em- 
phasize the parts played by individuals, and thus introduce names 
into the text whose part in the conflict could not be properly 
described. 

At the same time it is essential to make clear the extraordinary 
influence which personality had upon the history of the war. 
After all, men fought it. The quality or lack of quality in these 
particular men must be one of the most important elements in its 
history. Many foreign students have contended that the Allied 
failures in the first years were due to the incapacity of statesmen, 
staff officers, field generals, and the like. They were unequal to 
the responsibility placed upon them. Primarily, of course, they 
were lacking in experience. 

The Germans had developed a military and administrative ma- 
chine whose prime object was to eliminate possible failure, as the 
result of individual incompetence. So careful had been their work 
that their machine was at the outset superior to that of the Allies. 



THE PERSONALITIES OF THE WAR 131 

On the other hand one of the most conspicuous reasons for the 
German defeat was the failure of individuals in Germany to 
judge correctly the British and American people and to understand 
the deep ethical convictions of the modern world. The sinking 
of the Lusitania, the execution of Miss Cavell, the atrocities in 
France and Belgium are from any proper point of view individual 
failures. 

In all countries the political and industrial situations played the 
most important part in the fighting of the war and the relations 
of individuals to each other had a most important effect upon the 
progress of the war. Human material was a vital factor but it 
cannot be described briefly, nor can it be truthfully said that any 
success or failure can be credited to or blamed upon one man. The 
war was intentionally organized to prevent a single man from 
playing any such role as the conquerors of the past had enacted. 



CHAPTER XVI 

GALLIPOLI 

The execution of the plans for the opening of the Dardanelles 
was at first entrusted to the French and British fleets alone. Here 
was this narrow strait, protected by forts, the waters sown with 
mines, and nowhere more than a few miles wide. Some miles 
above the mouth of the passage came the Narrows, where it was 
not over two or three miles in width. Here were the chief defenses. 
It was supposed, however, that the range of the guns on the large 
British warships was greater than those of the forts, that they 
would be able to silence the latter, and would then be able to 
protect their own mine sweepers while they cleared the Channel. 
The real question was the effectiveness of a long-range attack by 
battleships. On February 19 and 25, 1915, fleet attacks were 
delivered upon the outlying forts, which were first silenced and 
then destroyed by landing parties. On March 6, a preliminary 
attack and on March 18, a concentrated assault, were delivered 
against the forts along the Narrows by the largest Allied battle- 
ships. 

But it became evident that the fleet could not succeed alone. 
The passage was so narrow and so tortuous, the current so swift, 
that navigation of such large ships was very difficult. The mine 
sweepers were unable to clear the waters until the forts had been 
silenced and the fleet could not come up until the mines had been 
cleared. But the nature of the ground made it so easy to conceal 

i32 



GALLIPOLI 133 

shore batteries that the observers for the fleet were not able to 
detect their location, and therefore the fleet could not, as had been 
hoped, destroy them at long range. 

The cooperation of an army was essential. The forts controlling 
the Narrows must be captured from the rear. They were located 
on the Gallipoli Peninsula, a very difficult position indeed to 
attack, but there was no other possibility because these very forts 
controlled the Asiatic shore and therefore could prevent the 
erection there of Allied batteries strong enough to reduce them. 

The desperate character of the expedition lent to it an extraor- 
dinary interest, and has caused the British people to think of it 
"not as a tragedy, nor as a mistake, but as a great human effort 
which came more than once very near to triumph, achieved the 
impossible many times, and failed in the end, as many great deeds 
of arms have failed, for something which had nothing to do with 
arms nor with the men who bore them." 

Here was a tongue of mountainous land fifty-three miles long 
and from two to twelve miles wide, gay with beautiful flowers in 
spring, drab in summer and in fall, when the heather and the scrub 
pines and dust made it desolate and drear. It was all but roadless, 
rough, waterless, and commanded throughout by the hills in the 
interior. Only a few narrow beaches existed on which a landing 
was possible and they were all positions on which a landing was 
thinkable only if the enemy could be surprised. 

But it was impossible to surprise him. His preparations at these 
few spots had been so complete that it seemed hardly within the 
power of flesh and blood to overcome them. The beaches and the 
sea itself were covered with tangles of barbed wire, ranged by can- 
non, swept by machine guns at close range. The troops must push 
their way through all these obstacles under galling fire, clamber 
up the hills and gullies, still under fire, and dig themselves in upon a 



134 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

waterless, torrid hill, while the Turks raked them with fire from all 
sides and charged them with bayonets. 

On April 24, the transports moved out of the great harbor of 
Lemnos, crowded with soldiers. The cheering of the sailors 
and the returning cheers of the soldiers, going as they knew to 
all but certain death, was one of the impressive moments of the war. 
Attacks were to be delivered at all possible points, but the main 
attempts were confined to two : one at the top of the peninsula 
against Sedd-el-Bahr, and the other, farther along the outer edge 
of the peninsula, at a place henceforth immortal as Anzac. 

The plan at the former was to run aground a collier, the sides 
of which had been especially cut down and reconstructed so as to 
form a sort of landing stage, to tow in between her and the shore 
with motor launches groups of flatboats, over which the troops in 
the collier should rush ashore and carry the first Turkish trenches. 
The collier should then become a landing stage at which the other 
transports should leave their loads. The collier was grounded, 
the tows drew in ahead of her, and then the Turks opened fire. 
They could not miss. From one hundred to three hundred yards 
away, in clear daylight, were thirty boats all bunched together 
and crowded with men, and a good large ship. Thousands were 
killed at once, a few reached cover on shore, but the bulk who were 
not at once destroyed were forced to wait until nightfall before 
they could land. Despite the awful slaughter the landing was 
made, the first trenches were carried, and a footing gained. 

Farther along the peninsula, the Australian and New Zealand 
troops forced a landing at Gaba Tepe, now called Anzac, from the 
initials of Australian New Zealand Army Corps. Here they 
approached a small narrow beach, mined, covered with barbed 
wire, ranged by Turkish guns. The men leaped into the water 
from the boats, holding their guns and ammunition above their 



GALLIPOLI 135 

heads, and rushed on shore. After a terrific struggle of two days 
and nights they made good their grip on a little strip of beach, by 
that time soaked with the blood of thousands of as gallant men as 
ever wore uniform. They were not only compelled to land under 
fire, but to bring ashore on their backs from the boats under fire, 
every gun, every bullet, ever scrap of food, ever drop of water they 
were to use. They carried up the hills on their backs the machine 
guns, the ammunition, and the food to the men in the trenches. 

They had not merely to fight in a more dangerous position than 
most troops during this war or any other but to perform as well, 
under the most extraordinary difficulties, the services of supply 
and transportation. Without rest, improperly fed, drenched by 
rain, burning with heat during the day, chilled to the marrow by 
the cold at night, these same men must not only hold the trenches 
but make piers, dig shelters, bring on shore the food, water, 
ammunition, and heavy guns. 

For ninety-six hours they fought continually with little or no 
sleep. And this they endured " night after night, day after day, 
without rest or solace, nor respite from the peril of death, seeing 
their friends killed, and their position imperiled, getting their 
food, their munitions, even their drink, from the jaws of death, and 
their breath from the taint of death, and their brief sleep upon 
the dust of death." No such undertaking was ever set an army 
before ; no army ever performed such a task. 

Their first landing came on April 25. A battle was fought on 
May 1 , and a desperate general assault on June 4 from all the vari- 
ous stations gained a total of some five hundred yards. In the 
middle of August another landing was effected at Suvla Bay, but 
in September Turkish counter attacks were successful enough to 
show that the enterprise could not succeed. 

The truth was that the troops were outnumbered, insufiiciently 



136 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

equipped with artillery and munitions to be able to make headway 
against the Turks, admirably equipped with everything and ably 
led by German officers. The nature of the ground made conceal- 
ment of artillery simple for the defense and all but impossible for 
the assailants to detect or destroy. The fleet did what it could 
to blow the Turkish trenches out of existence, but was deficient 
in information or in accuracy of fire or in both. The Allies 
learned here at great cost the lesson that a charge on machine guns 
is mere slaughter. The real blame must fall on the English and 
French political leaders who ordered the expedition despite the all 
but insuperable obstacles which their military and naval advisers 
pointed out. 

The decision was taken in the fall of 1915 to withdraw the army, 
but it was by no means clear that the army could escape. To 
land under Turkish fire had been slaughter ; to embark under the 
same fire would be no less certainly slaughter. And yet by a mira- 
cle of organization the entire British force, with all its wounded and 
supplies, was taken off during December, 1915, and January, 1916, 
without the loss of a man. The embarkation necessarily took 
place at night. The transports would steal in after dark and the 
loading proceeded, night after night — horses, stores, motors, 
guns — in absolute silence. The Turks had the range to a nicety 
and could have fired as accurately in the dark as in the daylight. 
During the day great piles of empty boxes were landed to convince 
the enemy that the British were intending to spend the winter. 

At last only the active men of the final contingent remained. 
During the day bombardment of the Turkish lines was continued 
and wireless automatic bomb throw^ers, with automatic candles 
and dynamite charges, were arranged to go off at intervals during 
the night to imitate a desultory fire. All through the hours while 
the last troops were boarding the transports, this display continued. 



GALLIPOLI 137 

At last at 4 a.m. all was ready and fire was set to the great piles of 
boxes so as to destroy what could not be moved. The great mass 
of leaping, roaring flames threw a red glow over the heavens and 
lit up the whole scene. The empty boxes burned furiously and the 
Turks began pounding everything in sight — the empty, vacant 
trenches, the piles of boxes, the vacant landings. And the British 
troops, safe on the ships, began shooting at the same target to make 
doubly sure of the completeness of the destruction. The army had 
escaped ! 



CHAPTER XVII 

WITH HINDENBURG IN POLAND 

After the failure to crush the French at the outset of the war, 
after the battle of the Marne had resulted in the establishment of a 
deadlock in the west along the trench line, the German general 
staff transferred its activities to the east. It made up its mind to 
crush Russia first, allotted the months of 1915 to that task, and 
entrusted it to General von Hindenburg. It will perhaps be clearer 
if we pass in review the entire strategic movement in Poland from 
the outbreak of the war to the final German victories, even at the 
risk of some repetition. 

The boundaries between Russia, Germany, and Austria were 
based upon military and strategic rather than upon racial considera- 
tions. They were the result of an attempt to strike a balance 
which would give some advantage to each of those powers in the 
event of war and place them all in a certain degree of peril. Rus- 
sian Poland was thrust in between Prussia proper and the Austrian 
province of Galicia. It might menace the approaches to Berlin 
but was itself threatened in turn on either flank. Before the 
Russians could use Warsaw as the base of an attack upon Berlin, 
they must first clear East Prussia and Galicia. Nor could the 
Austrians attack from Galicia without exposing Cracow, the key 
to Vienna, itself easily assailed by the Russians. On the other 
hand, the Germans could advance on Warsaw direct, only at the 
imminent risk of being caught between the Russian armies maneu- 
vering in Poland. Attacks upon Warsaw from both flanks by the 

138 



WITH HINDENBURG IN POLAND 139 

Austrians and the Germans would have to be made in great force 
because the Russian position in Poland was very strong. 

These conditions explain the character and nature of the first 
campaigns. We find Warsaw the German objective and Berlin 
the objective of the Russians. But we find them both campaigning 
in Galicia and in East Prussia. In Galicia, too, there were great 
wells of oil, exceedingly useful to the Germans and Austrians, and 
no less useful to the Russians. These eastern campaigns threat- 
ened as well the great German industrial district of Silesia. At 
the same time the prime object of the first Russian campaign was 
not strategic at all. It was to compel the Germans to transfer 
both men and munitions to the eastern front and hence to relieve 
the pressure on the French until the British could arrive. 

The Russians therefore advanced early in August, 1914, along 
both flanks into eastern Prussia and into Galicia in considerable 
force and with great rapidity, despite their very inefficient equip- 
ment. Both provinces were rapidly overrun. In East Prussia 
toward the end of August and the beginning of September Hinden- 
burg, as already related, defeated the Russian armies in the battles 
of Tannenberg and of the INIasurian Lakes. To the south, in 
Galicia, however, the Russian advance went on unchecked, meeting 
apparently no real resistance. Lemberg was captured ; Cracow 
even was threatened, and many of the passes of the Carpathians 
fell into Russian hands, so that by January the greater part of 
Galicia had been overrun, and there seemed to be some possibility 
that the Russians might be able to capture Przemysl and even 
invade Hungary. 

Long before this juncture, Hindenburg attempted a direct assault 
upon Warsaw. Having gotten possession of East Prussia and 
having thus made safe his flank and rear, he did not at this time 
propose to pay any attention to the Russians in Galicia, knowing 



140 



THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 



full well that if Warsaw should fall Galicia would be a death trap 
for the Russian army. From October 20 to October 27 he delivered 
a tremendous series of direct assaults upon the Russian lines before 
Warsaw and was everywhere defeated by the Grand Duke Nicholas, 
whose masterlv retreats and sudden counter-assaults checked and 



Kovnc 




1914 



Lubim 



N 



GCholm 






Cra^cow 






> 



T.c^ss'.^.^ flJvvncc t.fi„p.lO- 3ep4.f5 



ViENNO 









© 



I 



Poland, 1914. From a sketch by the Author. 

slowed down the German advance and often imperiled the whole 
German position. With inadequate artillery and a very small 
supply of ammunition, he fought a masterly series of actions, which 
did gain the time then so essential for the French, and which did 
prevent the defeat of his own armies by the much larger forces of his 
very much better equipped foes. 



WITH HINDENBURG IN POLAND 141 

General Mackensen then undertook a new assault upon Warsaw 
from the northwest, advancing on a broad front between the rivers 
Warta and Vistula. The Russian armies were of course using the 
Vistula as a defensive barrier but its passage did not seem difficult 
to the Germans. From November to February the pressure went 
on but without real success. The loss of men was heavy and the 
fact was only too conclusively established that the Vistula's heavy 
floods were too great a defensive barrier, when utilized by a general 
like the Grand Duke Nicholas, to be overcome by any direct 
frontal attack. 

Hindenburg therefore gave up the attempt and took time to 
prepare a tremendous series of movements, which should sweep 
all before them and crush the Russian army for good. He became 
convinced that he had been operating on too small a scale with too 
few men. The full strength of the German army must be thrown 
upon the Russians in a series of all but simultaneous assaults. 
He must smite them hip and thigh. He must also campaign 
behind the Vistula and therefore must assail Warsaw from both 
flanks. He could easily cross the Vistula in East Prussia, and by 
advancing through Galicia in the south he could march round the 
great river. 

The Russians had meantime made good use of their opportunity 
in Galicia. Frzemysl had fallen on March 17. The Russian 
armies could now safely cross the Carpathians and assail the 
defenses of Cracow itself. Already in London and Paris they had 
begun to hope that the invasion of Hungary and an assault upon 
Vienna might be the next news. 

Hindenburg, however, proposed to take full advantage of the 
large number of men the Germans could concentrate at a particular 
spot and especially of the greater efficiency of the German artillery. 
He had plenty of munitions and he knew the Russians had not. 



142 



THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 



The new campaign was to be an artillery battle. He would 
overwhelm them by mere weight of metal thrown. He would 
concentrate so tremendous a fire on them that their defenses would 
be wiped out, and he well knew that they had not a sufficient 
supply of ammunition to crush his forces in the same manner when 



/o ^S,?-" 




.£l7 o 



V,\m 



Grooluo 

1^15 
Api^il - AvGvsr 

real Liiov^k 



LuollQ 



©Choir 



Cra.covv ^k 



/rremyil 



® Lemloerd 



Vn 



oiSTnisia^o , 






A-^ 



The Polish Offensive, 1915. From a sketch by the Author. 

his infantry should advance. It was a mathematical calculation — 
so many Russians, so many guns, so much ammunition ; then the 
infantry could stride forward over the corpses so many miles. The 
process could then be repeated. They could advance as fast as 
the German artillery could be moved forward. 

By these tactics he would cut through the Russian right flank 



WITH HINDENBURG IN POLAND 143 

in Galicia, separate it from the Russian armies in Poland, and thus 
outflank the rest of the Russians in Poland and compel them to 
retreat on Warsaw to save themselves. The same movement 
would outflank the Russian center and left in Galicia and the 
Carpathians, which had been foolishly thinking of a descent 
upon Hungary. They would be compelled to retreat on Lemberg 
and would thus surrender without a blow the whole of Galicia 
and southwest Poland. 

The movement was a complete success ; it proceeded on schedule 
time, so many miles a day. Przemysl fell June 3 ; Lemberg was 
evacuated June 22 ; the whole of Galicia had been cleared by 
June 30. Cracow, Vienna, Berlin were safe; Warsaw itself had 
been flanked and was in real danger. 

Now, therefore, came a change in tactics. The time had arrived 
to begin to draw the strings of the net together. Hindenburg 
hoped to entice the Grand Duke Nicholas into Warsaw by not 
attacking in the center and by remaining up to this period quiet in 
East Prussia. His troops in East Prussia were already far east 
of Warsaw ; Mackensen beyond Lemberg was also east of Warsaw. 
If only the Grand Duke would stay in W^arsaw, the German 
armies could advance, the one south and the other north, and they 
would infallibly cut him off and destroy or capture his whole army. 
Thus told, the operations Hindenburg had in mind were simple 
in the extreme. But when such a movement had to be executed 
by more than a million men in a series of battles which must 
necessarily consume some weeks, it involved the most extraordi- 
nary foresight in planning and the greatest precision in execution. 
It also assumed a certain element of surprise. He had been 
quietly collecting enormous forces in East Prussia while Mackensen 
was pushing through Galicia. He had also collected a very large 
army in extreme East Prussia, which should be ready to assail 



144 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

the Russian railroads leading to Petrograd and Moscow as soon as 
Warsaw should fall. 

On July 1, therefore, Mackensen turned north and began to 
press on, so many miles a day, schedule time, towards Warsaw. 
On July 14, the Germans moved from East Prussia south on 
Warsaw, being now well behind the Vistula. Thus they were 
approaching Warsaw in overwhelming force and with great rapidity 
on both flanks. The Grand Duke instantly began the evacuation 
of the great city and of all the Russian lines. On July 29, Macken- 
sen reached the Lubin-Cholm Railroad on the south. Hindenburg 
crossed the Narew River north of Warsaw, and another huge 
German army was thrown across the Vistula south of Warsaw at 
Ivangorod. The Gerriians entered Warsaw in triumph on August 
4, the Kaiser himself appearing for the function. The Russians 
evacuated of necessity nearly the whole of Poland. Hindenburg 
now struck southeast at Kovno, attempted to put an army in the 
rear of the retreating Russians. Starting August 17, the Germans 
pressed on toward Riga on the north and toward Vilna on the east. 

For the remainder of the war some half-hearted attempts were 
made to push the lines somewhat further, and eventually Riga did 
fall into German hands. The fleet sailed up and captured some of 
the islands along the coast, and an attack upon Petrograd by sea 
was even considered. But by September, 1915, the German line 
reached in Poland practically the maximum of its extent until the 
Russian revolution in March, 1917, brought the real war in the 
east to an end. There was indeed little purpose in attempting to 
carry the war into Russia. The real foe was the Russian army, 
not the country itself, and the Germans believed that the army 
was broken and disorganized in 1915 to as great an extent as 
was useful to them. It was no longer dangerous, they thought, and 
could be further destroyed whenever they pleased. To pursue it 



WITH HINDENBURG IN POLAND 



145 



into the marshes beyond the existing lines, to assail Petrograd or 
Moscow by invasion, would have been to commit the fateful error of 




McMuTTay's Geography of the War 

The Beginning and the End of the German Drive 

Napoleon ; to place their army at the mercy of Generals Winter and 
Hunger without accomplishing anything of military importance. 



CHAPTER XVIII 

THE CAUSES OF THE RUSSIAN MILITARY COLLAPSE 

While the Russian revolution was the eventual factor which 
relieved the Germans of trouble in the east, the Russians really 
had ceased to be dangerous before the revolution occurred. The 
vital difficulty was not military but industrial. There were no 
adequate facilities in Russia for manufacturing guns, ammunition, 
or clothing, upon which a modern army depended. There was at 
the outbreak of the war no adequate supply on hand to equip the 
first troops that went to the front, and even if there had been the 
efficiency of the army could not have been maintained from Rus- 
sian resources. The Germans calculated, therefore, that the 
Russians might fight with effect once, conceivably twice, but not 
longer. They might equip one army, but not two ; surely not 
three. 

Unfortunately, too, Russia lacked the essential railway facilities 
for the distribution to her own troops of the materials which she 
did possess or was able to secure from her Allies. Here lay the 
true significance of the fatality at Gallipoli. If the Black Sea 
could have been opened, the immense river system of Russia might 
have been utilized for some adequate system of transportation of 
the flood of material which the Allies could have shipped to her. 
Archangel and a new port on the Murman coast were both im- 
mediately utilized as ports of entry, and new railroad lines were 
built to Petrograd from both in 1915. American and British 
engineers were secured to operate the Russian railroads. The 

146 



THE RUSSIAN MILITARY COLLAPSE 147 

Trans-Siberian Railway was also to bring goods shipped across the 
Pacific from the United States, but the task was too great. The 
amount of material necessary to support Russia was really 
greater in volume than these railroad systems could possibly carry 
such distances. Miracles were achieved, but even miracles could 
not perform the impossible. Had it not, however, been for 
direct treason in the Russian ministry of war and in the Rus- 
sian army, the worst might still have been avoided. 

As it was, the Grand Duke could scarcely do more than dis- 
sipate the German efforts, compel them to employ great forces 
in the east which might have been able to force a decision in France. 
His strategy must be to save his army; to retreat from position 
to position, forcing the Germans always to pay the price in men 
and in time. He must sacrifice cities, provinces, states, if essential, 
conscious that Russia could not lose the war so long as the British 
and French were unbeaten in the west. Without equipment 
Russia could not hope to win the war as a whole in the east. 
She could not fail to win the final objectives in the east, when the 
British and French should win the final victory in France. In- 
deed, the British and French held from the outset that victory 
in the east could not of itself win the war. 

At the same time, it must not be forgotten that the Russian 
defeat was due as much to the positive efficiency of the German 
army as to the comparative deficiencies of Russian equipment. 
The German artillery was not only tremendous in number, but 
extraordinary in efficiency. The Germans had also created on 
their eastern frontier a wonderful system of railroads which enabled 
them to deliver an army, direct from the western front, to any 
point along the eastern front or to transport it along the eastern 
front itself from point to point, or from one end of the front to the 
other with maximum speed. The element of surprise in modern 



148 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

warfare was no less useful than in earlier wars and the physical 
facilities at Hindenburg's disposal enabled him invariably to sur- 
prise the Russians with the number of men he could transport long 
distances in an extraordinarily brief time. 

. The German army was unquestionably the finer army of the 
two. Hindenburg again was a great strategist, one of the greatest 
in this war, Ludendorff was a remarkable organizer and strategist, 
as the campaign of 1918 showed; while Von Mackensen was cer- 
tainly one of the greatest field generals that this war produced. The 
Russians fell before no mean foemen. Indeed, it is one of the mir- 
acles of the war that the Russian army without equipment could 
have fought so long against such armies so thoroughly equipped 
and so competently led. 



CHAPTER XIX 

FRIGHTFULNESS : THE LUSITANIA 

Much of the story of the year 1915 is connected with the first 
concerted attempt of the Germans to show how horrible warfare 
could be made under the new science. Air raids were made by 
Zeppelins and aeroplanes with the intention of destroying in- 
nocent people who could not possibly be of assistance in warfare. 
Red Cross hospitals, clearly marked with great crosses, plainly 
visible from a great altitude, were frequently bombed and de- 
stroyed. Hospital ships with great crosses painted on their sides, 
illuminated at night by a great cross of electric lights, were sunk 
by submarines. There were no possible excuses for error. Be- 
sides, too many hospitals were destroyed to admit of accidents. 
The purpose was to frighten individuals by showing them 
how horrible war could be made and therefore influence them to 
surrender. 

In the spring of 1915, the Germans determined to prove the great 
power of the submarine. They would sink the largest ship afloat 
— the Lusitania. They would give the world warning that they 
meant to sink her and they would then see that she went down. 
The German embassy in America warped Americans against sailing 
upon the ship, and thus gave notice of the German plans, 
but nobody believed that they could mean what they said. On 
the seventh of May at two o'clock in the afternoon, the Lusitania 
was steaming along the Irish coast. It was a bright clear day ; the 
identity of the ship was known to every German submarine ; she 

149 



150 



THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 



was also known to be unarmed and unable to defend herself. 
There were on board no cannon and no explosives, nor was there 
any warning. She was torpedoed at least twice on the starboard 
side and began to sink at once ; indeed, she floated only eighteen 
minutes after she was struck. There was no panic, although there 







^.*£rU«.**^v' 



British Official Photograph 

Aeroplane Photograph of German Gas Attack. Note two waves of men in 
open formation and closely massed third line, a formation used late in 1915. 



was necessarily a certain degree of excitement. There was great 
difficulty in lowering the boats, due to the fact that the ship was 
leaning heavily on the starboard side into the water and that the 
leeward side was therefore lifted high above the sea. The ship also 
continued to travel fast through the water and it was difficult to 
lower the boats without capsizing them. How quickly the ship went 
down is clear from the following account by one of the survivors. 



FRIGHTFULNESS : THE LUSITANIA 151 

" I fell into a boat and we were slipped down into the water and 
over the side of the liner. The boat struck the water and after 
some seconds (it may have been a minute) I looked up, and cried 
out, 'My God ! the Lusitania is gone !' The entire bulk, which had 
been almost upright just a few seconds before, suddenly lurched 
over away from us. Then she seemed to stand upright in the water 
and the next instant the keel of the vessel caught the keel of the 
boat in which we were floating and we were thrown into the water. 
I sank fifteen or twenty feet ; however, I had my life belt around 
me and managed to rise again to the surface. Then I floated for 
possibly ten or fifteen minutes, when I saw and made a grab at a 
collapsible life boat at which other passengers were also grabbing. 
We managed to get it ship-shape and clambered in." A good 
many people were saved in life boats or by life preservers, but over 
a thousand lives were lost, over a hundred of whom were Americans. 
Many men of real prominence and importance went down with the 
ship, most of them in order to allow the women and children a 
chance for safety. 

The Germans had thought evidently that the sinking of the ship 
would deter travel, frighten sailors, thus cut off England's supplies 
and bring the war to an end. Never were they more astonishingly 
disappointed. The condemnation of the act was universal through- 
out the world. Contrary to all rules and practices of three 
centuries or more, a great ship had been sunk without warning 
or without opportunity for her passengers and crew to escape. To 
sink without warning had been considered for three centuries the 
clearest evidence of piracy. 

Six months later the Germans again astounded the world with 
an unparalleled act of cruelty. An English nurse, named Edith 
Cavell, had been arrested in Brussels on August 5. She had been 
the directress of a large nursing home at Brussels, where she had 



152 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

given aid impartially to German, Belgian, French, and English 
soldiers. She admitted that she had given certain assistance to 
Allied fugitive soldiers, with clothes and information about the 
roads to Holland. There was no claim that she had given any 
information to anybody that was of military importance or which 
in any way affected the issue of the war. The German charge 
was that of "conducting soldiers to the enemy." 

According to this she was a spy and as such to be shot. Once 
more, as in the case of the Lusitania, they proceeded contrary to 
all accepted practices. While in a certain sense everybody who 
in any way, even by a cup of cold water, assisted any one not a 
German, did assist the enemies of Germany, it had been generally 
agreed that a man or woman was not a spy unless in disguise within 
the enemy lines and unless possessed of secret information of direct 
military value. Miss Cavell was therefore no more a spy than 
thousands of people during our own Civil War and all other pre- 
vious wars who had performed acts of kindness for wounded and 
fugitive soldiers of both sides. Men had felt that to refuse simple 
shelter to a wounded man or a man in flight or in danger of his life 
was an act of inhumanity and not sufficiently dangerous to either 
side to be considered a crime. Nor had it been so treated. 

The Germans proposed to execute this brave little woman for 
acts of common humanity to wounded and suffering men. But 
the horror of the world at her execution on October 12 was not due 
merely to her death for the performance of acts which the Allied 
world judged humane, but the manner in which the Germans 
conducted the whole case. They refused to allow her any legal 
aid or counsel. The American embassy made the most deter- 
mined attempt to find out what was being done in her case and to 
render her assistance. Not only were they refused permission to aid 
her in any way, but the German officials repeatedly lied to them. 



154 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

Some time after she had been sentenced, in her cell behind locked 
doors, obviously that the fact might be secret, they denied on their 
honor that she had been sentenced at all. The order had been 
given to execute her at once during the night and it was only after 
the utmost pressure that the German officers were gotten to admit 
that the order had been given. All appeals for delay or for con- 
cessions of any kind were refused. She was denied at the end 
the common humanity of religious conference and prayer with her 
own chaplain. As INIr. Hugh Gibson, the secretary of the American 
embassy, wrote, " Her execution in the middle of the night at the 
conclusion of a course of trickery and deception was nothing short 
of an affront to civilization." 

The Lusitania and the death of Edith Cavell produced a tremen- 
dous impression in the United States and were among the prime 
causes which led this country to enter the war. We could not 
countenance for a moment the thought of victory for a nation 
absolutely lost to all considerations of decency, of humanity, and of 
civilization. 



CHAPTER XX 

WHY ITALY ENTERED THE WAR 

In April, 1915, the Italians signed a treaty with the French and 
British, agreeing to enter the war in ]May. They were moved first 
and foremost by their own passionate attachment to democracy and 
their own love for civilization, as the French and British understood 
it. They realized that the German militaristic state and the meth- 
ods it sanctioned would destroy all that they held most dear. While 
there were some considerable number of people in Italy who had 
doubts as to the way in which the general cause could be best ad- 
vanced, there were very few outside of those bought with German 
money who differed upon the question of Italy's real interests. 

In the next place, Italy had for centuries been oppressed by 
Austria, and the Italians had come to hate and distrust her to an 
extraordinary degree. Was she not the firm ally of the new 
Germany, committed to all Germany's schemes, and her ac- 
complice in the very worst of her plots ? Had not Austria opened 
the issue of the war by the extraordinarily severe ultimatum to 
Serbia? Was it not Austria who pushed the issue to war; who 
refused all compromises and declined to negotiate? Possibly 
the Kaiser and the Germans urged the Austrians on, but the 
Austrians at any rate yielded. 

There had been a treaty called the Triple Alliance between Italy, 
Austria, and Germany, which had provided for mutual assistance 
between the three under certain circumstances. Many have 
therefore believed the German statements that the Italians broke 

155 



156 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

the Triple Alliance and therefore themselves tore up a treaty by 
refusing to join th(> (xermans and Austrians at the outbreak of the 
war. Nothing was further from the truth. The Italians had 
always declared from the very beginning that the Triple Alliance 
should never cover a war begun by the Austrians and Germans, 
and they had always insisted upon their right to reserve action in 
any dispute which the Austrians might have with Serbia. The 
very situation out of which the war grew was one which the Italians 
had foreseen at the time the treaty was signed ; they had given 
notice then and since that they would not consider themselves 
bound by the treaty in any war growing out of a quarrel between 
Austria and one of the Balkan States. 

Moreover, Austria still controlled a considerable section of ter- 
ritory in which the bulk of the people were Italians — - Italy Un- 
redeemed, Italia Irredenta. These Italians were most anxious to 
join United Italy and their compatriots were eager to free them 
from Austrian domination. Their freedom would add to the new 
Italy the last territory which belonged to her. 

It was also true that this same territory contained the military 
defenses of Italy. The Austrians, when driven from Italy in 1866, 
had insisted upon retaining the military frontiers in their own hands, 
thus leaving Italy helpless before an Austrian assault. This was 
one reason why the great attack of 1917 was so successful. The 
strong position, the offensive position as we call it, the Austrians 
had always held. One reason, therefore, for Italy's entering the war 
was a desire to get possession of a frontier upon which she had 
some real chance to defend herself. 

Nor was there much doubt in the minds of a majority of Italians 
in 1915 that, if Italy was to fight at all, she must join before the 
British and French were beaten. She had not moved at the very 
outset of the war because her armv was not readv and because 



WHY ITALY ENTERED THE WAR 



157 







\Ks«Tvn\ 



VunevX Hist. Mag. N. Y. Times Cu. 

The Shaded Area is the Territory the Italians Desired to Win 



158 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

she rendered the Allies from the beginning a really tremendous 
service by declaring her neutrality and thus freeing the French 
from the necessity of guarding their own rear. If the Italians had 
joined the Germans and had attacked France in the south at the 
same time the Germans moved in the north, the position of the 
French would have been indeed desperate. 

By the spring of 1915, however, it w^as reasonably clear that the 
Allies could not win the war in a hurry, that long preparation 
might be necessary, that cooperation and unity among Germany's 
enemies would be essential to victory. The Italians therefore 
did not propose to wait until the British and French were flat on 
their faces before coming to their aid. It would then be too late. 
The great object which Italy herself had at heart would have been 
lost. They must act promptly and vigorously if the war was to be 
saved. 



CHAPTER XXI 

HOW GERMANY FOUGHT THE BLOCKADE 

In 1915 Germany adopted the most extreme measures to organ- 
ize completely her whole population for the fighting of the war. 
The first great blow which was to have ended the conflict had 
failed. The British, contrary to expectation, had entered the 
war, had cleared the seas of German ships, and created a blockade 
of Germany. It was not yet absolutely rigid and might never 
become so. Great quantities of metals and fats were being im- 
ported into Germany in 1915 from Holland, Denmark, and 
Sweden, who secured these articles ostensibly for their own use, but 
the amounts were so enormous compared to anything those nations 
had ever used before that the Germans had no confidence the 
British would allow this so-called neutral trade to continue. 

Germany must therefore expect to live during the war from 
what there was in Germany or in the territory of her allies. As 
long as they could live on what they had they could fight the 
war. The moment it became necessary to have other supplies 
the war must end. The question of victory or defeat, the Germans 
saw, might resolve itself into their ability to get along with what 
they had. 

They immediately took official control of everything in Germany. 
All that was raised or sold or eaten or bought was at every stage 
controlled by the government. By forcing people to eat a little 
less, the existing supply could be made to last. To this end they 
issued bread cards, meat cards, and very soon cards for other sorts 

159 



160 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

of foods. Nobody was to be allowed to eat more than so much 
bread or meat in a day or week. Every time he received any 
he must present a card to be stamped. It was a serious offense 
to get any more. In this way, by limiting the consumption of 
food it ought to be possible to make it last indefinitely. Certain 
products should be limited in their use ; milk, for instance, should 
be kept for the sick, for children, and for the aged. Other people 
could get along with something else. 

Then the most elaborate attempts were made to increase the 
amount of food in Germany. Every scrap of land on which any- 
thing could be grown should grow something useful. Little 
plots only six or eight feet square in front of the houses along the 
streets of German cities were dug up and planted with potatoes. 
All vacant lots were worked by the school children under the 
direction of their teachers in accordance with the orders given by 
the government. Planting potatoes was more important during 
the war than learning lessons, and the children represented just 
so much labor. 

Great attempts were made to increase the number of cattle so 
as to augment the amount of milk, butter, and meat. The breed- 
ing of swine was encouraged because bacon and ham were the 
meats which kept best and were therefore most suitable for the 
army. 

They did their best to think of everything that could be re- 
served, or increased, or portioned out so as to make it last. The 
British had expected that the blockade would very soon compel 
Germany to surrender for lack of food, copper, cotton, and 
rubber with which to continue the war. But the war ended be- 
cause the German army was beaten, not because the German 
people were starving nor because they did not have enough war 
material to fight on. Somehow or other substitutes were pro- 



HOW GERMANY FOUGHT THE BLOCKADE 161 

vided for things they could not get. Clothes were made of paper, 
bicycles and automobiles were given iron tires, or the tire was 
set on springs. "Coffee" was made from grain, and a soft sort 
of steel served the purpose of copper. The doctors told them 
that they had eaten too much in Germany anyway, had worn 
more clothing than they needed, and had kept the houses warmer 
than was good for them. They could just as well get along with- 
out. And they did. The German people at the end of the war 
were thinner than at the beginning, but they did not die for lack 
of food. At first the bread and meat cards were believed in London 
and Paris to be proof that Germany was weakening and would 
soon surrender. They were, however, merely Germaii precautions, 
taken with the usual German thoroughness, to make sure that 
they should not be defeated from lack of forethought. 



BOOK IV 
THE WAR IN 1916 



CHAPTER XXII 

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1916 

The fortunes of war in 1915 had taught the Allies that a speedy 
victory was perhaps too much to hope for. They had learned 
that the character of modern warfare required a sort of prepara- 
tion which they had not had time to make. It required an un- 
limited amount of ammunition which the British had made 
elaborate plans to produce in May, 1915, but which could not 
arrive on the battlefield for some time. The British army was 
training rapidly and rounding into form but experience had shown 
that it was not yet the sort of offensive instrument the AJlies were 
going to need. 

The Allied generals and statesmen were more convinced than 
ever that the advantage of numbers lay on their side. General 
Joffre, who was still in command, thought that "nibbling" was 
a possibility still and sure to bring results. If the Germans 
would only attack, the French could kill a few more Germans each 
time than they lost themselves and thus the German army would 
wear away little by little. The initial success of the Germans 
was ascribed to superiority in numbers and not to superiority of 
equipment, preparation, organization, or training. Now as the 
new British and Russian troops arrived, the Allies would grow 
stronger each month, and the Germans, inasmuch as they were 
being killed, must be getting weaker each month. There was 
therefore some disposition among the Allied generals and states- 
men to play a waiting game, to let the numbers pile up a little; 

165 



166 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

to wait until unlimited ammunition should arri\'e ; imtil the new 
big guns should be finished, and the new British army should be 
thoroughly trained. 

Much also was expected from the blockade which, by the end 
of 1915, was extraordinarily efficient. The fleet in the North 
Sea was doing its work well and the German submarine did not 
seem as yet to be particularly dangerous. Certainly no one be- 
lieved in England that the submarine could break the blockade. 
As time went on, therefore, the German supplies of all the things 
they did not produce must be getting lower and lower. The 
rubber, cotton, and copper were being used up. The food sup- 
plies were diminishing. The majority in London and Paris felt 
that a moment must come when the economic pressure must 
make itself felt on the German battle line and weaken the strength 
of the army for attack and for defense. When that moment came 
the Allies would know that victory was at hand. For this reason 
also there was a certain disposition to wait and not to attack too 
soon in 1916. There was as well the tradition of the Marne. 
By not forcing the issue, by not attacking too soon, by choosing 
the right moment, Joffre had in the end won a smashing victory. 
The same sort of tactics men thought would have the same result 
in 1916. 

But when the British army should be ready and the ammunition 
should arrive, the Allies proposed to deliver a simultaneous at- 
tack on three fronts, and they proposed this time to keep it up, 
week in and week out, until they broke through the German de- 
fense. If the attack only was simultaneous, if there was only 
enough artillery behind it and enough men, and if only it was 
kept up long enough, they did not believe that the Germans 
could resist it. The sustaining of the attack until the Germans 
broke was to be the great factor. 




I V y"NRogi^res^y^^ 



Currtnl Hial. Mag. N. Y. Times Co. 

Detailed Map of Allied Gains in 191() 



168 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

The German plan for the year was based upon the knowledge, 
brought them of course by their spies, that the British were not 
ready to fight. Probably, too, they were aware of the Allied 
decision not to open the offensive until summer. They also felt 
that the Russian army had been beaten in the preceding year and 
was no longer dangerous. They could therefore afford to draw 
considerable strength from the eastern armies to use in the west, 
which should give them an effective superiority in men and in 
artillery. To deliver a smashing attack on the British, who were 
not yet ready, was of course possible and the result would probably 
be the defeat of the British army. But this would leave the Ger- 
mans face to face with the strong, competent French army and 
would use up time and strength without promising to effect a 
decision. The German general staff argued that it was better 
to let the British alone and to throw the entire German strength 
upon the French. Once the better army was beaten and the 
bigger army was destroyed, the British would be at the mercy 
of the Germans. 

The assault had to be delivered of course on the French pre- 
pared positions and it had to be a frontal attack. It would 
therefore cost many lives and a vast amount of ammunition, but 
the German generals felt that if only enough guns and men were 
available, they could not fail. Being compelled to attack the 
French positions from the front anyway, they decided to assail 
the very key of the French line — Verdun. Here the great 
fortresses constructed in the past had been rendered useless by 
the new artillery and the French had abandoned them. The 
Germans, therefore, would have to reckon only with defenses 
of a type universal along the trench line. To carry Verdun ought 
to be no more difficult than to break any other part of the trench 
line, while the results would be proportionately more significant. 



170 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

The German spies also reported that the French generals were 
not in favor of holding Verdun in case a great attack should be 
delivered upon it. Verdun would cost a tremendous toll in lives 
to hold and was no better defense to Paris than the new positions 
to which the French could move without sacrificing a man. 
Probably, therefore, the Germans expected to get Verdun very 
cheaply and then to advertise the tremendous success which the 
valor of their armies had won. They therefore made elaborate 
preparations for the attack, put the Crown Prince in command so 
that he might take the credit for the expected victory, and in 
February began a vast assault, miles wide, along the French center 
in front of Verdun. 

The French statesmen appreciated better than the generals the 
moral effect of surrendering Verdun, even assuming that the 
generals were right that it possessed no military value which 
other positions did not have. It possessed a meaning for the 
French people which no other position could have. It had for 
centuries been considered the key to Paris, and the Germans 
would naturally advertise that because the key to Paris had 
fallen, the road to victory was open. It would not be true, but 
the French people might believe it and that would shake their 
confidence in the army. It would indeed be absolutely false, 
but the German people would also believe it and that would 
strengthen their confidence in their own army and in the Kaiser. 
Such moral results could not fail to be disastrous. Therefore the 
order went forth to hold Verdun at all costs. And Verdun was 
held. Month after month the German assaults broke upop it 
and failed. The famous watchword came true ; they did not 
pass. 

But when June came and the German attacks on Verdun still 
continued, the Allies deemed it wise to begin a tremendous of- 



THE CAMPAIGN OF 1916 171 

fensive against Austria along the Carpathian front. In that 
month the Russians under Brusiloff made such progress indeed 
and defeated the Austrians so many times, that the Germans did 
diminish their efforts against Verdun in order to send men to the 
east. When, therefore, the magnitude of the German defeat was 
clear, the Allies felt that the German army in France had been 
tremendously weakened. Had it not lost hundreds of thousands 
of men before Verdun? Had it not sent hundreds of thousands 
to the rescue of the Austrians? Hundreds of thousands of 
British had now arrived in France ; the English factories were 
pouring out an endless stream of munitions. The time had come 
when a great offensive must succeed if only undertaken on a 
sufficiently large scale and continued long enough. The Allies 
therefore launched along the river Somme a tremendous con- 
centrated assault, which continued week after week, month after 
month, from July until November. All this time the Russian 
assault in the Carpathians was continued. 

The Austrians had attempted in May and June to weaken the 
Allied resistance at Verdun by an assault upon the Italians. 
This they had had to abandon in order to send troops to the 
Carpathians and to resist the British and French along the Somme. 
In August, therefore, the Italians also took advantage of the 
German perplexity to deliver an attack upon the Austrians in 
Italy. Thus the summer of 1916 found the Allied armies fighting 
with tremendous intensity on all three fronts. 

So confident were they that a movement had been at last 
launched which promised success, that they now made every 
effort to bring the Rumanians into the war. If only an additional 
push could be given the Germans on the east, something must 
crumble. Rumania, they thought, was in exactly the position to 
strike that blow. The Russians were already attacking in the 



172 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

Carpathians, and if the Rumanians came through the mountains 
into Hungary they would strike the flank and rear of the Austrians 
opposing the Russians. One of two things would be sure to happen, 
and either would be disastrous. The Austrians would be com- 
pelled to detach troops to meet the Rumanians, which ought so 
to weaken their armies facing the Russians that the latter would 
be able to win a victory. On the other hand, if the Rumanians 
were quick enough, they themselves might win the victory by 
striking the Austrian rear before the latter could reorganize their 
lines. 

The campaign promised much for the Rumanians, for across 
the mountains in Hungary were some millions of people of Ru- 
manian blood who had long wished to be joined to their com- 
patriots. The Allies promised to add this territory to Rumania 
when the war should be won. At the end of August, therefore, 
the Rumanians did enter the war. They did deliver a great at- 
tack on Hungary, did penetrate the mountains, and did make 
some progress across the plains into Transylvania. 

The magnitude of the peril aroused the Germans. Hinden- 
burg was now made commander-in-chief of the German armies. 
He at once changed many of the dispositions of the troops, and 
soon had the situation in hand. In September both the Russians 
and Italians were driven back ; the Austrian lines were reorganized 
to meet the Rumanians ; and the catastrophe for which the Allies 
had hoped never eventuated. In France the German lines 
yielded a little here and there but on the whole held stoutly. 
The British and French casualties were heavy ; the amount of 
ammunition they expended was indeed unlimited ; but the Ger- 
man defense system was not pierced, and the gains they did make 
were out of proportion to the cost in lives and material. If the 
war had to be won at that rate, they saw that the cost was going 



THE CAMPAIGN OF 1916 173 

to be prohibitive. They could not ransom the soil of France by 
the expenditure of any such amount of blood and treasure. When 
the bad weather came, therefore, in November, and the winter 
set in, the British and French gave up the attempt along the 
Somme and settled down to another winter of defensive warfare. 

Then, as if to avenge themselves for their drubbing at Verdun 
and for the terrible punishment they had received along the 
Somme for so many months, the Germans fell upon Rumania to 
rend her limb from limb. Her king had previously promised 
both Kaisers that he would assist them in the war, or at least re- 
main neutral. He had not been able to keep his promise and the 
Kaisers proposed to punish him for it. The fields of Rumania 
were fertile, broad, and desirable. Great harvests of grain were 
ready for reaping and the hungry people of Germany and Austria 
would be able to use that food during the coming winter. There 
were also great oil wells in Rumania ; gasoline was as useful to 
the Germans as to the Allies ; and the Germans had no supply 
of it. There were a good many reasons why the Germans were 
anxious to get possession of the lower Danube. 

They therefore sent south one of their best generals. Von 
Mackensen. He allowed the Rumanians to come as far into 
Hungary as they wished. Every mile they advanced they put 
themselves in his power. He then attacked their left wing at the 
Vulkan Pass with great force, pushed through the mountains 
with tremendous rapidity, and thus flanked the Rumanian army 
in Hungary. It was forced to retreat at all speed in order to save 
itself from capture. The Germans were moreover in a position 
which compelled it to retire on its own capital. Xo sooner had. 
the Rumanians reached the defensive lines before Bucharest 
than Von Mackensen crossed the Danube on their flank and rear 
with another army and thus caught them between two fires. 



174 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

The Rumanians were not expert soldiers and were none too 
well equipped. They had expected to fight a reasonably easy 
war in which the Allies in Greece at Saloniki and the Russians 
in the Carpathians were to do the bulk of the work. The Allied 
campaign in Greece had not amounted to much ; the Russians 
had been beaten by the Germans ; and the Rumanians were now 
left to pay the penalty. The greater part of their country was 
evacuated and the wheat fields and the oil wells fell into the hands 
of the Germans. Whether this conquest materially aided the 
Germans in prolonging the war has been questioned by Allied 
authorities, but, while it may not have resulted in as great ac- 
cessions of food as the enthusiastic newspaper reporters in Berlin 
and Vienna led the people to hope, it must have been of real con- 
sequence and value. 



CHAPTER XXIII 

VERDUN 

The tremendous assault upon ^'erdun fell upon the apex of the 
French defense system. It Avas not a single fort by any means, 
but a series of forts, supported on a twenty mile front by trenches, 
barbed wire, artillery positions, to such an extent that the French 
called it the Iron F'rontier. They had learned long since from the 
experience of Antwerp that any fixed fort could be destroyed by 
heavy artillery, ^'erdun, the most important single point in the 
French line, must be an impregnable fort, and it must therefore be 
movable, nor must it depend upon any single position. 

Every foot of ground for twenty miles was hence covered in a 
dozen ways by various grades of artillery, planted to sweep the 
roads, fields, and woods, as a fire hose sweeps a gutter. All the 
forests on the hills were labyrinths of barbed wire, so cunningly 
concealed, that if German spies, much less a file of men, should get 
in they would never find their way out. Bottles and pans were 
also hung on the wires so as to make a terrible noise, whenever 
any one unacquainted with the place attempted to move around in 
it. There would be no surprise at Verdun. 

The strength of the new line was well known to the Germans, but 
its importance was no less clear, and when they concluded to crush 
the French army before the British could arrive in strength no 
spot was better adapted to their purpose than Verdun. It was 
the hinge between eastern and western France. It controlled all 
the roads from Germany to Paris ; it controlled the great highway 

175 



176 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

of the river Meuse ; it was the center of the French Hne, and its key. 
Once lost, the roads to Paris would be open and the rest of the 
French army could be beaten at pleasure. The fact that the 
Crown Prince was given command showed that it was intended to 
be the decisive blow of the war. 

The method employed in fighting at this time was to pave the 
way for the infantry by a prolonged bombardment of the enemy's 
fortifications, so long continued and so thorough that it was ex- 
pected to break down all the barbed wire, blow up all the trenches, 
kill all the infantry, and prevent any other preparations being made 
to replace those destroyed. Such a bombardment lasted in this 
case for weeks. The effect of it is thus described by a French 
officer, caught for twelve hours in one sector by the bombardment. 

"Alone, in a sort of dugout without walls I pass twelve hours of 
agony, believing that it is the end. The soil is torn up, covered 
with fresh earth by enormous explosions. In front of us are no 
less than twelve hundred guns of 240, 305, 380, and 420 caliber, 
which spit ceaselessly, and all together, in these days of preparation 
for attack. These explosions stupefy the brain ; you feel as if 
your entrails were being torn out, your heart twisted and wrenched ; 
the shock seems to dismember your body. . . . Twelve hours 
alone, motionless, exposed, and no chance to risk a leap to another 
place, so closely did the fragments of shell and rock fall in hail 
all day long." 

At night the firing slackened momentarily and he was able to 
make his escape from the hole, but passed five days in a cave 
underground with other men, packed so tight they were unable 
to lie down. They escaped then into a tunnel, where they stayed 
for two days, and then ran at top speed through the remains of 
what had once been a dense forest, through a hail of shell — to 
safety. 



178 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

After the artillery preparations were judged complete, and the 
French troops and artillery destroyed, the German infantry came 
on in dense masses to the attack, surely expecting to occupy the 
territory from which the French had thus been driven. But the 
French had not been expelled from it. With artillery, with 
machine guns, with rifle fire, and at last with bayonets, and even 
with their bare hands, they fought back the finest troops of the 
German army and defeated them. When the German infantry 
advanced, the German artillery had to cease fire or it would have 
killed their own troops. Then the French guns operated upon 
these vast masses of men proceeding across the fields. 

A French officer describes such a fire. "We fired at full speed 
for twenty minutes. When 'cease fire' came, there was a heap of 
shell cases fully man high behind our guns. At the order I rushed 
to look out of the trench at the side of the battery. At the bottom 
of the ravine, on the edge of the plateau, was a great heap of 
Germans. They looked like a swarm of bees, crawling over one 
another. Not one was standing. . . . The whole ravine slope 
was gray with corpses. . . . The snow was no longer white . . . 
and the river ran past, dappled with great patches and streaks of 
blood." 

For weeks and months this steady attacking by the Germans, 
the ceaseless bombardment, this continual reply of the machine 
guns and counter-attacks by the French infantry went on and on. 
At the beginning of the battle, the Germans won some considerable 
territory, first here and then there, but they did not reach Verdun. 
Toward the end of the year the French won back again more than 
they had at first lost. 

Thousands of brave deeds, both by the French and by the 
Germans, were done during this tremendous battle. The following 
description of an eye-witness tells of the French counter-attack 



VEIiDUN 179 

upon the Germans. "At midnight the concentration is completed 
and the armies are in their appointed places. Is the cannonade 
fiercer or less fierce ? I cannot say. The noise is so deafening that 
I have lost the power of judging its intensity. I cannot even dis- 
tinguish the explosions of the shells that fall nearest. . . . The 
searchlights throw patch after patch of trees into bright relief ; . . . 
Not a yard of ground fails to receive the shock of a projectile. The 
solid earth bubbles before my eyes. Trees split and spring into the 
air. It is a surface earthquake with nothing spared, nothing stable. 
. . . The searchlight reveals the German redoubt ... a wall of 
earth and tree trunks half buried in the ground. Now and again 
in the patches of brightness one sees tiny shadows running, falling, 
rolling over or flitting from trunk to trunk. . . . They are the 
soldiers of the Kaiser trying vainly to escape from the rain of death. 

" Dawn breaks. ... A shrill ringing startles every one. The 
captain springs to the telephone, listens for an instant, and mur- 
murs, 'They're off ! '. . . Our guns still thunder, but they have 
lengthened their range, and the line of smoke blobs opposite leaps 
toward the horizon. . . . Some one grabs my arm and points 
northward. Down the slopes of Hill 304, a multitude of nimble 
figures are rushing westward. Their numbers increase ; armed 
warriors spring from the ground, as in the old Greek. ' Our men,' 
says the officer beside me. It is the soldiers of France at the charge. 
For a while they are sheltered from the German fire by a swelling 
billow of ground. They mount its crest and pour headlong down- 
ward. 

" Now the pace is slower ; they advance singly or in scattered 
groups — crawling, leaping, running. . . . They pass the first 
trench without hesitating, as though it were a tiny brook. . . . 
Now the whole mass is across. . . . The charging men go straight 
forward like runners between strings, leaving open lanes along 



180 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

which their comrades can still fire upon the defenders. At last 
the edge of the woods is reached. ... It is hand to hand now . . . 
work for bayonet or revolver, for butt or club, or even for fists and 
teeth. Corpses are everywhere until the bodies form veritable 
heaps among which the living fight and wrestle." 

At Caillette Wood an extraordinary exploit was performed by 
the Germans. They had found the work of holding the gains 
made by the troops during an assault extremely difficult because 
they could not fight and at the same time dig themselves in. 
After an attack had been sent forward successfully some little 
distance, the German commander determined to build a new 
barrier immediately behind it. Lowering clouds and the smoke 
of battle aided them. Behind the German assault columns came 
a corps of workers, three thousand strong, forming a long line 
across the fields. They passed from man to man, like firemen 
passing buckets at some old country fire, wooden billets, sandbags, 
pieces of steel, machine guns, and everything needed for the 
barrier. 

To have carried the material across that field in any other way 
would have been impossible. The ground was too rough for 
wagons even had the artillery fire not been too intense. Only 
by such a human chain could the material reach its destined point. 
Cover was disdained. The workers stood erect, exposed to the 
sweep of the French fire. Again and again, great rents were torn 
in the line. Coolly, new men sprang from shelters to take the place 
of the fallen. Gradually another line began to double the line of 
workmen. It was a line of corpses, but, with the material they 
were piling, it did form the barricade they wanted. At last at 
a frightful cost, the new line was completed. At evening, the bar- 
rier still held, covering troops burrowing like moles into the hillside, 
strengthening the trench. 



VERDUN 181 

And then came a French exploit matching the German. It 
was eight o'clock and pitch dark. Volunteers from a French 
regiment crept forward on their stomachs, carrying with them 
dynamite with which to blow up the new fortification. In Indian 
file, the volunteer blasting corps advanced, the long line stiffening 
to look like corpses when the German searchlights played upon 
them, and crawling slowly forward when the searchlights moved 
away. When within a few yards of the new fortification, each 
man, lying at full length, began to scoop out with his shovel the 
earth under him, gradually making a shallow trench in which he 
sank out of sight. 

Then the leader began to dig forward. Inch by inch, the file 
stole on, sheltered by this narrow ditch from the hail of German 
machine gun fire, which constantly swept the field. Hours passed. 
It was all but day, when the gallant remnant at last reached the 
barricade, placed the explosives in position, and crawled back along 
the ditch as fast as they dared. Suddenly came a roar, engulfing 
the sound of the cannon. Along the new barrier, fountains of fire 
rose skyward, hurling a rain of fragments upon the survivors of 
the blasting party. And then came to their ears the music of 
the cheers of their French comrades, dashing forward to the 
assault as they carried the position. 

Another difficulty surmounted by the French during these 
long months was that of supplying the fortress and its defenders 
with ammunition and food. The German preparations had been 
carefully made and they had control almost at once of the only 
railroad leading to Verdun. There remained for the French 
only an automobile road and only one : over that for six months 
passed everything used in this tremendous defense. The Germans 
had calculated that Verdun must fall by reason of the inability of 
the French to supply it, but the French put in use every auto 



182 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

truck or car on the whole French front and started an endless chain 
of autos, running along that highway only a few feet apart at top 
speed. 

For months that chain went on and on, day and night, never 
stopping, every car going in loaded with supplies and coming out 
loaded with wounded. If a car broke down, it was shoved off the 
highway in an instant, so that it should not block the line upon 
whose movement the fate of France depended. If it could be 
mended, a corps of machinists mended it and shoved it back into 
line ; if not, they abandoned it. 

The result of this long battle was a German failure. How 
many hundreds of thousands of Germans perished in this 
great assault is not yet known, but the number was exceedingly 
great, and in the end they failed to destroy the French army or to 
defeat it before the British could arrive with adequate assistance. 

Of the fortress of Verdun nothing was left but the site where it 
had stood. Of the city nearly all was in ruins. As the battle 
went on, it became essential for the French to construct, deep 
in the earth, new fortresses which became, as time went on, a 
city underground, sufficiently large to house comfortably the entire 
army, with bedrooms, dining rooms, concert halls, theaters, long 
lines of corridors, to say nothing of the emplacements from which 
the artillery fired upon the enemy. Aboveground — not a blade 
of grass, not a tree, nor a yard of earth not churned up by artillery 
fire. Below — the French army, courageous, indomitable. 



CHAPTER XXIV 

THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

On May 31, 1916, there took place off the coast of Denmark 
the only engagement between the German and British fleets of the 
war ;^ and while it cannot be called in the strict sense a great battle, 
it does bring into relief the policies of the two navies and shows 
something of their relative competence. It was the only engage- 
ment, because it was the German policy to avoid battles. By great 
daring and skillful planning the Germans had brought into exist- 
ence a fleet. They boasted that it was large enough to frighten the 
British navy, but they never so far deceived themselves as to sup- 
pose that it was large enough to conquer it. Indeed, they were 
pretty thoroughly of the opinion that despite its size and quality 
it would be inadvisable to risk it in battle. The existence of that 
fleet was more useful to them than a victory could possibly be. 
Even supposing that it won a great battle, it could not expect to do 
so without loss, and, inasmuch as the German fleet was smaller 
than the British, its losses would be relatively more serious. 

So long as the fleet existed, the British were compelled to con- 
centrate their own navy in the North Sea, both in war and in peace, 
and were therefore compelled to surrender the actual control of 
the ocean highways to their aUies. 

1 There had been engagements in the Pacific and South Atlantic which 
had had the important result of clearing the seas of German raiders and cruisers, 
but which had not been in any sense engagements between the major fleets. 
There had been also skirmishes l)etween the cruiser squadrons in the North 
Sea and some raids of the British coast by light-armed fast German craft. 

183 



184 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

The Germans could easily conceive that these allies might not 
always remain faithful. It was even thought in Berlin that the 
chances to take possession of the Pacific would be more attractive 
than the Japanese could resist, that possession of the Mediterranean 
would have an irresistible charm for the French, and that the 
United States would not be sorry to occupy the West India 
Islands. By all means, therefore, keep the German fleet in exist- 
ence. It perpetuated a situation extremely dangerous to the 
British, one which had caused uneasiness in London for ten years. 

This policy had also caused the Germans to locate the real 
base of the fleet in the Baltic at Kiel rather than on the Atlantic 
at Hamburg. The Kiel Canal, connecting the Baltic and the 
Atlantic, allowed them to use their fleet in both seas, gave them 
control of the Baltic, and enabled them to blockade Russia. On 
the Atlantic they erected at Helgoland and at Wilhelmshaven the 
most extraordinary variety of defenses, with great guns, mine 
fields, and all other devices they could think of, to prevent the 
British fleet from attempting, in Nelson fashion, to deliver an 
assault upon the German base. For they well knew that it would 
be British policy during the war, as indeed it was, to force an 
action between the fleets at all costs. 

The British were so far superior in numbers and believed their 
fleet, ship for ship, so superior in quality, that they could well 
afford to take great risks and even suffer considerable loss to 
cripple or destroy the German navy. They were entirely capable 
of dashing into the German fleet at anchor, for, if they could 
sacrifice ship for ship and succeed, it would be well worth their 
while. The German base must be strong enough to prevent a 
battle without German consent. 

For practically two years, therefore, the German fleet swung at its 
moorings, while the British fleet steamed restlessly up and down the 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 185 

North Sea, partly to make the blockade tight, but principally to be 
on hand to take instant advantage of the slightest opportunity 
the Germans might give for an attack. The British admirals 
knew at the outset that any attempt to rush the German fleet in 
harbor would be suicide ; they must entice the Germans outside. 
They were also wisely anxious about mines and submarines. As 
Admiral Jellicoe has revealed since the war closed, the preponder- 
ance of the British in numbers in 1914 was not sufficient; the 
German calculations were correct ; the British could not disregard 
caution. There was in 1914 the possibility that they might be 
defeated. 

Nevertheless, they were anxious for an engagement, and on 
May 31, 1916, the British scouts reported that a battle screen 
of swift, German light cruisers had come into sight oft' Jutland, 
followed by five battle cruisers of the largest type. It was half 
past three in the afternoon, however ; the day was relatively dark, 
and the light was therefore likely to fade between six and seven. 
If an action was to be forced, it must be done in a hurry. Nine 
fast British cruisers, followed by four of the largest battleships 
of the Queen Elizabeth class, started at once in pursuit. The de- 
tails of this engagement as given by the British and the German 
accounts vary considerably, but it seems likely that the British 
account is the truer, primarily because it accords with the general 
policy of the two navies, whereas that of the Germans does not. 

When twelve miles distant, the British battleships opened fire, 
but the Germans kept back well out of range. At 4.40 p.m. 
a destroyer screen was seen behind the German battle cruisers 
and behind it what the British believed to be the whole German 
high seas fleet, steaming ahead in three divisions. The British 
grand fleet was already in motion but was some miles away. 
Admiral Beatty did not hesitate for a moment. He saw before 



186 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

him the only opportunity in two years to force an engagement and 
he started at the Germans at top speed, his object being to engage 
them, lead them to attempt the destruction of his small force, and 
thus expose themselves to the full weight of Jellicoe's assault, which 
Beatty hoped they would not realize was so imminent. 

A considerable amount of maneuvering took place. The Ger- 
mans attempted to close around Beatty; he avoided them and 
kept clear his own retreat, while at the same time enticing them to 
pursue him toward Jellicoe. All this time a running battle was 
continued at long range between such ships as could open fire. 
For about an hour, therefore, Beatty's cruisers and the Queen 
Elizabeths were in contact with the German fast cruisers, and per- 
haps with a portion of the German high seas fleet. But the 
mists of the evening were rising, the smoke of battle added to the 
obscurity, the ships were firing at a distance of several miles, and 
marksmanship became extremely difficult. 

The British grand fleet was coming up fast in three divisions, 
and by masterly maneuvering, Beatty so arranged his division as to 
keep in touch with the Germans and at the same time let the whole 
British fleet pass through upon them. Jellicoe seems to have 
attempted the Nelson touch, an attack in force upon the head of 
the column of advancing German ships. He seems also to have 
meant to get between the Germans and their own base, if possible. 
But the mists descended ; darkness came ; the whereabouts of the 
rival navies could only be determined by distant flashes. There 
was imminent danger that the British would fire upon each other 
in the dark. The Germans seemed to have profited by the situa- 
tion and made good their escape, for escape it was. 

Both sides at first claimed the victory ; both claimed to have sunk 
the larger number of the other's ships and the greater tonnage. 
The British admitted the loss of fourteen ships, the Germans of 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 187 

eleven, though the British felt sure that they sunk some eighteen 
or twenty German vessels. The darkness and distance made it 
impossible, however, to dispute the German claims. There seems 
to be no considerable doubt now that the victory remained with the 
British. Technically it was theirs, because they remained in pos- 
session of the field of battle. Certainly too the Germans retired 
behind their defenses and never emerged again until they sailed 
forth to surrender. 

The engagement showed the mettle of the British navy, its will- 
ingness to attack under tremendous odds, its great skill in maneu- 
vering, but the fact is none the less clear that the real fighting took 
place between a few ships only of the second type, - — fast, heavily 
armed cruisers. The battleship squadrons of both fleets were 
present, rather than in action, and certainly did not really come 
within effective range of each other until darkness had already 
fallen. The real result of the engagement appeared in the German 
unwillingness to attempt another. But the German policy, as the 
war displayed it in the field, in the air, and on the sea, was always 
the same, never to risk an engagement without practical certainty 
of victory. No victory could possibly be worth the risk of the 
navy's loss. When eventual victory came in France, the navy 
must be ready to go forth and conquer the seas. A victory on 
land and defeat at sea would be in the end an overwhelming defeat. 
They must win both on land and on sea, but they could not begin 
the battle on the sea until they had won on land. 



CHAPTER XXV 

LIFE IN THE TRENCHES 

To those who have not experienced warfare, it seems a most 
thrilling and exciting adventure. We imagine something hap- 
pening most of the time and certainly suppose it to be the most 
interesting experience which an individual could have. But 
on the majority of men who fought this war, life in the trenches 
left the same impression. War was dull. It was composed of 
long delays, of interminable waiting, of weeks and months in which 
nothing of consequence took place. The danger of being shot 
became too commonplace to furnish any excitement. The ordinary 
man spent day after day sitting or lying in little holes in the ground, 
either waiting for something to happen, or, if he was fortunate, 
watching another hole in the ground some distance off where the 
Germans were. While the year 1918 was one of almost continuous 
activity all along the front, such was not the case in the years 
preceding it. An individual might have a week or more of the 
most intense or exhausting activity, followed by months in which 
he felt that he was doing nothing at all. 

The soldiers, moreover, were unanimous that war was un- 
comfortable. War was, first of all, mud ; war was also wet, for it 
rained upon the Allied trenches as well as upon the Germans. In 
Flanders the greater part of the country had always been under 
water during the winter and spring months and the floods came 
during the war as at other times. The Germans and Allies also 
took great pleasure in devising measures for turning rivers into each 

188 



LIFE IN THE TRENCHES 189 

others' trenches. On large sections of the lines throughout the 
winter the mud was ankle deep when it was not deeper. On some 
considerable portions, the men stood waist deep in ice water, some- 
times for hours at a stretch. 

War also was cold. It had to go on in winter as well as at other 
times. Men had to be on duty in the trenches during long winter 
nights when the sleet and snow descended as well as on pleasant 
summer evenings. It does not get cold in Europe as it does in this 
country, for in northern France the ground does not freeze solid 
for the winter, as it does in the northern part of the United States, 
and the snow is rarely deep and seldom lasts. But it is damp and 
foggy and the cold somehow seeps through one's clothes and flesh 
into the very marrow of one's bones. 

War therefore was dirt. A soldier coming out of the trenches 
looked like a sort of animated mud bank, or, if it were a rainy day, 
like a man who had fallen into a sewer and had just been rescued. 
It was extremely difficult to keep clean, and while baths, dry 
clothing, and new clothing were provided, it was very difficult for 
the men to keep comfortable. The amount of food on hand at 
all times in the trenches and dugouts drew vast numbers of rats and 
mice who were very unpleasant companions. Dogs and cats were 
kept to kill them but it was never entirely possible to get rid of 
them. 

All of these conditions made two things particularly essential 
in the trenches if life was to be endurable. First, what was known 
in the British army as "spit and polish." Whatever the condi- 
tions, however deep the water or mud, however long the rainstorm, 
the men must present themselves in the morning at inspection with 
the chin shaved, the hair cut, the gun clean, the clothes brushed, 
with all the buttons on, and with the leather shiny. The result 
might last only five minutes but the officers were insistent that it 



190 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

should be done. The purpose was clear. It was necessary if the 
men were to keep well. Unless a man is kept clean, he very soon 
becomes diseased and sick. Unless his clothes are clean, he 
accumulates vermin and also germs. The health of the army could 
not last long unless as great cleanliness were insisted upon as 
possible. 

But why the polish ? That had to do with the morale of the men. 
The tendency of the soldier is to say after a while to himself, what's 
the use of being clean — I am as likely as not to be killed the next 
minute — why should I be polishing my boots — what difference 
does it make to me whether I am killed in a clean or a dirty shirt — 
whether I have two buttons off or two buttons on. Once an officer 
allows the men to become dirty, they begin really to believe that 
they probably will be killed the' next minute. It was absolutely 
essential that the men should act as if they could not be killed ; as 
if they were going to live forever. If the mud was deep, all the 
more reason to act as if it were not there. The effect upon the men 
was to keep up their courage and to keep them in good humor. 

The other essential thing was healthy amusement. For the 
British and Americans this took the form of football and baseball, 
which the Americans began to teach the British. There were 
dances in which the men danced with each other, when there were 
no girls available, and movie performances which were regularly 
provided for the troops. The British created almost at once what 
were called Church Huts ; the American Y. M. C. A. also began its 
work in the British army before we entered the war. The British 
Salvation Army undertook a vast work for keeping the men happy 
and amused. All of these organizations distributed a considerable 
amount of luxuries, particularly tobacco. The French do not 
care for games of the sort the British and Americans play, and the 
French government provided theatrical and vaudeville performers 



LIFE IN THE TRENCHES 



191 



and moving pictures. The greatest actors and singers in France 
were glad to give all their time to the task of amusing the soldiers 
and their work was extremely important and successful. 

It would be a very great mistake to allow any one to suppose 
that there was any lack of humor or cheerfulness in the trenches. 




London Graphic 



A Quiet Little Party 



The contrary was true, especially in the case of the British and 
Americans. The British in particular extracted a great deal of 
satisfaction out of French names, which they never were able to 
pronounce and which they therefore mispronounced intentionally. 
Ypres became Wipers ; Meault became meaow, pronounced as we 
pronounce the mewing of a cat ; Mouquet became moo cow. 

The French early in the war began to refer to the Germans as 
the "boches, " which is supposed to come from caboche, meaning 
thick head, but its real derivation is declared by the best authori- 



192 



THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 



CHEER UP IT5 



THE 



•^ 



ties to be vague. The British promptly nicknamed the Germans 
"Fritz," just as the Germans called the Highland troops, with 
their kilts and bare knees, the " ladies from hell." The Americans 
also contributed to the army slang and nicknamed the Germans 
"Jerry," and termed their own motor corps the "gas hounds." 

One of the most pe- 
culiar words com- 
monly used by the 
British and Americans 
was "blighty." It 
meant a wound suf- 
ficiently serious to in- 
valid a man home and 
was supposed to come 
from a Persian word, 
picked up by the 
British in the east, 
which means back 
home, or going back 
home. 

Almost at the out- 
set, the French private 
soldier began to be 
called "poilu," which 
is said to be derived from a French word meaning hairy, and re- 
fers to the fact that most Frenchmen wear beards, and that most 
soldiers therefore were hairy. "Tommy Atkins" was a term for 
the British soldiers which had been in use for a long time before 
this war, and is supposed to have come from some story or comic 
song. It is also interesting to know that the British and Ameri- 
can soldiers used a great deal of that sort of private language 







Poster of American Army Camp Show in France 



LIFE IN THE TRENCHES 193 

which a good many American children think they invent, when 
they turn words hind side before or reverse some of the letters. 
The soldiers after all were nothing but great boys ; many of them 
in fact were no more than seventeen or eighteen years old. It is 
therefore not surprising that they should have continued in the 
army all those practices which have been so long dear to the 
British and American youth at home. 



CHAPTER XXVI 

BELGIUM — SCORNFUL — DEFIANT 

Throughout the war, although crushed beneath the German 
heel and helpless beyond all question, the spirit of Belgium never 
for a moment wavered. The loyalty of the people to their king 
and to the ideal of independence never faltered. Money, physical 
abuse, threats, torture, were absolutely unavailing to draw from 
them any admission of the right of the German cause or any 
cooperation with it. If they must go to prison rather than aid 
the Germans by working, to prison they went, and in prison they 
stayed. If they had the alternative of betraying their fellow 
countrymen or of being shot, they placidly and cheerfully put 
their backs against the wall and were shot. 

The Germans could not understand it. It was the sort of logic 
which never appealed to the German mind. But the silent, 
continued, scornful defiance of an entire nation of truly helpless 
people did make its impression. There came to be lengths to which 
even Germans would not go. There was an extent to which an 
unresisting people could not be abused for loyalty to their country. 

The very children in the streets carried on the war for Belgium. 
They mimicked the German soldiers' march to their faces. Noth- 
ing delighted the public or the children more than to see some Ger- 
man dignitary proceed down the street, followed at a safe distance 
by three or four ragged urchins, imitating his stride, and probably 
whistling the Belgian national air. The children made faces at 
the Germans, made to each other exceedingly uncomplimentary 

194 



BKLGIUM — SCORNFUL — DEFIANT 



195 



remarks about Germans, which the soldiers could not help hearing, 
and kept it up month after month, year after year, despite the 
thrashings they at first received and the kicks and cuffs they always 
got when within range. 

At first the whole population determined to show that it was 
not conquered, by wearing a little button or badge containing the 
picture of the king. Every 
man, woman, and child had 
one; every dog wore one on 
his collar ; every horse had one 
on his bridle. They were 
stuck on the street cars and on 
the doors of all the German 
officers' houses ; when possible, 
the little boys attached a but- 
ton to the tail of the officers' 
coats. The movement was so 
absolutely universal that the 
German governor felt himself 
helpless ; he could not send a 
whole people to jail. But 
after a while the buttons were 
forbidden. 

All the newspapers, of course, 
were prohibited at the very 

beginning of the German occupation. All public meetings, 
speeches, songs, or any demonstrations in favor of Belgium were 
prohibited. Then one morning in February, 1915, there appeared 
on the streets of Brussels, a newspaper, La Libre Belgique — Free 
Belgium. The paper announced that it was to be "published 
regularly, irregularly" ; it would be brought out whenever possible 




Underwood and Underwood 

Princess Marie of Belgium 



196 



THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 



and would be distributed but not sold. Certain prominent Bel- 
gians had contributed the money and proposed to issue this secret, 
flaming, patriotic paper under the very noses of the Germans. 

The editorials de- 
clared that the Ger- 



EXPOSITIOM 

DU 1" AU 30 OCTOBRe 1 © 1 "7 
CHEZ G£ORG£S PETIT, 8, RUE DE SI&ZE 
ORGANIStE PAR LA LISUE SOUVEN EZ* VOUS 

167. RUE MOr>IT/v\ARTRE 



mans were assassms, 
traitors, pigs, dogs, 
and other names 
which their high 
mightinesses did not 
appreciate. It printed 
pictures of the Ger- 
man military governor 
which made him 
ridiculous; there was 
even a cartoon show- 
ing the Kaiser in hell. 
From the first the 
Germans were deter- 
mined to put a stop to 
the paper and they 
did their best to dis- 
cover how and where 
it was published. 
They turned Belgium 
upside down, but the 
paper still appeared. The military governor himself found a copy 
on his own desk or breakfast table on the morning of its publication. 
Who put it there, he could never find out, but it always arrived. 
Presently it began to contain exceedingly humorous articles about 
the attempts to suppress it. It showed its own printing plant 




'^"tSx'ST^I^S^ (RIMES ALLEMAflDS 



French Pictorial Service 
French Poster Designed to Show German 
Atrocities 



BELGIUM — SCORNFUL — DEFIANT 197 

installed in an automobile, touring around the country, with the 
Germans running after it. Finally it printed a picture of the 
German military governor reading the paper itself. His rage 
when he found that on his desk fairly shook the foundations of 
Belgium. 

The search was redoubled. Every house that they could think 
of was ransacked, — any house was subject to search at any time, 
— and many people spent weeks and months in prison for pos- 
sessing a copy, but not one of them ever told how he got it. Some 
"confidences" were made to the authorities which resulted in 
making them more ridiculous than ever. In one case the plan of a 
house was sent and the location of the press was marked. With 
infinite care, the Germans surrounded the house, the soldiers, 
on tiptoe with expectancy and anxiety not to alarm the prey, 
went inside and proceeded to the spot marked — and found a small, 
dark closet. The hated newspaper knew about it and soon all 
Belgium was laughing over the ease with which the Germans had 
been gulled. 

On another occasiofi directions were given of such an explicit 
character that the authorities felt sure they were at last going 
to catch the publisher of the forbidden sheet. They followed 
the directions to the letter and presently found they were to arrest 
an old statue in one of the public squares ! 

The greatest public demonstrations were naturally those on the 
Belgian national holiday, the twenty-first of July. Fearful of 
riots and demonstrations in 1915, on the first holiday after the war 
had begun, the German authorities forbade the people to cele- 
brate it in any way. But word was quietly passed of a method to 
demonstrate to the Germans without breaking their rules the unity 
and determination of the Belgians. The entire population of the 
cities, particularly in Brussels, put on their Sunday clothes, closed 



198 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

the shops aiifl houses, and walked up and down the streets quietly, 
slowl.w peacefully, irreproachably from early morning until late 
at night. The German officials raged and fumed but not a single 
individual broke any of the rules posted for the day, and apparently 
not a soul in Brussels failed to turn out to demonstrate to the 
Germans that he despised them utterly and always would. 

So complete was the lesson that when the next national holiday 
appeared in the following year, the German governor attempted 
to forestall this particular sort of demonstration, and required 
that no stores or shops should be closed, and, of course, that there 
should be no celebration or demonstration. He threatened any 
who disobeyed him with prison and a fine of five thousand dollars. 
As La Libre Belgique said, the fine did not matter, for the only 
people in Belgium who had five thousand dollars were the Germans, 
who had stolen it from the Belgians. 

The twenty-first of July, 1916, dawned a wonderful, sunny day. 
The entire city was green. Every one had a green ribbon, signify- 
ing hope, in his buttonhole ; every dog had a green ribbon round his 
neck ; every horse had one on his bridle ; every house and every 
store had green paper pasted in the windows. Every shop and 
store was open, but everywhere green was in sight. The Germans 
understood, but were helpless. One particular place in the city 
where the Belgian martyrs were buried gave the Germans especial 
concern. There a guard of soldiers with fixed bayonets had been 
placed to prevent any demonstration. The Belgians found the 
matter simple. The entire city of Brussels walked through that 
street sometime during the day, and, as they passed the spot where 
the martyrs had fallen, they simply bowed their heads. The rules 
did not cover this point, and all day the officers and soldiers stood 
there, witnessing this tremendous demonstration made in their 
very faces, without being able in the least to do anything. 



200 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

At the churches, service was held and the crowds were so great 
that not an additional person could have entered one of the build- 
ings. That was the point. The churches were so full that the 
police could not get in. At least twelve thousand people were 
supposed to have been in the largest church. The Germans raged 
but were helpless. At the Cathedral the ordinary service was held 
and then the Dean announced that at eleven o'clock a funeral 
service would be held for the Belgian soldiers who had fallen in the 
war. It was sung by Cardinal Le IMercier with great pomp and 
dignity. The Cardinal sang the service in a voice shaken by 
emotion and then delivered a patriotic address which stirred the 
very souls of the thousands present. 

On the national holiday, despite the German prohibition, 
they were celebrating their resistance and the Germans could not 
interfere ! They sang the national song, and suddenly there 
rang through the building a shout — " Long live the King ! " 
And despite requests that no demonstration be made, a tremendous 
shouting and cheering rose, swelled, broke, and reechoed through 
the vast spaces of the Cathedral. " Long live the King ! Long 
live Belgium ! Long live the Queen ! Long live the Cardinal ! 
Long live the Army ! " Hats were thrown in the air, handker- 
chiefs were wildly shaken, people wept, laughed, fell on each others' 
necks. The soul of Belgium, repressed for two years, suddenly 
burst the bonds placed upon it by the German government and 
gave voice to its true feeling. 

The end of the war made known the fact that the principal 
author and publisher of La Libre Belgique was M. Eugene van 
Doren, aided by several Belgian journalists, the chief of whom 
were M. Victor Jourdain and M. van de Kercheve. At the begin- 
ning the printing offered no great difficulty because the Germans 
did not know what was going on. The delivery of the papers was 



BELGIUM — SCORNFUL — DEFIANT 



201 



the great problem. M. van Doren and his wife put them in 
envelopes without names on them and delivered them personally 
to a number of people who distributed them personally to friends. 
No name was put on the paper and only a very few people knew 
from whom it came. Thev 



merely knew that their own 
copy came from a friend. 

When the third number was 
printed, a new press had to be 
found. The police had already 
discovered the identity of the 
first. M. van Doren bought 
the necessary material with 
great caution and installed the 
plant in an abandoned house 
in a little town outside Brus- 
sels. Two professional print- 
ers, the Allaer brothers, did 
the work. Phillipe Baucq de- 
livered alone between four and 
five thousand copies of the 
paper each time, making the 
trips at night on a bicycle. 
When the Germans forbade the 
use of the bicycle, he had to walk and at one time walked two 
days without a rest. Presently M. van Doren decided to set up 
the type in his first plant but to print the paper in a second 
plant at another village at some distance. Here was the auto- 
mobile feature. He was, however, very soon compelled to carry 
the matrix on a trolley car. One day, when he himself was 
carrying some four thousand copies of the paper, some German 







u^ 



French Pictorial Service 

British Poster to Arouse Sympathy 
FOR Belgian Refugees 



202 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

soldiers obligingly lifted the bundle for him and set it on his 
shoulder. 

The paper was so popular and so many copies were demanded that 
it became necessary to have a larger printing press, and the prob- 
lem to get that press set up and enough blank paper on which to 
print was difficult to solve. The printing was being done in a 
house fairly surrounded by Germans and there was a reward of 
twenty thousand dollars for the discovery of the office of the paper. 
To deaden the noise of the press M. van Doren built a brick room 
around it. He left for a door a little hole in one corner through 
which he crawled on hands and knees. This opened into what 
seemed to be quite an ordinary shop and was hidden there by a 
pile of boxes and old iron. 

After the great celebration of the national holiday in 1916, the 
German spies ferreted him out. The plant had to be broken up in 
great haste and transferred. Some few more copies were issued, 
but then M. van Doren had to flee and take refuge with relatives 
and friends, lying in hiding for several months. But the paper 
did not stop. One man after another took it up, each for a short 
time. Baucq, who had so faithfully distributed it for so long, was 
captured by the Germans and shot, and many other men, who at 
one time or another had aided in the printing or the circulation, 
spent long terms in prison. But despite the extraordinary rewards 
offered and the terrible penalties dealt out, not one individual 
in the whole of Belgium, who had anything to do with the paper 
or who received a copy, ever in any way by word or look betrayed 
what he knew. Belgium might be crushed but she could not be 
conquered. 



CHAPTER XXVII 

THE WAR IN THE AIR 

The air service became, as soon as the armies dug underground, 
the most important factor in the war. The aeroplane became 
the eyes of the army. On it the artillery fire entirely depended 
at all times. Upon it the army must rely for knowledge of the 
existence and whereabouts of any assault. The all important 
portion of the air service was, therefore, its least dramatic and the 
one about which least has been said. The observation of the 
enemy's batteries and lines was undertaken partly by observation 
balloons, anchored within the Allied lines, and able to see with 
accuracy all of the smaller and nearer enemy artillery. The 
larger enemy guns, located, of course, several miles away, were 
ferreted out by the slow, heavy aeroplanes, carrying at least the 
pilot and his observer, and equipped with camera and wireless. 
This branch of the service was the fundamental factor, and per- 
formed what the British called "ceiling work." On it almost 
every phase of the combat depended. 

Another phase of air work was the bombardment of enemy 
territory. Munition factories, railroad junctions, railroad yards 
far in the rear of the lines were commonly the targets, and a few 
well-directed bombs might do enough damage, it was thought, to 
prevent some movement at the front ; might interfere with a stream 
of supplies or with the manufacture of munitions long enough to be 
of some consequence. It is not yet proved, however, that the bom- 

203 



204 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

bardment from the air, undertaken by both sides, had any material 
effect upon military events. 

The last phase of aviation, the most dramatic and most popular, 
was, from the point of view of the larger aspects of warfare, the least 
important. This was the aviation of combat. Its purpose was 
to protect the balloons and the observation planes of the Allies 
while they were obtaining the data upon which the conduct of the 
war depended. This made essential attacks upon German aero- 
planes which were attempting to destroy the Allied balloons or 
observation planes. Another phase was naturally an attempt to 
destroy the German balloons and observation planes and often led 
to combats in the air with the German fighting machines sent out 
to protect their own observers. This work was always dangerous 
in the extreme and not infrequently important, though it is not 
yet demonstrated that either the Germans or Allies succeeded in 
getting control of the air for more than a very brief period or that 
any of the military victories was the direct result of the fighting 
in the air. Probably no military event of any consequence took 
place which did not have vital connection with the air service, but 
it is probable that the great successes were not due to any one arm 
of the air service. 

During the last two years of the war extraordinary developments 
were in progress which might have resulted, had the war lasted 
longer, in great transformations of warfare itself. The aeroplane 
began to take a direct part in the fighting on the ground. Fighting 
planes did occasionally annihilate a German division marching 
to the trenches, or was able to rake a trench with machine gun fire 
from the air and thus remove the obstacle facing the Allied troops. 
The great gun batteries located far behind the lines were particu- 
larly vulnerable. 

In the great offensive of 1918 whole squadrons of aeroplanes 



THE WAR IN THE AIR 



205 



fought battles in the air, when hundreds of planes charged each 
other, laid down barrages of machine gun fire, and even attempted 
concerted assaults upon large masses of troops, advancing across 
open ground. Of course, the aeroplane, armed only with a machine 
gun, could never assault with success prepared trenches or dug- 




Sketch for London Graphic of Aeroplane Attack in Rain Storm on Ger- 
man Trenches. December, 1917 



outs, but once the troops left their defenses and started to charge 
across the open, unprotected by artillery, a single aeroplane might 
do great damage. Columns advancing to the support of the 
front trenches were also splendid targets for the aviators. The 
daring of some men was extreme. Garros, one of the first great 
French aviators, bombed trains, troops, supply depots, from a 
distance of only one hundred feet above them. 

As the war went on, changes in the structure of the aeroplanes 



206 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

were no less remarkable than the increase in the skill of the pilots. 
Before the war the machines had been barely dependable, had 
lacked strength and stability, but as the war went on nearly all 
desirable qualities were developed, and in addition, motors were 
created capable of carrying heavy weights over great distances 
and planes were built able to fly in heavy winds or storms. Me- 
chanics learned how to mend the machines ichile in the air, even 
repairing the engine itself. Hospital aeroplanes were created and 
minor operations were sometimes performed in flight. So great 
was the stability of the planes at the end of the war that part 
of the machine could be blown away by a shell and the machine 
would still fly. Bishop, the British aviator, landed with his ma- 
chine in flames and escaped unhurt, largely because of his con- 
fidence that, although the machine was doomed, he would be 
able to control it long enough to reach the earth. 

The real interest of the war centered in these fighting planes. 
They developed a speed of one hundred and thirty miles an hour, 
would climb into the air at the rate of one thousand feet a minute, 
and some carried as many as three rapid fire guns, able to fire four 
hundred shots a minute. Many great aces were developed on 
both sides, but although numerous personal exploits are extremely 
interesting to study, the general tactics of aviation as a whole are 
really of more consequence in the history of the war. 

As always, German tactics reasoned out logically what was to be 
done and then proceeded to keep the individual within bounds. 
At first the Allies charged the Germans with cowardice because 
their aviators kept for the most part over their own lines, but the 
great German aces explained that if a German plane fell within 
their own lines the Allies learned none of the German secrets of 
construction. The object of the fighting planes in any case was 
to prevent Allied observation and to protect German balloons and 



THE WAR IN THE AIR 



207 



observers. This could always be done within the German lines. 
It was therefore foolhardy to venture beyond them. Immelmann 
developed first among the Germans a method of attack upon an 
enemy plane which combined the maximum chances of success 
with the minimum danger. The aeroplanes were at first not armed 




London Graphic 

Cooperative Attack by French Tanks and Aeroplanes in Combined For- 
mations IN One of the Last Actions of the War. 

at all and then carried guns which shot only between the blades 
of the propellers, straight in front of the machine. Let the aviator 
keep above, behind, below, or at either side of his adversary and he 
was perfectly safe. Immelmann, therefore, cruised around at high 
altitudes, preferably in the clouds ; when an Allied plane appeared, 
he waited until it passed beneath him. He then shot straight 
down upon it, carried by the force of gravity at a terrific speed and 
intending to pass just behind it. When almost upon the enemy 



208 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

lie fired as many shots as he could, and was then carried by the 
speed of his own flight below and beyond his enemy, protected 
from his enemy's fire, partly by his ])()sition and then, as he passed 
in front of him, by his speed. He would never wait to see whether 
the enemy fell or not, nor attempt to reengage him. To do that 
was to fight at a disadvantage. 

Boelke, another great German ace, pointed out the advantage of 
fighting in pairs and later in squadrons. Several German planes 
would engage a smaller number of Allied planes, but preferably a 
single plane. This increased the chances of their success and 
diminished the danger. Commonly, if outnumbered, the Germans 
turned tail and fled. They did not propose to take risks ; the pilot 
and machine were too valuable to be lost in such fashion. Richt- 
hofen, perhaps the greatest of the German aviators, invented 
camouflage in the air and developed maneu\'ering by a squadron 
of aeroplanes. His favored method was to attack in long file, 
he himself heading the tango circus as it was called. He scorned 
concealment in his own case, however, and painted his machine 
bright red so that it might always be known. 

One of the most successful French aviators was Fonck, who 
destroyed ten German planes without himself being scratched. 
On May 9, 1918, he went up alone, as Allied machines frequently 
did, to meet three German planes, each carrying two men, and, 
therefore, more than doubly dangerous. Two he destroyed in ten 
seconds and the third five minutes later. That afternoon, he met 
five German planes in formation, dove into them from above, 
and sent down three, the remainder escaping. The whole six 
had been shot down with an average of six cartridges per plane. 
Bishop, the Canadian aviator, was ordered to return to England 
to take charge of instruction and went out for a last trip across the 
lines. He was gone twelve minutes and brought down five German 



THE WAR IN THE AIR 209 

planes. The true secret of success in the case of these exceptional 
men was primarily deadly marksmanship. Their skill as aviators 
was apparently a secondar,\' consideration, although none of the 
tricks in flying was without its value and sometimes meant the 
difference between destruction and safety. Their coolness, con- 
fidence, and self-control under all circumstances were the great 
qualities which accounted both for their marksmanship and for 
their ability to fly. 

The greatest of aviators, however, typifies the Allied methods and, 
as well, the romance of the war. Guynemer, a young Frenchman, 
physically rejected by all sections of the service more than once, 
only twenty-three years old when he died, exemplified the reckless 
courage and daring of the Allied tactics in the air. He courted 
rather than avoided danger, gloried in risks, preferred to fight 
several German planes at once, and commonly returned from a trip 
with his clothing and plane riddled with bullets. His favorite 
method of attack was to approach his adversary from below, per- 
form the difficult tail spin, which stood his plane on its tail, im- 
mediately below his adversary, and bring him down with a stream 
of bullets through the bottom of his machine. 

No single character of the war so attracted the admiration of the 
French people. He seemed to them to embody all that quality 
of French youth most precious to preserve. They seemed to say 
of him, "Here is the pattern of the young men of France; look 
upon it, and copy it : it is the best ; it is France." While everything 
about him was burning truth, it seemed as if the truth was already 
legend. The subtle perfume of mysticism appeared to hang about 
him. He died in combat, September 11, 1917. The official cita- 
tion read : " Like a legendary hero fallen in the full measure of glory 
after three years of ardent combat, he will remain the purest 
symbol of the qualities of the race : indomitable tenacity, fierce 



210 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

energy, sublime courage. Animated by the most unshakable 
faith in victory, he bequeathes to the PVench soldier an imperish- 
able remembrance which will exalt the spirit of sacrifice and stir 
to the noblest emulation." 

One of his intimate friends wrote : " I have known his intrepidity, 
his tenacity, his fascination. Duty of combat was for him a 
religion. He had an iron will. He was upright as a sword, pure as 
a diamond, and utterly absorbed in the struggle which he carried 
on to the detriment of a constitution already frail. . . . He was of 
a finer essence than ourselves, inspired with a sacred fire which 
passed our understanding. He fell amidst forty enemy aeroplanes, 
of which he had brought down one, one arm was broken, a ball 
was in his head, and a smile was on his lips." 



BOOK V 
THE WAR IN 1917 



CHAPTER XXVTTI 

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1917 

Despite discouragement and disaster the strategy of the Allies 
remained in 1917 what it had been in the two years previous. The 
Allied statesmen still believed that unless victory were won in 
France it would be worthless. They must not merely beat the 
German army somewhere ; they must drive it from France and Bel- 
gium ; a satisfactory peace could be signed only with the Germans 
across the Rhine. The trench line imposed upon the assault ex- 
treme difficulties and sacrifices, but they saw no real alternative. 
They prepared themselves therefore once more to deliver a simul- 
taneous offensive on all fronts, on the theory that the previous logic 
was good, but that the earlier preparations had not been sufficiently 
elaborate. More men, more cannon, more ammunition, larger artil- 
lery, and better trained infantry must infallibly succeed. They 
proposed also to win back the ground lost in Asia Minor, where a 
very small British force had been defeated by a considerably larger 
Turkish army. The military positions were of no consequence to 
the issue of the war, but the British made it a point of pride to 
recover the lost ground before the war should end. 

The German plans were, as usual, based upon their suppositions 
as to the plans and preparations of the Allies in France. Hinden- 
burg still seemed in 1917 to cling to his original plan of holding 
the lines in the west, while all German foes in the east were beaten 
and victory then made final. Though the Russian army had been 
considered beaten in 1915, had been again demolished in 1916, its 

213 



214 



THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 



continued existence alone compelled the Germans to retain a strong 
force of men on the eastern front. They therefore schemed in the win- 
ter of 1917 to remove 
Russia permanently 
from the conflict and 
to conquer her for the 
present and for the 
future. They precipi- 
tated the Russian 
Revolution in March/ 
to put Russia definitely 
out of the war and to 
release the German 
armies on the east 
front. They would 
then throw large forces 
against Italy in the 
fall of the year, at the 
season most favorable 



1 As will presently ap- 
pear, the outbreak of the 
Russian Revolution was 
due to various causes, but 
there seems to be no rea- 
sonable doubt that the 
German agents thought 
they controlled the situa- 
tion and beheved when the 
Revolution came that it 
was their own work. It 
did therefore form a part 
of the plans of the German 
High Command. 




Review of Reviews 

Allied Gain in 1917 in Detail 

Note on adjoining map how small the area is com- 
pared to the whole battle line. 



THE CAMPAIGN OF 1917 215 

for the campaigning in the south, and treat her as they had treated 
Poland and Rumania. They could then end the war in 1918. 

Meanwhile Von Tirpitz was to attempt to bring England to her 
knees by means of unrestricted submarine warfare. For two 
years now the submarine had sunk British shipping where it could, 
but, despite their general lack of humanity, the Germans had 
observed some of the rules and practices of the past. They now 
announced to the world that from February 1, 1917, they would 
sink any and all ships that the submarines might meet. They 
declared a danger zone around the British Isles and the French 
coast within which no ship, however neutral, should be safe. 
They thus rescinded all the promises they had made to the United 
States and other nations of warning to vessels in order to allow the 
crew and passengers to escape. The new order was " Sink without 
trace" : the ship must disappear — there must be no survivors to 
tell the tale of how she was lost. They promised themselves that 
England and France would be put to such straits by this unre- 
stricted warfare that the factories would be unable to get the raw 
materials necessary to continue the war. Food would give out, 
especially in England, and the British would be compelled to 
sue for peace. 

Meantime while Russia was being successfully revolutionized, 
while the submarine was bringing Great Britain to terms, the lines 
should be held in France with the least possible effort. They should 
maintain the defensive as cheaply as possible. Hindenburg kaew 
well that the British and French had made extraordinary prepara- 
tions throughout the fall and winter for an assault upon the 
German lines. Special railroads had been built all along the front 
to make easy the movement of troops, of ammunition, and of food 
so that men could be massed readily at any point, transferred else- 
where with rapidity, fed there, and supplied with ammunition. 



216 



THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 



In February and March, therefore, to render all these prepara- 
tions useless, Hindenburg withdrew the German lines to the famous 
Hindenburg line, a new line of defense elaborately prepared, miles 
enough in the rear of the old line to prevent any assault upon it by 
the British and French from the positions which they had prepared 




Review of Reviews 

West Front in 1917 and Total Gain in that Year 

SO carefully during the winter. Moreover, the Germans destroyed 
every living thing, every building, every tree, every possible shelter 
in the entire zone, which they thus abandoned ; it was laid waste 
with a thoroughness which only Germans can attain. The Allies 
must therefore attack them over a waste ground where everything 



THE CAMPAIGN OF 1917 217 

would impede their progress to the maximum and where there 
would be nothing to aid them. 

The results were not exactly what the Germans had anticipated. 
The United States promptly entered the w^ar on April 6, 1917, 
and undertook with equal promptitude an extent of preparations 
which paralyzed the German statesmen and generals. Conscrip- 
tion was voted almost immediately and an army of millions was 
put at once into training. The United States government took 
over factories and railroads and began to build ships to transport 
the new troops to P'rance. Indeed, we began to build from the 
bottom an army of five millions of men, with everything necessary 
to place them on the fighting line in France and keep them there 
indefinitely. The example of the United States w^as followed by 
declarations of war from a crowd of hitherto neutral states in South 
America and in Asia. 

In a measure the new submarine menace was met by the seizure 
of German ships interned in American and neutral harbors. They 
were promptly repaired, despite the fact that the Germans had in- 
tended to injure them so that they could not be put into service 
for some years. In June, Greece joined the Allies, and the obstacle 
to an assault upon the Austrian rear, which had bothered the Allies 
for three years, was removed. 

In April the British delivered a great assault on the German 
lines around the city of Arras, to the north of the new Hindenburg 
line in a position not affected by the German retirement. Al- 
though some territory was won, the battle failed to break through 
the German trenches, and in July the British began a determined 
effort, which was continued until December, to break through 
the German lines along the coast so as to reach the submarine base 
at Ostend and Zeebrugge. Not only did they feel that if they 
could capture the coast they might lessen the power of the sub- 



218 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

marine, which was aheady committing great inroads upon the 
world's shipping, but they might also turn the German right and 
compel the withdrawal of the whole line over a considerable area of 
territory. But the attempt failed. In the center an attack was 
launched on November 20, at Cambrai, known as the battle of the 
tanks, which did gain a larger amount of territory than the Allies 
had up to that time won; but some of it was lost again and in 
general the success failed to produce any effect upon the fundamen- 
tal strength of the German position. 

Meanwhile, the Italians had begun on the Isonzo in May a great 
assault against the Austrian army, intrenched around Trieste. 
The object was twofold ; partly to put pressure upon the Germans 
on two fronts at the same time, and partly to win the Austrian 
territory occupied by people of Italian blood, which the Italians 
were determined to add to Italy when the war should end. They 
felt that there was small chance of its cession to Italy unless they 
should capture it during the war. They therefore made this 
determined attempt throughout the summer to capture Trieste. 
In October, the Germans and the Austrians delivered a well-timed 
and well-planned blow against the Italian army along the Isonzo. 
They broke the left of the Italian army before Trieste and won 
through the mountains into the valley below. 

The entire Italian position was at once flanked and the great 
bulk of the army in great danger of being cut off and captured. 
To escape, it was necessary for the army almost to run ; to abandon 
its artillery and baggage ; and to make its way back at breakneck 
speed to some new front. Finally, in November, after a magnifi- 
cent retreat, a new front was established on the Piave. British 
and French aid had been promised and had arrived. The French 
and British had marched on foot from France, had crossed the Alps, 
and joined the Italians. A furious attack was delivered by the 



220 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

Austrians in November and December, but the line on the Piave 
was successfully held. 

Yet the net result of the year 1917 was extremely discouraging 
for the Allies. Russia was unalterably out of the war ; all possible 
help from her army had evaporated. Italy was in the gravest dan- 
ger thinkable. The submarine had been successful in sinking an 
amount of shipping which the Allies had not believed possible 
although it was far less than the Germans had thought probable. 
It had not prevented the supply of the British and French armies 
in France nor interfered for a day or an hour with the stream of 
ammunition, but, if the loss should continue at that rate, there 
was no knowing when the submarine would make itself felt on the 
battle line. England was building ships at furious speed ; so was 
the United States ; but the submarine was sinking them immensely 
faster than they could be built. 

Meanwhile the Allies had failed to gain anything of moment 
in France. They had supposed that a simultaneous offensive on 
more than one front would expose the Germans and Austrians to 
certain defeat on some point. But instead the Germans had suc- 
cessfully held the lines in France and had won victory after victory 
elsewhere. The outlook was black indeed, for, although the United 
States had entered the war and had begun preparations of ex- 
traordinary magnitude, the American army could not in the nature 
of things take the field in great force for some months to come and 
perhaps for a year or more. The year 1918 every one foresaw 
would be the critical period of the war. 



CHAPTER XXIX 

THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 

One of the most important and dramatic events of recent 
decades was the Russian Revolution. In its results upon the 
war itself and upon conditions after the war in Europe it was one 
of the most significant events of a complex period. While we do 
not at present know with certainty much about it, we know 




L' Illustration, Paris 



French Caricatures of Bolsheviki — 1917 



enough to say that its causes were varied. We are really dealing 
with three revolutions, all simultaneous. 

The internal condition of Russia had been for generations 
extremely bad and the government was still tyrannical, unjust, 
cruel, and oppressive. The conditions of life were hard. It was 
extremely difficult to make a living. Sweeping reforms had been 
put on paper but were still awaiting execution, so that, despite 
decrees, the peasants rarely owned the land on which they worked. 
They were bound to pay heavy taxes, heavy rents, and suffered 
greatly from the oppression and injustice of the proprietors, the 
local nobles, the local officials and clergy. They formed the over- 

221 



222 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

whelming majority of the population and their dissatisfaction 
had been growing in recent years in intensity and readiness of 
expression. 

These conditions had produced definite movements in Russia 
for reform. Various parties were organized to oppose or destroy 
the Tsar's government. The laws, however, were strict against 
holding meetings without permission or publishing criticisms of 
the government in books or newspapers. Secret societies be- 
came, therefore, the only way in which reform movements could 
be organized. To ferret these out was the work of the secret 
police, which became in Russia an exceedingly powerful organiza- 
tion. The penalty for opposition even in small things was exile 
to Siberia, where the most terrible suffering was experienced by 
political prisoners. Only by the use of the army, the officials, 
and secret police had the Tsar's government kept itself in power 
so long. Revolts had been planned in 1913 and 1914, but the out- 
break of the war postponed them and united Russia for the time 
against the Germans. 

There came to be an almost universal belief in Russia that the 
defeats in the field and the death of nearly four millions of soldiers 
were due to treason. The generals and officials were pro-German, 
had sold the nation to the enemy, and were sacrificing. the army in 
the field. They prevented sufficient food from reaching the troopSj 
failed to send the necessary ammunition, or ordered the men to 
make attacks prearranged with the Germans so as to insure the 
destruction of the regiments. 

An economic crisis also developed as the war proceeded, due 
not so much to the Tsar's government as to the inability of the 
railroads to do the work required, but the result in the large 
cities was a great scarcity of bread and the possibility of famine. 
Reforms had been promised before the war, and, while some had 



THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 223 

been granted, the more important changes had not been made. 
As the war progressed more reforms were asked for by the Russian 
National Assembly, the Duma, but were again refused. In fact 
measures were taken by the government in the large cities to deal 
severely with any opposition. 

This brought to a head simultaneously three independent at- 
tempts to overthrow the Tsar's government. There was first a 
strong body of Russian Liberals, headed by jMilukoff and Prince 
Lvoff. The former was a college professor, an extremely well- 
educated and intelligent man, who had lived in America and had 
come to know much of our notions of government. He had long 
been the leader of the Intellectuals in Russia. Prince Lvoff, 
also an extremely intelligent and well-educated man, had em- 
braced the cause of the peasants and had organized them so as 
to create better conditions and to prevent their oppression by 
the officials. His peasant organization had rendered great service 
to the government in feeding the army. These Liberals were in 
control of the Duma, wished to depose the Tsar, and frame a new 
constitution. They did not, however, propose to go beyond po- 
litical reform and would have been entirely content to have the 
son of the Tsar as monarch. 

A considerable portion, though by no means a majority of the 
population, had been organized in various groups called Social- 
ists, Anarchists, Nihilists, who had long been anxious to over- 
throw the Tsar's government. They were radical thinkers and 
wished for something more than a mere reform of the political 
machinery or a change of the people who did the governing. 
They wished a complete social revolution which should shake 
society from top to bottom, and affect not merely the government 
but the ownership of property. It should put the control of the 
new state into the hands of the laboring people. This party con- 



224 



THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 



trolled the army and comprised the majority of workmen in 
Petrograd and other large cities. 

There was a third party hostile to the Tsar's government. 
The Germans were anxious to put Russia out of the war for good. 
They had beaten the army, but so long as it existed they must still 
keep a million or more Germans on the lines in Poland, whom they 




French Pictorial .Si 



Street Barricade, Petrograd, March, 1917 



needed to win the war in France. Once overthrow the Tsar, the 
Russian army would be disbanded and they could then throw 
their entire strength against the British and French. They 
also foresaw that they might secure control of the new Russia 
and set up a government there in the hands of Germans, or of 
Russians in German pay, who would organize the country in 
German interests and make it a German colony. 



THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 225 

When, therefore, on March 8, 1917, food riots broke out in 
Petrograd, there occurred at the same time movements against 
the Tsar's government in the Duma and in the army. For three 
days the rioting in Petrograd went on. The police and the army 
were ordered to put it down, but the army joined the rioters who 
took possession of the imperial palace and most of the govern- 
ment buildings. With some few exceptions the whole city fell 
into their hands on March 11. The fact was that the Tsar him- 
self was very weak as a sovereign, the government had no real 
roots, and was nothing better than a sort of block balanced on 
top of a pyramid ; a very small push was sufficient to knock it 
ofT. 

By March 15, the Revolution had been successful in Petrograd, 
Moscow, and Odessa. A provisional government was set up 
by the Duma in the hands of Milukoff, Lvoff , and others, although 
the city was practically already in the hands of the Soviets. The 
truth was that all these parties had acted together without know- 
ing it and each apparently believed that the others were acting 
in cooperation with it, a fact which they all soon realized was 
untrue. They were all agreed in putting down the Tsar. They 
were by no means agreed upon the reasons for which they wanted 
to get rid of him or upon the situation they proposed to create 
when he was gone. 

On March 15, certain generals visited the Tsar on his special 
train. He had been with the army at the time the revolt broke 
out and was journeying back to Petrograd. They stopped his 
train out in the country, there informed him of the situation, 
and requested him to abdicate. The scene was tense but very 
quiet, much like an ordinary conversation between men in a small 
room. The Tsar was very composed and abdicated in favor of 
his brother in order that he might keep his son with him. Two 



226 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

days later he was arrested and brought to Petrograd as a prisoner, 
whence he was sent to southern Russia and finally to Siberia. 
There he is said to have been shot by official order, though his 
family are still supposed to be alive. 

The provisional government at once declared in favor of a 
constitution, assured the Allies of the loyalty of Russia, announced 
liberal reforms, and called for a constitutional convention. Mean- 
while, certain committees had been organized in Petrograd of 
workmen and soldiers, calling themselves Soviets. These then 
elected delegates to larger committees, and proposed in this way 
to establish a government for Russia by electing these committees 
in all parts of the country. There were now really two govern- 
ments in Petrograd. Neither of them was as yet assured of sup- 
port from the country at large, nor was it clear that the Revolution 
would not be confined to a few large cities. The Soviets in Petro- 
grad promptly refused to accept the platform announced by the 
Liberals, and for two months active disagreement continued in 
Petrograd while the organization of Soviets went on' in other 
parts of Russia. 

On May 15, a coalition was formed, headed by Prince Lvoff, 
the result of a compromise between the Liberals and the Soviets. 
The new government now proposed that all the Allies should sign 
a peace with the Germans upon the basis of no annexations or 
indemnities. Inasmuch as this would have left the French and 
Belgians in the same danger at the end of the war which had all 
but destroyed them at its beginning, they could not consider 
any such terms. This was fatal to the Liberals and during the 
next month a great shift took place in the parties in Petrograd, 
for this revolution seems to have taken place chiefly in a single 
city. At any rate, what happened in Petrograd seems to have 
settled the issue for the whole of Russia. It became presently 



THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 



227 



clear that the majority of the Soviets in Petrograd were radicals, 
not moderates, and these larger groups came to be called presently 
the Bolsheviki/ which is a Russian word meaning majority. Al- 
though only a very small party when the Revolution first broke 
out, they gained strength steadily in Petrograd. 

In July some hope was held out stDl of creating a government 
which should represent more than one Russian party. The 




frwnp 



French. Pictorial Sercice 

Russian Mob, Mainly Women, Bearing Red Flag, Advancing on the Duma 
IN Petrograd, March, 1917 

Liberals now withdrew and Kerensky, the leader of the Moderate 
Socialists, became head of the state and admitted into the govern- 
ment a number of radicals, including some of the Bolsheviki. 
Attempts were made to hold national conferences which should 
secure the support of all Russia for this government, and Kerensky 

1 The singular is Bolshevik, pronounced with a strong accent on the first 
syllable. The plural is Bolsheviki, pronounced with a strong accent on 
the last syllable. 



228 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

undertook to restore the discipline of tlie army. But the AlHes 
refused to recognize him, knowing the extent of the pro-German 
interests and afraid therefore to recognize a government which 
might result in putting Russia into German hands. Kerensky 
seems not to have been pro-German and the result was exactly 
what the Allies had been most anxious to avoid. The pro- 
Germans came into control in the person of the most radical of all 
the Russian parties, the Bolsheviki. 

The latter accepted the aid of the Germans, took German 
money, and possibly had the aid of German soldiers as well, upset 
the coalition government, and installed themselves in control 
in Petrograd. The two leaders were Lenine and Trotsky. Neither 
of these names are their true names and both had been professional 
agitators before the war. Lenine ^ was about forty-seven years 
old, had been a student and had been exiled to Siberia for his 
socialistic ideas ; his brother had been executed for them ; and 
he grew up hating the Tsar. When released, he went to Switzer- 
land, where he became a leader of the socialistic agitation. Trotsky 
lived a long time in New York, where he published a Socialist 
paper. While it is probable that these men accepted German aid 
merely to get themselves into power, with the full intention of 
getting rid of the Germans as soon as they could, the result was 
entirely favorable to the latter. 

The Bolshevists proceeded to negotiate with the Central Powers, 
and signed, in February, 1918, the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, in which 
they yielded to the Germans a great deal of territory in western 
Russia, and perhaps received a promise of German money and 
support necessary to continue their own authority over Russia. 
They were an insignificant minority of the Russian people and 
could hope to control only by reason of the fact that the vast 
1 Pronounced Leynin, with the accent on the first syllable. 



THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 229 

majority were densely ignorant and were scattered over so vast 
a country that they could not organize effective opposition. 
Russia had always been governed from Petrograd, and the control 
of Petrograd continued to carry with it a nominal right to govern 
Russia. Nevertheless the Bolsheviki must get support. They 
distributed the land to the peasants, gave the factories to the 
workmen, abolished all private property, and proposed that every 
one in Russia should work with his hands. In order to destroy 
the educated and proprietor class, they began a series of murders 
and massacres which resulted in the deaths of thousands of people. 
Russia, however, is a very large country and many parts of it 
refused in 1918 to be governed from Petrograd. A separate 
state called the l^kraine was organized in southern Russia, a 
separate government was organized for Siberia, and still others 
in the Caucasus, in Plnland, and in Poland. The Germans 
themselves organized new governments along the Baltic coast 
in Lithuania. At the time this is written Russia is divided into 
several states, of which the Bolsheviki control only one, which 
contains, however, Petrograd, Moscow, and the largest part of 
the old Russia. 



CHAPTER XXX 

WHY THE UNITED STATES ENTERED TOE WAR 

On August 4, 1914, the President formally declared the neutrality 
of the United States in the war which had just broken out, but 
the war was not many days old before it began to be clear that 
American sentiment was anything but neutral. For three years 
event after event only convinced the American people more firmly 
that the German cause was not ours and that the cause of the Allies 
was ours. As time went on the number of people who had any 
doubt of this fact became smaller and smaller, and in 1917 the vast 
majority of the nation without question was convinced that this 
was our war, and that we could stay out of it only at a risk to 
principles we held dear and at grave danger to ourselves. Belgium, 
France, Great Britain, and Russia had been for nearly three years 
fighting our war and it was our duty and our privilege to aid them. 

Unquestionably the facts instrumental in creating these feelings 
in the American people had been first and foremost the invasion 
of Belgium and the German chancellor's declaration that the treaty 
protecting Belgium had been nothing but a scrap of paper. If 
such was to be international morality, no promises or agreements 
would ever after be worth anything. Then the atrocities in France, 
so horrible that for a time Americans felt them impossible to be- 
lieve, gained credence and men came to know that the worst was 
only too clearly true. Not only were the atrocities facts but they 
were not chance facts. The cruelty was purposeful, intentional, 
no mere accident of warfare. The German was consciously a Hun. 

230 




John Bull feeding his dear little friends. 

Illustration from German prison paper, printed by the German govern- 
ment, distributed to the American prisoners to rouse hatred of England. 
Copy brought to America by a St. Louis boy and loaned to author.. 



232 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

He meant to destroy his enemy forever while he had the chance. 
And the babies in arms, the children in the streets were as truly 
Belgians and Frenchmen to be slaughtered as the men in the 
armies. The Germans were striving to destroy a nation. Nothing 
so terrible had been conceived within the memory of man. 

The sinking of the Limtania and the execution of Edith Cavell, 
as well as the murder of Captain Fryatt for the "horrible crime" 
(to German thinking) of attempting to sink a submarine, con- 
vinced even the most obstinate minds in the United States that 
the German was the enemy of civilization. As time went on the 
scraps of paper multiplied. To President Wilson's warnings, 
the Germans replied with promises, which they broke in rapid suc- 
cession. They agreed to give warning before sinking ships ; to 
make adequate provision for the escape of the passengers and crew ; 
but on the first of February, 1917, they issued a notification that 
all vessels would be sunk without warning. This was a direct 
violation of the solemn pledge given by the German government 
to the United States the year before. 

The German intrigues against this country had also increased. 
The Secret Service seized papers upon German spies in this country 
which demonstrated an extent of operations contrary to the laws 
and rights of the United States truly extraordinary. German 
agents were placing bombs on ships, fomenting a revolution in 
Ireland from the United States, and organi-zing a great conspiracy 
in India, purchasing writers and lecturers, stirring up strikes in 
American factories, blowing up buildings, all justified by the same 
morality which sank the Lusiian'm. 

The result was a conviction in American minds that the Imperial 
German Government had repudiated the fundamental principles 
of law and humanity and could be restrained and made to respect 
law and right only by being defeated in war. The American people 



WHY THE UNITED STATES ENTERED THE WAR 233 

became convinced that Prussian militarism and autocracy were a 
menace to the nations and civiHzation of the world and endangered 
the homes, rights, and natural privileges of men all outside of 
Germany. The war had become a combat between the democratic 
nations on the one side and the principles of militarism on the other. 
Autocracy as developed in Germany was a type of government 
with which free nations could not live in peace. The German 
system intended the destruction of all the United States had stood 
for since the founding of this country. Only by its annihilation 
could democracy be rendered safe. 

Such being the conviction of the American people, the entry 
of the Ignited States into the war became necessary in the spring 
of 1917. The Russian Revolution in March completed the German 
victories in eastern Europe. In 1914 and 1915 Poland had been 
overrun and the Russian armies beaten. In 1916 the Russian 
armies had been again destroyed and Rumania laid waste. The 
political revolution in Russia would now relieve the Germans of 
all further fear of war in the east and would enable them to 
throw their entire army against the French, British, and Italians in 
the west. There was more than a possibility that the i\.llies would 
not be able to hold the lines against such an access of strength. 
The French had borne the greater part of the burden of the war 
up to this time and still held the major part of the lines in France. 
The British had suffered great losses in the campaigns of the pre- 
ceding year, and, with all the magnificent strength which they had 
still to put into the field, could scarcely offset the numbers the 
Germans could now bring to bear. 

There was no lack of confidence in London and Paris that the 
Allies could themselves prevent the Germans from winning the 
war, but they were by no means so confident that they could win it 
without America's help. And they saw and President Wilson saw 



234 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

that the calamity to civilization would be almost as serious if the 
Germans were not beaten as if the Germans were to win. The 
United States must come to the aid of its true friends and allies 
in Europe before it was too late. The Russian Revolution meant 
that w^e could not possibly delay longer. The country was now 
solidly behind the President, as perhaps it had not been before, and 
he felt able to take the step with the consciousness that the nation 
would stand behind him to " the last drop of blood and the last 
dollar." 

The specific causes of the American declaration of war were 
the facts which stood for this determination. The German order 
declaring unrestricted submarine warfare from February 1 con- 
vinced us finally that the Germans never proposed to keep any of 
the promises they had made or to respect any American rights. It 
showed us clearly what we would have to expect if the Germans won. 
In January, 1917, the State Department made known the Zimmer- 
mann Note, in which a responsible German official offered Mexico 
our southwestern states if she would join Germany and Japan 
in a war upon us. This was nothing more than confirmation of 
what President Wilson already knew, but it was a demonstration 
of the extent to which Germany was willing to go which the nation 
heretofore had not known. Accordingly the German Ambas- 
sador was dismissed and diplomatic relations severed on February 
3. When it became clear that the Germans were executing their 
threat of unrestricted submarine warfare, armed neutrality was 
recommended by the President on February 26, and on March 12 
American merchant vessels were ordered to be armed. 

Then came the news of the Russian Revolution and the President 
saw that the moment for action had come. On April 2, 1917, he 
appeared before the assembled Congress and urged the recognition 
of a state of war with Germany. " With a profound sense of the 



WHY THE UNITED STATES ENTERED THE WAR 235 

solemn and even tragical character of the step I am taking and of 
the grave responsibilities which it involves, but in unhesitating 
obedience to what I deem my constitutional duty, I advise that 
the Congress declare the recent course of the German Imperial 
Government to be in fact nothing less than war against the Govern- 
ment and people of the United States ; that it formally accept the 
status of belligerent which has thus been thrust upon it. . . ." 

"A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except 
by a partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic Govern- 
ment could be trusted to keep faith within it or to observe its 
covenants. It must be a league of honor, a partnership of opinion. 
Intrigue would eat its vitals away ; the plottings of inner circles 
who could plan what they would and render account to no one 
would be a corruption seated at its very heart. Only free peoples 
can hold their purpose and their honor steady to a common end 
and prefer the interests of mankind to any narrow interest of their 
own. ..." 

"• . . . The world must be made safe for democracy. Its 
peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political 
liberty. We have no selfish ends to serve. We desire no conquest, 
no dominion. We seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material 
compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely make. We are 
but one of the champions of the rights of mankind. We shall be 
satisfied when those rights have been made as secure as the faith 
and the freedom of nations can make them." 

Congress responded with a declaration of war against Germany 
on April 6, and one against Austria-Hungary on December 7. 
The exact reason why the latter declaration of war was delayed 
is not yet known, but probably because of the expectation that 
Austria-Hungary might be drawn away from Germany and a 
separate peace signed with her. 



CHAPTER XXXI 

MESSINES RIDGE 

South of the city of Ypres in a corner of Belgium which the 
Allies had held tenaciously, there was a high ridge of ground which 
projected into the British line and flanked two sections of it. From 
this the Germans had harassed the British for months. To hold 
it they had fortified it for a depth of over a mile with a degree of 
ingenuity and completeness not surpassed during the war. Barbed 
wire entanglements covered every approach. All sorts and kinds 
of guns were concealed there. Deep concrete dugouts, many feet 
underground, had been constructed, able to withstand any amount 
of pounding by heavy artillery. 

It was a position too strong to be carried by assault, the British 
soon learned, but could not the entire embankment be blown into 
the air from below, if not from above? It would take time, 
courage, and skill. Underground tunnels would have to be dug 
from the British lines long distances to the ridge and under it, 
but the feat might be successfully performed. For nearly two 
years several corps of Australian, New Zealand, and British sappers 
tunneled and dug and finally located nineteen mines containing a 
million pounds of ammonite. 

On June 7, 1917, after two weeks of artillery " preparation " of the 
position, the mines were exploded with complete success and 
over the fragments swept an infantry attack directed by Sir Henry 
Plumer, one of the most successful of the British field generals of 
the war. In a few minutes the German lines on a front of ten 

236 



238 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

miles were captured. It is more correct to say that the site where 
they had been was captured, for there were no trenches or dugouts 




Illustrated London News 

Italian Trench in Mountains, 1915 



left. The British occupied the spot where the German lines 
had been. Then followed the storming of Messines Ridge itself, 
the second German line. The forests, which the Germans had 



MESSINES RIDGE 239 

calculated would shelter them, were burned down by streams of 
blazing oil. Within three hours the second line was carried, and 
by the end of the day the rear defense line fell, so that the entire 
salient was wiped out in one of the most gallant actions of the war. 

An eyewitness thus described the assault. "All through the 
night the sky was filled with vivid flashes of bursting shells. 
From an observation post I watched this bombardment for that 
moment when it should rise into a mad fury of gun fire, before the 
troops, lying in those fields, should stumble forward. The full 
moon had risen, veiled by vapors. The drone of a night-flying 
aeroplane passed overhead. The sky lighted a little and showed 
great smudges like ink blots on blue silk cloth, where the British 
kite balloons rose in clusters to spy out the first news of the coming 
battle. 

" The cocks of Flanders crowed. Out of the dark ridges of Mes- 
sines, gushed up enormous volumes of scarlet flame from exploding 
mines, and of earth and smoke, all lighted by flame spilling over into 
fountains. Fountains of fierce color so that the countryside was il- 
luminated with red light. . . . The ground trembled and surged 
violently. . . . Thousands of British soldiers were rocked like that 
before they scrambled up and went forward to the German lines." 
As day broke, rockets rose from the latter, distress signals white, 
red, and green, flung up by the few who still lived in that zone of 
fire. 

To the troops engaged, one of the most extraordinary thrills 
of this battle was the moving forward of the gun batteries from 
the positions they had held for two years and a half. When the 
good news came of the success of the attack, the signal was given, 
the horses were harnessed to the gun limbers and dashed out at a 
gallop, past the old screens, up the slopes they had watched so 
long. And from thousands of hot, dusty throats rose a great cheer, 



240 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

sweeping along the British front, as they watched the gunners go up 
the ridge, where they unhmbered in new positions and began a 
new phase of the fighting. As an eyewitness said: "There had 
been up to that time nothing Uke it in excitement and sense of 
victory." 

The aviators performed astonishing feats. They attacked not 
merely German aeroplanes but the German troops. Flying far over 
the German lines, they swooped down upon groups of men on the 
march and killed them with machine gun fire from the air ; one 
man thus destroyed a large body of troops preparing a counter- 
attack. He then cleared out a whole trench full of German sol- 
diers, who scuttled like rabbits for their dugouts. Other aviators 
swooped down upon the German batteries, killing the crews with 
machine gun fire. One airman swooped so low he cleared a motor 
car by only four feet, splashing bullets all round the car as he 
passed, and barely saved his own machine, as the driver steered 
the car into a ditch, where it upset. 



CHAPTER XXXII 

ITALIAN FIGHTING IN THE ALPS 

None of the armies engaged in this war had greater difficulties 
to meet than the Italians. On practically the entire battle front, 
they were holding lines in the mountains which produced a type of 
modern warfare utterly different from that in France. The 
difficulty there was to see anything ; the trouble in Italy was that 
the enemy saw too much. The trenches of both sides were clearly 
outlined in the mountain air and the artillery on bright days could 
pick out the positions with extraordinary accuracy, but the 
greatest difficulties were those created by travel in the mountains. 
Everything to be used for attack or defense had to be carried up a 
mountain side many thousands of feet. Water in particular for 
the troops in the trenches was a great problem and eventually all the 
important positions were supplied by water piped up the mountain 
side and pumped up at regular intervals. 

In many instances the trench line ran through districts covered 
both winter and summer with ice and snow ; snowshoes, skiis, sleds 
were essential for the troops. Imagine a regiment marching on 
snowshoes or a dispatch bearer with important papers sliding 
down the mountain on a sled ! In some cases a precipice was 
being held and the troops on top were supplied by means of ele- 
vators. A crane was rigged out over the precipice and a car was 
hauled up and down on a wire by an engine, and in other cases 
a wire was strung across a chasm or over a river or from one moun- 
tain peak to another, and a trolley car running on the wire was used 
R 241 



242 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

to send men, ammunition, and food across the gap. Funny little 
railroads were built up the sides of the mountains, running on the 
cog system. 

The amount of preparation often necessary to hold a line in the 
mountains was extraordinary to contemplate. When the troops 
got up there, the ground was frozen solid, perhaps several feet. 
Moreover it had been frozen for years, perhaps for centuries ; it 
had never been anything but frozen; it would never thaw out. 
They had to blast out a trench as if they were blasting rock. Snow 
blindness also caused much suffering. Dark glasses or snow glasses 
were essential for all the men. 

On no section of the front was camouflage so necessary, because 
nowhere could a man walking along a mountain some miles off be 
seen so clearly. It was necessary for the troops to dress winter 
and summer so as to be indistinguishable. The trenches had to be 
covered with white screens in winter and green in summer. The 
cold was particularly difficult to endure. The men in France suf- 
fered from it but the cold in the mountains was intense and the 
soldiers must stay day and night in open trenches in positions where 
a fire would advertise their location to the Austrians. The ques- 
tion of warm food in the front line trenches, very essential in so 
cold a temperature, was a hard problem to solve. The defense 
was easier perhaps than in France because the enemy was easier to 
watch and because he had great difficulties to overcome in scram- 
bling up the mountains. But it was not easy to maintain contact 
with all parts of the line and to keep up the constant watch to pre- 
vent surprise. 

One picturesque incident in the Julian Alps during the summer 
of 1917 illustrates this difficult and picturesque warfare. The 
general staff decided to take some Austrian batteries on top of 
a precipice forty feet high. It could be reached only by crossing 



ITALIAN FIGHTING! IN THE ALPS 243 

a swift, deep river and must be scaled in full sight of the Austrians 
and within the range of their guns. The Italians decided to make 
the attempt at night because, while darkness to them was a great 
obstacle, it was to their enemy a greater. With extraordinary 
ingenuity they first put out the eyes of the Austrian batteries. 
They concentrated on the mountains opposite the position to be 
attacked a row of brilliant searchlights, and, when the moment 
for the attack came, turned the full glare upon the Austrian posi- 
tion. It literally blinded the gunners. The light was so intense 
that they could see absolutely nothing of what was going on below 
them. 

It was necessary for the Italian engineers to throw pontoon 
bridges across the river and that meant noise, which of course 
would inform the Austrians what was going on. They must there- 
fore deafen the Austrian gunners. This was done by a tremendous 
cannonade creating so loud a roar that the noise of the hammering 
and pounding could not be heard. Once the eyes of the Austrians 
had been put out and their ears had been deafened, the Italians 
threw across the pontoons, the troops rushed over the river, 
scaled the precipice, and were upon the astonished Austrians before 
the latter knew what was being attempted. The positions were 
carried with a rush and at once the guns were turned upon the 
Austrians. That single feat compelled an Austrian retreat of 
nearly seven miles, because those guns commanded an entire 
mountain valley. 



CHAPTER XXXIII 

FIGHTING THE SUBMARINE 

No sooner had the submarine commenced its operations than 
the necessity of combating it was clear. For a while the greatest 
attention was given to methods by which merchant ships might 
escape destruction. Dodging and zigzagging were attempted with 
some success. Flight at top speed proved to be the most reliable 
method. Then elaborate camouflage was tried with great success. 
A ship painted in blue and white squares or in zigzag lines merged 
in the waves when seen at a distance, and the submarine could not 
tell which way she was traveling, even when the ship was clearly 
visible. Camouflage also spoiled the submarine's aim with tor- 
pedoes. This difficulty the submarine met by coming to the sur- 
face and sinking the ship with gun fire. As the war went on, the 
Germans developed new types of submarines, huge affairs, carrying 
heavy rifles, the shells of which were able to riddle a ship. 

Then came scouting and patrolling, directed b}^ wireless from 
the shore and intended to cover certain areas of water most com- 
monly used by merchant ships. In this the United States Navy in 
the last year of the war played a very active and distinguished part. 
But it was necessary to do a good deal more than merely to get the 
merchant ships through. The submarines themselves must be 
destroyed. The sinking of one such craft might prevent the loss 
of twenty ships. Vulnerable to destroyers and cruisers on the 
surface, the submarine had only to submerge and rest for a while 
on the bottom to elude all pursuit. To meet this method of defense, 

244 



FIGHTING THE SUBMARINE 



245 



the depth bomb was in- 
vented. A destroyer steered 
at full speed straight to the 
spot where the submarine 
had submerged and as she 
passed it, rolled over the 
side or stern something not 
unlike a large tin ash can 
which sank rapidly and was 
timed to explode at a depth 
of from twenty to two hun- 
dred feet below the surface. 
The explosion was effective 
throughout a wide area, 
and, unless the submarine 
was extremely fortunate, 
the crew of the destroyer, 
circling back to review re- 
sults, would be almost sure 
to see a dark oily smudge 
appearing, with fragments 
of clothes and wood. 

Then came the "Q" 
boats, meaning Queer 
boats. Their purpose was 
to lure the submarine to 
the surface, where it could 
be destroyed by concealed 
guns. The "Q" boat pre- 
tended to be a helpless 
merchant craft. Here 




246 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

would come puffing along an old rusty tramp steamer with the 
crew loafing around on deck and all serene. Suddenly, up pops 
a submarine which signals with gun fire that the ship is to be 
abandoned. The crew tear around in a panic. The submarine 
comes closer and becomes impatient. Suddenly a white flag 
shoots to the masthead ; there is a rattle of chains and a clat- 
tering down of steel bulkheads ; out pops a great rifle, and in 
fewer seconds than it takes to tell it the submarine is going down, 
riddled with shot and sw^pt by machine guns. 

Such a drama could not be enacted more than a few times. The 
submarines became exceedingly wary of all innocent-looking craft. 
In February, 1917, the Q 5 was chugging along when suddenly her 
commander saw a torpedo coming toward her. With iron nerve 
he deflected the course of the ship a trifle and allowed the torpedo 
to hit aft, blowing a hole forty feet wide in her side. The gun 
crews were already concealed inside ; panic stations were ordered ; 
the camouflage crew were rushing around outside in a well-acted 
confusion ; and the boats were lowered and shoved off. Apparently 
the ship was abandoned, but inside were the commander and the 
gun crews waiting for the submarine to come up and show herself. 

The chief engineer reported that the ship was sinking fast. 
The commander ordered him to keep the pumps going until the 
water put the engine fires out. Meanwhile the submarine was 
watching the ship through its periscope. Slowly it came to within 
five yards of the boats, not ten yards from the ship itself, observ- 
ing, watching, well aware that it was difficult to be hit under the 
water at that angle, and knowing that it could submerge im- 
mediately. Despite the fact that his ship was going down the 
British commander was forced to wait. It was no use to fire until 
the submarine came up, but apparently the submarine had no 
intention of coming up until the ship w^nt down. 



FIGHTING THE SUBMARINE 247 

At last after many anxious minutes, the submarine rose to the 
surface, and came slowly toward the ship. Patiently the British 
officer waited until it was near enough for every gun to bear. 
Then up went the white flag, down clattered the bulkheads, and 
a terrific gun fire poured upon the doomed vessel. The German 
commander was complacently climbing out of the conning tower ; 
the first shot neatly beheaded him. The crew of the submarine 
came pouring out of the hatchways and were swept off by the 
fire of the machine guns as the submarine sank for the last time. 
Some hours later, assistance summoned by wireless rescued the 
men in the small boats, and as the Q 5 was still afloat she was 
successfully towed back for repairs. 

In June, 1917, another "Q" boat went through very much the 
same sort of stage play to get the submarine to appear. The panic 
party abandoned the ship and for thirty-five minutes the men on 
board waited and waited, with the water getting higher every minute. 
Then a long distance off the periscope of the submarine broke 
the surface and came toward the ship. As it approached, the sub- 
marine submerged, passed under the ship, and came up on the other . 
side out of range. Night was coming on ; unless the submarine 
came up presently there would not be enough light to hit her, and 
the British boat was going down rapidly. 

The men in the boats here tried a new game which completely 
fooled the German commander. They started pulling for the ship 
again as if to take possession. This convinced him that the ship 
had really been abandoned and up came the submarine in a hurry. 
Open came hatches and the angry Germans began pouring from 
them with machine guns to shoot the "treacherous Englishmen." 
It began to look as if the British in the small boats were going 
to be shot by the submarine and by their own men as well, but 
they pulled like mad through the range of their own fire. 



248 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

Then suddenly down clattered the steel screens and a broadside 
of yellow flame leaped over their heads. Half out of the water, 
the submarine listed as the oil spouted from the rents in her hull. 
The crew scrambled out of her hatches, held up their hands, and 
shouted "Kamerad." The British ceased fire and the submarine 
rushed off at top speed, attempting to escape, and sweeping into 
the water to die the poor fellows on her deck. Grimly the British 
guns broke out again and continued fire until not one remnant was 
left. They rescued a few of the hapless Germans and were them- 
selves presently rescued by destroyers, waiting around over the 
horizon for the "Q" boat to finish its task. 



CHAPTER XXXIV 

ZEEBRUGGE AND OSTEND 

There were few exploits in the history of the war more con- 
spicuous in gallantry than the blocking of the harbors of Zeebrugge 
and Ostend in the springof 1918.^ Both were submarine bases from 
which went forth the slinking craft that infested the seas around 
Ireland and accounted for the loss of so many ships and the death of 
so many brave fellows. If these harbors could be closed, it was 
possible that the submarines might find it so difficult to venture 
out from Germany itself that their activities would be immensely 
restricted. A good many of the deadly craft could probably be 
bottled up at Zeebrugge, if not at Ostend, and effectively put out 
of the game. So elaborate, however, were the fortifications, so 
numerous the searchlights, big guns, little guns, destroyers, and 
garrisons, that it was clear that any attempt against that base 
would be one of the utmost danger. 

At Zeebrugge, there was a canal with wharves on either side 
of it and protected from the action of the sea by a long mole or 
breakwater. The plan was to fill three old cruisers, the Intrepid, 
the Ijjhigenia, and Thetis, with concrete, to attach mines to their 
hulls, work them into the very neck of the canal, and sink them 
across it. Two others similarly prepared were to be sunk in the 
harbor of Ostend. An old battleship, the Vindictive, aided by 
ferry boats, destroyers, smoke boats, motor launches, and indeed a 

1 This chapter has been placed here so as to avoid breaking the narrative of 
the great German offensive in 1918 by inserting it in its chronological place. 

249 



250 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

whole swarm of craft, was to attack the great mole guarding the 
Zeebrugge Canal, create a diversion, and draw the fire of the 
German guns while the cruisers were working their way into the 
canal. To render the diversion convincing, blue-jackets and 
marines were to be landed on the mole and were to attempt to 
destroy such stores and guns as they could. The small motor 
launches were to carry off the crews of all these various vessels 
which were to be sunk and to render aid to any of the other craft 
which got into diffi.culties. 

It was absolutely essential that all weather conditions should be 
exactly right. The night must be dark ; the sea calm, so that the 
small craft might operate without too much danger ; and above all, 
the Germans must be surprised. It was on the night of April 24, 
1918, that the Vindictive, followed by two ferry boats, headed to- 
ward the mole, while around her rolled a thick smoke screen created 
by the small launches plying near by. The wind blew this toward 
the shore and concealed the ship, and it was not until she was close 
upon the mole that the wind suddenly changed, whirled away the 
smoke, and showed the startled Germans what was intended . 

"There was a moment immediately afterwards," says the 
British official account, " when it seemed to those in the ships as 
if the dim coast and the hidden harbor exploded into light. A 
star shell soared aloft, then a score of star shells ; the wavering 
beams of the searchlights swung around and settled to a glare. 
The wildfire of gun flashes leaped against the sky ; strings of lu- 
minous green beads shot aloft, hung and sank." A tremendous fire 
from all the batteries upon the shore burst upon the Vindictive 
as she laid her nose against the concrete side of the mole, thirty 
feet high. She let go an anchor and the two ferry boats, brought 
for the purpose, began to shove her up against the high side of the 
mole. 



ZEE BRUGGE AND OSTEND 



251 




Current Hist. Mag. N. Y. Times Co. 



Attack on Zeebrugge 



252 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

In order to get the sailors and marines on shore, it had been 
necessary to construct a series of drawbridges which could be 
lowered from the ship on to the mole, and up which the men must 
scramble, peppered all the while by German machine guns. The 
ship rose and fell with the tide more than had been expected. The 
gun fire was extremely severe and getting off the ship at all turned 
out to be an extremely hazardous and costly adventure. The men 
were magnificent, and as soon as possible swarmed on shore. The 
Germans abandoned the mole without a struggle and contented 
themselves with sweeping it with machine gun fire. One by one, 
the great store buildings and sheds burst into flames or crumpled 
as the dynamite which the British marines set went off. 

Meanwhile the three cruisers were making their way into the 
canal. The first fouled one of the German defense nets and went 
ashore on a mud flat. The Intrepid, smoking like a volcano to 
conceal her from the Germans, and with all her guns blazing away 
at the shore, steered straight into the canal, followed by the 
Iphigenia. Her commander placed the nose of the ship on the mud 
of the western bank, ordered the crew into the motor launches 
clustering around, and blew up the ship by means of electric 
switches in the chart room. Four dull bumps told him that the 
work was complete. The Iphigenia was then beached on the other 
side of the canal, blown up, and dropped exactly across the canal 
closing it from one side to the other. Her commander missed the 
motor launch, and was compelled to take refuge in a Corley float, a 
sort of life boat carrying a chemical which lighted a flare as it 
touched water. Originally intended to save the man by showing 
his position to the rescuers, it now picked him out as a target for the 
Germans and they promptly gave him unremitting attention. He 
was saved by drifting into a huge cloud of smoke thrown off by 
one of the cruisers, caught a rope from a passing motor launch, 



ZEEBRUGGE AND OSTEND 253 

and was towed along for a while before he could be hauled on 
board. 

As his launch cleared the canal and came forth into the open 
harbor, the water spouting all about them from the German shells, 
they saw the success of another phase of the expedition. An old 
submarine laden with explosives had been run into the mole, her 
crew picked off by the waiting motor launches, and blown up. "A 
huge roaring spout of flame tore the jetty in half and left a gap 
of over a hundred feet." It would be some time before the Ger- 
mans would get out again upon the mole. The Vindictive, her 
work done, now blew her whistle, gathered in such of her men and 
wounded as she could, was pushed off from the mole by the two 
ferry boats, and limped out of the harbor, literally riddled with 
shot and shell. There she was received by destroyers and cruisers 
who were supporting the operation. 

An attempt made that same night on the harbor of Ostend was 
a failure, but on IMay 11, the Vindictive herself successfully carried 
out the enterprise. The night promised well ; it was nearly windless, 
the sky a leaden blue and with no moon ; the sea was still, enabling 
the motor craft to cooperate. In the darkness, without a light, 
the Vindictive made her way towards the shore, shrouded with 
smoke thrown up from the smoke ships. A motor boat preceding 
her lighted flares on the water to show the way to the harbor 
mouth. Fifteen minutes before the ship was due at the entrance, 
two motor boats dashed in and torpedoed the high wooden piers 
on either side of the entrance, both vanishing in the roar and leap 
of flame and debris. 

Suddenly there appeared high in the air a flame that sank slowly 
earthwards, a signal from the fleet of aeroplanes, cruising over the 
town, ready to drop bombs upon it at the proper moment. The 
same instant came the shriek of the first shells thrown from the 



254 



THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 



great guns of the British marine artillery, brought up to occupy 
the German heavy artillery. A tremendous roar from the shore 
replied as every one of the many guns began action. Star shells 
shot up, lighting the great smoke plumes ; green flares and strings 



ZEEBRUGGE 




Current Hist. Mag. N. Y. Times Co. 



OSTEND HaRBOU 



of luminous green balls, which the airmen called "flaming onions," 
soared up and lost themselves in the clouds. Through all the glare 
and hail of shell, the Vindictive pushed steadily on. 
And then came a fog, a real fog, dense, thick, moist ! The 



ZEEBRUGGE AND OSTEND 255 

Vindictive lost her way ; the motor boats could not see each other ; 
their flames were lost in the fog. Twice the old battleship cruised 
across the harbor entrance, missing it both times. The third time 
there came a sudden rift in the mist and she saw the entrance 
dead ahead. She steamed over the bar and once she was in the 
German guns poured shells upon her. She was hit every few 
seconds, her decks and turrets destroyed, her guns put out of 
action, her officers and men killed and wounded. She laid her 
battered nose against the eastern pier and tried to swing across the 
channel, but she was too hard and fast in the mud to be moved. 
They blew the main charges beneath her, tearing out her bottom 
plates and sinking her in the channel. Her commander was dead 
already and many of the officers. Every man alive was taken oft' 
in motor launches which immediately ranged alongside. One 
by one, they made their way through the fog, back to the waiting 
cruisers and destroyers outside. The deed was done. Ostend 
harbor would no longer be useful to the Germans. 



CHAPTER XXXV 

THE BATTLE OF THE TANKS 

The war had scarcely begun before the deadly effect of machine 
gun fire was clear to the British and they set about experimenting 
with some sort of defense for the advancing troops. After a 
year and a half of experiment they produced the tank, which was 
first used on September 16, 1916. They had found an American 
machine, created for the purpose of. carrying heavy loads over 
bad roads. It was called a caterpillar tractor, and had no wheels 
but ran on a sort of endless chain moved by machinery and on 
which the tractor crawled forward. The tread of the chain was 
so broad that it could run over all sorts of mud, soft earth, and 
bad going without getting stuck. This provided the first requisite. 
The new weapon must not be impeded by ground dug up by 
shells ; it must be able to climb through trenches or over them ; 
it must be able to walk on barbed wire entanglements. 

The British now put armor on the car, mounted guns in it, 
and thus created a land battleship which was impervious to small 
artillery fire. The purpose was to tramp down the barbed wire 
entanglements, which hindered the infantry, to hunt down the 
German machine gun nests, walk right up to them and clean them 
out. It had been proved that artillery fire could not wipe out the 
underground dugouts. At Verdun there was under one of the 
hills a dugout, called the Crown Prince, eight hundred feet long 
and twelve feet high, in which a whole regiment might take refuge, 
and from which it could pour out when the defense was needed. 

256 



THE BATTLE OF THE TANKS 



257 



The first time the tanks went into action the Germans were 
astonished and the British troops were so delighted that they were 
hardly able to stand from laughter and joy. One of the cor- 
respondents thus described one of the first engagements. "A 




French Pictorial Service 

French Troops Charging Protected by Large French Tank, 1918. 
the men are lying down, not running. 



Note 



tank had been coming along slowly in a lumbering way, crawling 
over the interminable succession of shell craters, lurching over 
and down and into and out of old German trenches, nosing heavily 
into soft earth, and grunting up again, and sitting poised on broken 
parapets as though quite winded by this exercise, and then wad- 
dling forward in the wake of the infantry. It faced the ruins of 



258 THE STOUY OF THE GREAT WAR 

the chateau and stared at them very steadily for quite a long time, 
as though wondering whether it should eat them or crush them. 
Our men were hiding behind ridges of shell craters, keeping low 
from the swish of the machine gun bullets and imploring the tank 
to 'get on with it.' Then it moved forward in a monstrous way, 
heaving itself on jerkily like a dragon with indigestion, but very 
fierce. Fire leaped from its nostrils. The German machine guns 
splashed its sides with bullets. . . . But it got on top of the 
enemy's trench, trudged down the length of it, laying its sand- 
bags flat and sweeping it with fire." 

One tank would march up single-handed to a whole trench full 
of Germans. It would crawl around until it could rake it and thus 
force the whole company to surrender. When the infantry came 
up, it would hand over the prisoners, who stood there holding 
up their hands, and lollop off in search of new adventures. One 
tank took a town single-handed, driving the Germans into the 
cellars, and wandering undisputed up and down the streets. 
The machine gun bullets rattled on its sides like peas, but to no 
purpose. Another tank got stuck in the mud and the Germans 
rushed upon it. "They flung bombs at it, clambered on to its 
back, and tried to smash it with the butt ends of rifles, jabbed it 
with bayonets, fired revolvers and rifles at it." When the in- 
fantry arrived, between two and three hundred killed and wounded 
Germans lay on the ground around it. Presently, with a good 
deal of grunting and grinding, the tank heaved itself up and 
waddled off to find new foes. 

But the tanks were at first not so effective as they were interest- 
ing. They were used at the Somme in September, 1916, and 
in the next year at Arras, Messines Ridge, and elsewhere, but 
were not really effective until the battle of Cambrai on November 
20, 1917. The troops were here led against the Hindenburg 



THE BATTLE OF THE TANKS 259 

Line by some hundreds of tanks on a thirty-two-mile front. The 
assault penetrated the German defenses to a depth of five miles, 
but inasmuch as the Hindenburg Line was here about twelve miles 
wide, they did not go through it. Nevertheless this was the 
largest single gain the Allies had made during the entire war. 

It was a quiet part of the line, as the war went, and the surprise 
attack was therefore attempted against a relatively thinly held 
part of the German line. There could be no artillery preparation, 
for that would merely advertise what was coming. • The ground 
was hard and dry and it was expected that the tanks would them- 
selves be able to crush down the barbed wire, take the trenches, 
and perform the work usually done by the heavy artillery. Several 
hundred tanks were secretly, slowly concentrated along the thirty- 
two miles of front and hidden from the curious aeroplanes in woods 
and villages. 

On November 20, the mists of the morning were extremely 
heavy, and out of them as day broke came trudging down upon the 
astonished Germans scores and hundreds of tanks. They trampled 
the barbed wire entanglements and slaughtered the Germans with 
a barrage of machine gun fire. Behind came the infantry, cheering, 
shouting, leaping, and laughing, and overhead was a tremendous 
barrage fire from the British heavy artillery, meant, now that the 
surprise was sprung, to crush the trenches immediately ahead of 
the tanks, to silence the German batteries, and to prevent the 
bringing up of reenf or cements. The surprise was complete and 
the success astonishing. The Germans were killed or ran or sur- 
rendered, and the tanks and infantry rumbled gayly on, as line 
after line of the strong defenses fell. 

Here had been concentrated great bodies of British cavalry. 
They were to ride round the infantry and tanks, once the formal 
defenses had been broken through, dash forward into the open 



260 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

country behind, and prevent the bringing up of reenforcements. 
The tanks and infantry moved slowly ; the cavalry was to gallop, 
occupy as advanced positions as possible, and hold them until the 
infantry could come up. It was the first time in the war that 
great bodies of cavalry had been used for anything except scouting 
and the carrying of messages. The most picturesque element 
of the old warfare had practically disappeared from this war nor 
did the cavalry on this occasion accomplish much. 

Great as was the success, it was not great enough. The British 
infantry outran their supplies, artillery, and reenforcements, and, 
before the position could be consolidated and defended, a fierce 
German counter-attack retook much of the ground. The tech- 
nique of gaining ground in a hurry had been established. The 
technique of holding it had not yet been learned. 



CHAPTER XXXVI 

WITH ALLENBY IN PALESTINE 

Few campaigns of the war thrilled the western world to a 
greater extent than that in Palestine and Asia Minor. Few events 
caused a deeper satisfaction than the capture of Jerusalem by 
AUenby in December, 1917. It was certainly not because of the 
extraordinary importance of the campaigns themselves, nor yet 
because the military operations displayed greater skill or courage 
than those in Europe. Remarkable as they were, they certainly 
cannot be compared with the great movements in France. But 
the fact was that the western world saw Allenby achieve what 
the Christian world had failed to win in the Middle Ages, saw him 
take possession for the first time in nearly eight hundred years of 
the place in the world most sacred to Christians. 

His quiet entry into Jerusalem was the achievement which 
Richard, the Lion Hearted, Philip Augustus, and a long line of 
knights and pilgrims had shed their blood in vain to accomplish. 
The Christian world had believed for centuries that Palestine 
should not be in the hands of the Infidel and yet in his hands it 
had remained. Now it was returned once more to Christian 
possession. He was a crusader, that quiet general in khaki. 
The imagination of the western world clad him in burnished armor 
and placed upon his breast the magic cross of the eleventh century. 
The hopes, aspirations, traditions of the Christian world invested 
the campaigns in Palestine with a significance which few in 
history have had. 

261 



262 



THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 




WITH ALLENBY IN PALESTINE 



263 



The British also found deep joy in Allenby's victory because a 
British force had pushed up the Persian Gulf from India, had 
invaded Mesopotamia in the first years of the war, and had finally 
been captured in 1916 by the Turks. The British never accept 
defeat and they burned to wipe out the stain on their arms before 




French Pictorial Service 

British Auxiliary Troops Advancing in Palestine 



a general victory in Europe should ingloriously overthrow the 
Turk in Asia Minor. 

People too found the military operations in the Near East 
romantically interesting, not because different things were being 
done than in France, but because the appearance of warfare was 
different. Aeroplanes and tanks in the desert, cooperating with 
Arabs on camels, seemed certainly more romantic than they did 



264 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

in France or Italy. The campaign was of the older type ; there 
were never enough troops on either side to make necessary a 
trench line. Eventually the one great crowning exploit of the 
campaign was that in which the British cavalry in force rode around 
the Turks and caught them in the rear, while AUenby's infantry 
attacked them in front. These are the probable reasons for the 
interest of the public in these campaigns. 

The story itself is soon told. On April 29, 1916, General Town- 
shend surrendered at Kut-el-Amara. British forces at once 
started from India, advanced up the Tigris and Euphrates, and 
on February 24, 1917, General Maude retook Kut-el-Amara. A 
campaign was waged then during the summer and autumn, by 
Allenby from Egypt, on Jerusalem, which fell December 10. In 
1918 both British forces, aided by Arabs, pushed steadily on. 
September 22 was the great victory over the Turks in Syria. 
On October 1 the British entered Damascus ; October 26 Aleppo 
surrendered, followed on October 31 by the surrender of Turkey, 
and the war in the Near East came to an end. 



BOOK VI 
THE WAR IN 1918 



CHAPTER XXXVII 

THE GERMAN PLANS FOR THE CAMPAIGN OF 1918 

The Germans saw in 1917 that it would be essential for them 
to win the war in 1918. If they delayed, they would never win 
it at all, and a failure to win a military decision would be complete 
disaster. The Americans could not arrive in force in 1918, but 
in 1919 they would place in the field millions of well-trained men 
who would decidedly outnumber the Germans and win the war 
without a doubt. We must never forget the character of the 
war : it was for the Germans an aggressive war intended to win 
control of Europe, an object to be attained only by substantial 
victory. 

But in 1918 they considered their object all but assured. Russia 
had been defeated partly by the German army but principally 
by the revolution. She was now ready to become a German 
political and economic colony in which the German secret service 
could mold things at pleasure. What mattered the loss of colonies 
in Africa and in the Pacific ! The lost German territory had at 
most a few millions of people, crude and undeveloped, buying 
little and producing less. Even Mesopotamia was undeveloped 
and without inhabitants and only time could render it the sort 
of market adequate to meet the German needs for expansion. 

But now at their very door was a colony of one hundred and 
eighty millions of people, already producing exactly what Germany 
wished to buy, already buying exactly what Germany was anxious 
to sell. It was in their hands already, its resistance overthrown 

267 



268 



THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 



for good. They had only to assure their future possession of it 
to have in their hands the solution of all serious problems. Noth- 
ing stood in the way except the obstinate British and the stubborn 
F'rench in the west, who were beaten, but declined to admit it. 




AEKiH'LANfc Photograph of Advance Attack in Three Waves Dug 
In to Escape Observation 



The war itself had created the great Pan-German Confederation. 
Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey had been so tightly 
bound to Germany by circumstances that they could never again 
escape. The miserable peoples, who had hitherto stood out and 
refused to cooperate, had been trampled on and destroyed during 
the war while the trampling had been good. Rumania and Serbia 



THE GERMAN PLANS FOR THE CAMPAIGN OF 1918 269 

had been crushed too flat to offer further opposition. Poland, 
which stood in Germany's path to her new colony in Russia, had 
also been weakened and destroyed in a thousand ways. Her 
people had been slaughtered, her factories demolished, her fields 




French Pictorial Service 

French Temporary Trenches to Stop German Advance, March, 1918 



laid waste. There was nothing there the Germans thought to 
give them future anxiety. So too of Belgium, the natural outlet 
for German commerce, the new German seacoast on the Channel. 
The Belgians had been treated as people should be who refused 
to cooperate with Germany. The mailed fist had smitten them 
and ground them in the dust. Italy had been defeated and could 
be punished at any moment for her treachery. 



270 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

The new empire which was to dominate the world was a fact; 
it was necessary merely to extort recognition of it from the British 
and the French. Negotiations and peace offers had been rejected 
with disdain and with insults. The submarine had tried valiantly 
to achieve a decision but had not brought England to her knees. 
A victory in France was essential. Everything must be staked 
on winning it in 1918. To fail then was to lose the war, for 
victory thereafter would be impossible ; the Americans would see 
to that. 

The means for victory the Germans thought were at hand. 
The great armies in France could be strengthened and made 
irresistible by bringing the armies from the east, from the south, 
from Italy. The entire equipment of great guns could now be 
concentrated upon any part of the French front. There re- 
mained only the question of whom to strike and where. The 
High Command determined to attack the British and destroy 
them. Their army. was newer and less well trained than the 
French ; the Germans thought it less well officered and its 
general staff less competent. The British had possible reserves 
of man power, the French had none ; if the British were beaten, 
the French would be compelled to surrender. The latter had 
borne the brunt of at least two of the three and a half years of 
war and had carried no inconsiderable share of the remainder. 
They could not continue the war alone. To beat the British 
would be to win the war. 

Ludendorff decided to throw an overwhelming force against 
the right wing of the British army at the junction of the British 
and French armies. He would force his way through the British 
line, crush the right wing, and separate the British from the 
French. He would thus reach the Channel, and coop the British 
up in a section of France where, with the Germans on two sides 



THE GERMAN PLANS FOR THE CAMPAIGN OF 1918 271 

of them, they could be beaten and destroyed at leisure. The same 
movement would flank the whole French line, imperil Paris, if 
not capture it, and place the French as well between the fire 




French Pictorial Service 

French Counterattack with Liquid Fire during German First Offensive, 

March, 1918 



of the German armies in the new position and of those advancing 
from Metz and Verdun. 

Much time was spent upon the method of attack. The Germans 
had not studied three years of warfare for nothing. They had 
not failed to advance so many times without speculating on the 
reasons why. They came to the conclusion that nothing but an 
overwhelming superiority of artillery and of men could break 
the trench line and permit "a war of movement." They would 



272 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

plant their cannon as close together as it was possible for them 
to operate ; a great gun every few yards would not be too many. 
The infantry cxolutions necessary for the movement were prac- 
ticed for weeks behind the lines by the ver}' men who were to 
carry them out. The offensive was rehearsed like a theatrical 
performance. As many divisions as could stand without stepping 
on each other should attack the British lines. As soon as each 
had struck its blow and succeeded, it should be replaced by fresh 
divisions, each coming up successively to relieve the others. The 
same British troops should therefore be compelled to meet wave 
after wave of attack from fresh German divisions without any 
opportunity to rest, and the waves should come fast enough to 
overwhelm the British before aid could come. 

These assaults should be delivered at various parts of the 
British line, bulging it out in several places. This would compel 
the British to retreat from the sectors in between to avoid being 
captured, and thus the attacks would throw back the whole line 
over a front many miles wide. This method was followed through- 
out the entire battle : a thrust forward here and a thrust forward 
some distance away ; the line between the points then had to be 
withdrawn, and a general German advance followed. 



CHAPTER XXXVIII 

THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE OF 1918 

In accordance with the plans rehearsed for nearly three months, 
at the very second agreed upon long in advance, the German of- 
fensive rolled forward on March 21, 1918. It was directed against 
the Fifth British Army, commanded by General Gough, and is 
known as the battle of Amiens. Military critics declare it one 
of the most remarkable movements in the history of warfare. 
It was instantly successful although in the end nothing like as 
much so as the Germans had anticipated. The Fifth British 
Army, surprised and enormously outnumbered, was broken and 
driven back. A great gap, thirty miles wide, was opened between 
the British and French armies. Another gap to the north some 
eight miles wide was opened between the Fifth British Army 
and the Third British Army, which occupied the next sector of 
the line. For some days the entire Allied cause was in extreme 
peril. There were on the field no proper reserves of troops to 
fill these holes, and, if the Germans had known exactly their lo- 
cation and size, they would have w^on the war. But with extreme 
rapidity, General Fayolles moved a new French army into the 
gap between the old French line and the retiring British. He 
weakened the French line itself, but the Germans did not know 
that. 

The gap between the British Fifth and Third Armies was filled 

by a scratch division eventually commanded by General Carey, who 

really deserves the credit for its exploits. There were no troops 

to be had, but American and Canadian engineers, cooks, chauffeurs, 

T 273 



274 



THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 




Cunent Hist. Mag. N. Y. Times Co. 

German Offensive, March-June, 1918 



•THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE OF 1918 275 

road workers, anything that walked on two legs, were picked up 
wherever they could be found, in ones, twos, and tens, armed with 
the first implements that came to hand, and rushed up to the gap 
on trucks, on horseback, on mule teams, on foot. Near by they 
found a machine gun school with plenty of guns and ammunition. 
Only a few of the men collected had ever handled a machine gun, 
but those who knew how fell to work in the crowded minutes of a 
battle on the outcome of which the fortunes of the world were at 
stake, and taught the rest how to shoot. For two days the de- 
tachment held the gap, which was at that time only a couple of 
miles wide. The commander then collapsed from exhaustion. 

At this very instant, in the providential way often told in novels, 
appeared a dusty automobile; in it was General Carey looking 
for his troops. He was pressed into service by the scratch division 
and told the danger. An old South African soldier of the dare- 
devil type, afraid of nothing and full of resource, he took the situa- 
tion in hand. For six days with very little eating and less sleeping, 
these cooks, chauffeurs, and engineers, men who had never maneu- 
vered in their lives, armed merely with what they could pick up, 
and led by a general who had never seen them before, convinced 
the Germans that a great force of experienced troops held the 
position. They attacked here, rushed to a position a mile away, 
and attacked again. They lost ground constantly, were beaten 
time and again, but came back for more. They held the gap; 
the Germans did not get through. They saved the battle, and 
it will be a source of pride to many that a division of American 
engineers sent to France for very different work formed the back- 
bone of this scratch army, and that a good many of the rest were 
American ambulance drivers. Others were Canadians, a people 
who fought throughout the war with a gallantry unsurpassed by 
any nation. 



276 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

One dramatic feature of this tremendous offensive was warfare 
in tlie air on a scale never before attempted. Hundreds of Allied 
and German machines went out to combat in massed formation. 
They charged each other, laid down barrages of machine gun 
fire, swooped down upon advancing troops and annihilated them 
with a hail of bullets. The losses of men and machines were terrific : 
the latter fell in tens and dozens, some as the result of collisions, 
some with pilots killed, others in flames. For two days the battle 
raged as intensely in the air as on the ground. Then the Allied 
aviators won. Their victory was one of the vital factors slowing 
down the German drive and was certainly responsible for the Ger- 
man ignorance of the plights of FayoUes' and Carey's divisions. 

But the magnitude of the defeat could not be concealed. The 
Allied line had been broken and patched up again; but it had 
bent and bulged repeatedly until more ground had been surren- 
dered in a few da\s than the Allies had won in three years. The 
Germans w^ere within a few miles of Amiens and well on the road 
toward the coast. The iVllied reserves came up, however, and 
the German advance itself slowed down. They had outrun their 
artillery ; they outran their supply trains with food and am- 
munition ; flesh and blood could do only so much and at the end 
of a week the great rush was manifestly over. 

Then in the first week of April, fresh German troops delivered 
the second blow upon the next sector of the British line around 
Arras. This was now the key to the entire British position. 
The line had bulged out so far to the south that if Arras should fall 
and the Third British Army under General Byng should be de- 
feated, the whole line as far as the Channel must swing back. 
But to the astonishment of the Germans and the extraordinary 
joy of the Allies, General Byng's army held its ground and yielded 
nothing of consequence. Back went the Germans to work on 



THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE OF 1918 277 

the great bulge at Amiens, trying to push through the sides so 
they might safely advance further in the center. 

Now in April came a great change, (ieneral Foch was ap- 
pointed general of all the Allied armies. He was to command the 
British, the Americans, and the Italians as well as the French. 
He was to dictate all the moves of the campaign. This unity of 
command the Allies had hitherto declined to adopt for various 
reasons not necessary here to explain, but the great crisis com- 
pelled some sort of radical change and the appointment of one 
general seemed the best measure to take. 

By direction of President Wilson, General Pershing offered 
General Foch the services of all American troops in France, to be 
used wherever and whenever he could. They were to be brigaded 
with the French and British troops and commanded by French 
and British generals. It was one of the wisest of the President's 
decisions and made the American troops at once available in the 
field. Our private soldiers were ready to fight, but our general 
staff and our artillery were not sufficiently experienced at that 
time to have taken the responsibility of a sector of the front at 
such a crisis. Probably they would have acquitted themselves 
well, but the risk would have been too great, for the Germans 
would have at once singled out that sector for a crushing attack, 
and the last week had shown that the British and French them- 
selves, despite their experience and training, were not able to 
withstand the German thrusts. Reenforcements also were poured 
in from England, and arrangements were made at once in the 
United States to ship over to France as rapidly as possible the 
new army whicb had been training during the previous months. 
This was the great crisis of the war. Ready or not ready, let the 
men go to France ; the work of Carey's scratch division had shown 
what could be done by intelligent but untrained men. 



278 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

But the Germans gave the Allies no rest. On April 9 a great 
drive was begun against the Second British Army in the sector 
between Ypres and Arras. Having failed to dislodgei Byng's 
army, the Germans proposed to bulge out the line above him and 
thus compel him to retire, and at the same time put the British 
army on the coast in such danger that they also would have to 
flee. The success was again substantial, although not so great 
as in the attack of March 21. A great hole was opened out and 
then considerably widened ; the British were compelled to retire 
from ground which they had won during the previous three years 
at heavy cost in men. The net results of these attacks was to 
put the entire British line in the gravest peril. 

And now, fortunately for the Allies, the Germans were com- 
pelled to pause for a month to organize a new effort. They had 
expected the first attack to demolish the British army. The 
moment it failed to do so, the amount of ground it occupied be- 
came an embarrassment to the Germans. They must rearrange 
their forces, rest their troops, and prepare again for a new thrust. 
They could not take so much time as they had taken before, but 
they must take more than they could afford, for the Allies also 
would have that period in which to prepare to meet the assault. 

On May 27, the Germans began what is known as the battle 
for Paris. Down to the south of the great bulge they had made in 
March, they directed an attack, just west of the great city of 
Rheims, directly at Paris. Poison gas was used with especial 
freedom in this attack and a great concentration of troops and 
artillery. Once more the Allied line yielded. There were now 
three great bulges in the line. On June 9 the battle was begun 
along the river Oise to fill in the gap between the first bulge and 
this third bulge, but it was only partially successful. The Allied 
reserves had come up ; Foch had had time to make his prepara- 



THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE OF 1918 279 

tions ; and the French and Americans threw back the Germans 
at more than one point. 

Again the Germans paused and took time to prepare for the 
final and much advertised thrust which was this time to win the 
war. Using the great bulge just created to the west of Rheims, 
they proposed to move east from its side and also to attack from 
the north at the same time, thus striking the French and American 
armies in this sector on two sides at once. The success of either 
of these attacks would insure the success of the other, and both 
would mean the loss of Rheims and the withdrawal of that whole 
section of the line. Verdun would then be isolated and could be 
assailed from the rear. It might have to surrender and the whole 
French right wing could then be crumpled up. Or, if the German 
High Command preferred, Paris would be at their mercy and they 
could destroy the center of the French army. The British ought 
then to be assailed with ease. 

Whether the Germans were too confident and made less com- 
petent preparations than before, because they believed the French 
army exhausted and demoralized, we do not know, but this sup- 
posedly greatest attack was the least successful of all. It was 
stopped almost at once ; after three days it was clearly a failure, 
and on July 18 Foch delivered an Allied offensive which at once 
succeeded and which was to continue until the war was won. In 
March, the Germans had all but won the war; in April again 
it looked as if they might win it ; in June the decision still was 
within their reach. One month later it became clear to the Allies 
that the Germans had lost ; two months later victory was in sight ; 
in three months victory was at hand. In four months after the 
Germans had been conceded in London and Paris to have an ad- 
mirable chance of winning the war, they surrendered. No more 
extraordinary and rapid change is recorded in history. 



CHAPTER XXXIX 

THE STRATEGY OF FOCH 

When Foch took command of the Allied armies in April at the 
moment when things looked all but at their worst, he determined 
that the one thing essential was to forestall a decision in favor of 
the Germans. To attempt to hold the ground against such Ger- 
man assaults was to sacrifice hundreds of thousands of men. 
Neither the French nor the British could afford to pay that price, 
even assuming that the ground could be held. The fate of France 
and of the world depended upon the continued existence of the 
armies, not upon the holding of a particular line. The French 
could win by keeping out of the Germans' way and by not allow- 
ing the Germans to beat them. They must resist enough to slow 
down the German advance ; they must force the Germans to pay 
the maximum for what they gained ; they must retire in good 
order and give the foe no chance to open a hole in the lines. But 
they should retreat and retreat rather than attempt to hold the 
territory at the expense of human life. Even Paris was not 
worth the risk of defeat. The loss of the Channel ports would 
hamper operations but could not result in total defeat. Until 
the French and British armies should be broken, the Germans 
could not win. 

Moreover, the further and the faster the Germans advanced, 
the greater became the problem of maintaining their armies. 
They were advancing into a region without railroads, chewed up 
by years of warfare, where transportation of food and munitions 

280 



THE STRATEGY OF FOCH 



281 




282 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

would be difficult in the extreme. So long as they did not break 
the Allied line, the further they advanced the worse off they 
would be. Presently they would put themselves in a position 
from which they would not be able to extricate themselves except 
at the risk of defeat. To succeed, the German movement must 
keep on succeeding. The moment it stopped it was in danger. 

Besides, Foch seems to have felt that the great object at this 
time was to maintain the Allied armies intact until the Americans 
could arrive in force. At all costs, they must not be beaten before 
that time. This meant defensive w^arfare, pursued until it be- 
came clear that the Germans could not win. But late in June 
Foch became convinced that the Germans had failed. They 
had shot their bolt ; they had used up their reserves ; and he 
correctly divined the fact that they had thrust into the battle 
every man they possessed. They had lost hundreds of thousands 
during these months of fighting and were now tired and weakened. 

Foch knew again that a million Americans had come ; millions 
more were on the way, every week adding to the number in France. 
They were not, to be sure, experienced troops, only a few of them 
perhaps were of proper caliber to trust in battle. But they were 
an admirable reserve. The future was assured : the Americans 
were on the spot and more Yanks were coming — plenty more. 
It was possible for him now to throw against the Germans the 
entire strength of the experienced British and French armies, 
superb troops, trained by the entire experience of the war. The 
Americans had made victory possible. 

He concluded again that the German advanced positions, won 
during the great offensive, were only lightly held. There was no 
long series of trench positions to carry ; the Germans had not 
won this territory to hold it, but merely to use it as a temporary 
base for a further advance. They ought therefore to be easily 



THE STRATEGY OF FOCH 



283 



driven out of it. If the campaign had been one of movement 
forward, it might as quickly become one of movement backward, 
and, once started to the rear, the Germans would probably have 
to continue the retreat until they reached their old permanent 




Underwood and Underwood 

British Battery Advancing over Plank Road to Stop German Offensive, 
1918. A shell has just exploded behind the batterj'. 



lines. It seemed possible to drive them out of their new gains 
during 1918, without waiting for further aid from the Americans. 
So much was eminently desirable. Paris was in danger ; it 
was being shelled by a long-range German gun and the German 
armies were all but within sight of it. The effect of victory upon 
the French and British people would be extraordinary, and if 



284 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

they were to undergo another winter of war it was particularly- 
necessary. Unless they began to have the hope of victory to offset 
the fears of the spring, it was possible that the Allied morale would 
weaken. Then there was the submarine. It had by no means 
won the war. Ship-building in England and America had begun 
to tell ; more ships indeed were beginning to be launched than 
the submarine was at that time sinking ; but it was not wise to 
put too much confidence in ship-building. The new devices for 
beating submarines were also effective, but it was better not to 
rely too much upon them. If the German could be driven back 
to his old lines before the Americans arrived in force, it was a 
result peculiarly desirable to achieve. 

On July 18, therefore, Foch launched the first of a series of 
offensives against the west side of the great bulge which the 
Germans had made in their third assault along the Marne just 
west of Rheims. The object was to pierce the western side of this 
salient and thus to force the Germans to retire from its tip or 
run the risk of being captured. The movement was from the first 
a glorious success and in it the American troops played a splendid 
part. They showed such dash, vigor, and skill that the French 
were electrified. Indeed, their spirit infused into the war-worn 
French and British a new courage and hope. As the pressure on 
the western side of this bulge continued, the Germans frantically 
resisted. Then the French attacked the eastern side of the salient, 
and the French and Americans began pushing in its center. The 
German Crown Prince had his troops fairly scrambling over each 
other trying to escape. The retreat, however, was admirably 
conducted and the Germans did escape, but by August 7 they had 
evacuated the entire salient, surrendered all their gains in their 
third great offensive, and Paris was again safe. 

Then Foch struck at the great salients to the north which the 



THE STRATEGY OF POCH 285 

Germans had driven into the Allied line in March and April. 
Pushing here and then there, availing himself with masterly skill 
of the weakness of the German position, the great general and 
his assistants so conducted the campaign that by the middle of 
September the Germans were back again on the old Hindenburg 
Line. All the gains of 1918 were lost ; victory was no longer 
possible — and the Germans knew it. It was only now a ques- 
tion of the time when the Allies themselves could win the war. 
Ludendorff declared after the armistice that he had so informed 
the High Command and the political authorities and had demanded 
the acceptance of any terms they could secure. But it looked 
to the great majority in Allied countries in September, 1918, as 
if the full strength of the Americans would still be necessary to 
drive the Germans out of their defensive system. 



CHAPTER XL 

THE FIRST AMERICAN OFFENSIVE — CANTIGNY 

In all probability the American attack upon Cantigny on May 
28, 1918, was the first offensive attack conducted by American 
troops alone. While not in itself a major operation as this war has 
judged affairs, its immediate success at once altered the opinion 
of foreign observers of the value of American aid. It probably led 
the French general staff to intrust to the Americans the far more 
important positions at Chateau-Thierry and Belleau Wood. The 
offensive was conducted and carried out with magnificent dash and 
verve by the First American Division, comprising sections of the 
Regular Army. 

Cantigny was a sort of observation post for the Germans, jutting 
out into Allied territory, and gave them a considerable advantage. 
It was a strong position because of the number of cellars and dug- 
outs around it, and it was joined by a long tunnel to the chateau 
in the village. The American infantry had carefully rehearsed 
the attack behind the lines with tanks and finally went forward in 
three waves. The tanks preceded the troops, who advanced 
slowly, not on the run, separated from each other by considerable 
spaces. With the infantry went an attachment of flame-throwers 
who were to throw bombs into the cellars and dugouts if the 
Germans refused to come out. Engineers, signal corps men, 
carrier pigeons, also went with them ; in case the wires should be 
cut, the carrier pigeons should be used. Overhead the artillery 
fire roared. The French guns also threw over gas bombs on the 

286 



THE FIRST AMERICAN OFFENSIVE — CANTIGNY 287 



German batteries to the rear of Cantigny. Immediately pre- 
ceding the infantry was laid down a rolling barrage behind which 
walked the troops, not moving faster than fifty yards a minute and 
then only half that pace. Suddenly a heavy smoke was thrown to 
blind the eyes of the German observers. 

The village might have been a volcano in eruption, shooting up 
clouds of smoke, first white, then brown, then black — a great dull 




French Pictorial Service 

French Official Photograph of American Regulars Leaving the Trenches 
FOR the Assault on Cantigny. Note the broken formation and the slow pace. 

cloud covering all like a pall, eternally writhing and twisting as if 
Cantigny were trying to escape its fate. The German defenses 
were completely leveled by the artillery fire ; the trenches were 
smashed so that they looked like a field plowed by a giant harrow ; 
the German artillery was silenced by the gas and smoke. 

At 6 : 45, the zero hour or the minute for the attack, the observers, 
watching from behind, had their eyes fixed upon a smooth green 



288 



THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 



slope, dotted with trees, across which the American troops must 
advance. The moment for the attack came and the great smoke 
cloud rolled itself between the observers and objective. Then 
came a rift in the smoke and on the green slope were tiny black 




French Pictorial Service 

French Official Photograph of American Regulars "Mopping up" 

Canti6ny 

figures, like ants, walking forward slowly. "We could see two of 
the three waves and not a single man out of place, following the 
barrage like veterans, " said one of the officers. 

The sun had just risen and through streaky clouds the tongues 
of red flame from the hundreds of guns were momentarily visible 
to the watchers behind, but the village itself was nothing but a 



THE FIRST AMERICAN OFFENSIVE — CANTIGNY 289 

pillar of smoke. Out of it came back in thirty-five minutes the 
characteristic American message, "We're here! Everything 
O.K." Further messages came back to the observers in the 
staff office : " They can see the Boche throwing down his arms 
in Cantigny — the colonel has twenty prisoners — the right flank 
is sending back about a hundred — balloon reports grenade fight- 
ing west of Cantigny where our men are mopping up the trenches 
— one tank returning from Cantigny — our men are seen walking 
around the city — flame throwers can be seen through the smoke 
cleaning out the dugouts. " 

xA.ll had gone absolutely as rehearsed, the artillery fire, gas, 
shells, smoke screen had prevented the German artillery from 
operating and had driven the Germans into their dugouts. The 
rolling barrage kept them there until the Americans were upon 
them. The Americans had not lost their heads, had walked as 
they should and had not run, and had executed in thirty-five 
minutes with a precision which no Allied troops could have sur- 
passed an operation of real difficulty. These were men of the 
Regular Army. 



CHAPTER XLI 

CHATEAU-THIERRY 

The third great German attack had burst through the Allied 
lines in the battle for Paris and had reached the Marne at Chateau- 
Thierry. Paris only thirty-nine miles away, all but within range 
of German guns! Paris already bombarded by the long-range, 
monster gun some sixty or seventy miles distant ! As one French- 
man expressed it, " We felt in our faces the very breath of the ap- 
proaching beast." 

It had been throughout the German offensive the strategy of 
Foch to retreat to save men rather than positions, and, as the lines 
had drawn back nearer and nearer to Paris, the hearts of the Allied 
world had stood still for fear that Paris itself might fall into German 
hands. Dauntless as the French were, it seemed at that moment 
as if their strength was failing. The British had just suffered two 
months before a crushing defeat ; the Italians were as yet in the 
gravest danger ; there was serious question whether the British and 
French could themselves resist the Hun alone. Were the Ameri- 
cans ready? Although the American regulars at Cantigny had 
showed superb skill, they were comparatively only a handful. 
But there were other Americans. The Second Division was com- 
posed largely of marines, the land soldiers who go to sea with 
the navy, and in desperation the marines were rushed to the 
Chateau-Thierry sector to help stop a gap, when even French 
heroism had seemed almost incapable of resistance. 

It was a characteristic modern charge, an all-night charge. On 

290 



CHATE AU-THIE RRY 



291 




292 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

motor trucks, cattle cars, dummy railroad trains, across country 
they hurried, crowded together like sardines. With little food and 
less sleep, they reached the battlefield. They were not posted in 
the town — the Third Division of Regulars were there ; but along 
the line to the west of the town itself. The French commander 
advised and even ordered them to retire. The German advance 
was so strong that it was idle, he thought, to sacrifice life to stop it. 
But the American commander declined. It was not the tradition 
of the marines to retreat, he told the French officer ; it was their 
business to attack. They stormed ahead through the middle of an 
artillery battle, yelling like wild Indians, ardent, young, irresistible. 
" Don't go there !" shouted the French, "The boches with machine 
guns are there!" "That's where we want to go!" shouted the 
Americans. "That's where we have come three thousand miles 
to go." It is reported that an American officer hurried up to a 
French officer, commanding troops who were fighting fiercely and 
almost hopelessly, and in extraordinarily bad French said, " Vous 
fatigez — ^ vous partir — notre job." "You tired — you go back 
— our job." 

Part of the marines went into action on June 2, in a wheat field 
hereafter to be famous in American annals. Far in the distance 
they saw the Germans advance across another wheat field in smooth 
steady columns, with no attempt at concealment. Indeed, the 
Germans were so far off that they believed themselves out of 
danger and the French were amazed to see the marines set their 
sights and open rifle fire on the Germans; The European tradition 
still was in this war, that the best that could be done was to fire 
toward the enemy rather than at an individual man. But just 
as the American farmers in the Cambridge marshes bothered 
General Howe's men on the ramparts of Boston, and as Morgan's 
men at Saratoga picked off Burgoyne's officers, so the American 



CHATEAU-THIERRY 293 

marines each picked out his man and killed him. The Germans 
were literally paralyzed ; men were falling on all sides, very ob- 
viously killed — and by rifle fire — and at such a distance The 
German lines hesitated, stopped, and broke for cover The 
advance was checked. A French aviator, soaring overhead, 
grasped the situation and signaled, "Bravo." His signal was 
caught and passed back through the lines to Paris, echoing again 
and again and spelling courage and hope. 

There was also a bridge across the Marne which the Germans 
were determined to take and which the Americans determined to 
hold. The Americans had pushed across the river on the north 
bank some small companies of machine gun men who were to 
attempt to hold the Germans away from the town and the bridge 
during the night of May 31. The Germans filtered into the out- 
skirts of the city and occupied positions on the hills which enabled 
them to direct a galling fire upon the French and Americans holding 
the north bank of the river. In accordance with orders, after dark 
on the first of June the French retired to the southern bank. It was 
now 10 : 30 p.m. and pitch dark except for the light of the burst- 
ing shells and the flame stabs of the machine guns on both sides. 
Then there came to the Americans out of the black darkness, 
the ghostly chant of the advancing enemy and they knew the 
Germans were coming, shoulder to shoulder, singing loudly to keep 
up their courage. Presently the shuffling and creaking of their 
boots was heard by the straining ears of the Americans, and then 
every gun let loose in the darkness. The enemy waves melted 
away, but on they came again, only to be met by furious gun fire, 
and to melt away once more. 

One American lieutenant with a squad of thirteen men was some- 
how or other left on the north bank, and, returning as he understood 
under orders, he approached the main bridge after the Germans 



294 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

arrived and while the grand attack was proceeding. He and his 
men worked their way down toward the bridge, took refuge under 
the stone parapets, and watched the Germans rushing forward and 
getting shot. The lieutenant knew that his own company was 
on the other side and in a lull of the firing he yelled repeatedly, 
"Cobey! Cobey!" — the name of his fellow officer. Cobey 
heard him, and the next time the German wave retired the Ameri- 
can guns ceased long enough for the lieutenant and his men to 
scramble back across the bridge. 

The next day, June 2, the Germans continued heavy shelling 
of the position and then at nine o'clock under cover of darkness 
they sought to rush the bridge. But fifteen minutes of heavy 
machine gun fire squelched the attack. The next night the 
French engineers laid a charge under the bridge and blew it up, 
and, as the Germans rushed out of the houses to learn what had 
happened, a flare was thrown over which lit up the whole scene, 
and the American bullets again found plenty of targets. The 
German advance was checked. The Americans had held. France 
was electrified. Help had come. 



CHAPTER XLII 

BELLEAU WOOD 

To the northwest of Chateau-Thierry, along the edges of the 
great German drive on Paris, was Belleau Wood, a forest in which 
the Germans had established nest after nest of machine guns in a 
jungle of matted underbrush of vines and heavy foliage. They had 
placed themselves in positions which they did not believe could be 
captured. But unless they could be driven from Belleau Wood 
the success of Chateau-Thierry would be unavailing. There would 
come another drive and another from this wood protecting the 
German flank. Once in Allied hands, the Germans would be 
forced to retreat from Chateau-Thierry. On June 6, therefore, 
the marines began a tremendous assault upon the wood and the 
towns near it. The method was a rush, a halt, and a rush again by 
four lines of men some distance apart, the men in the rear lines 
taking the places of those who fell in the front ranks. 

"Men fell like flies," wrote an officer from the field; com- 
panies dwindled away ; but the attack did not falter. The fighting 
was literally of the sort for which the Americans first became fa- 
mous in the American Revolution. It was fighting from tree to 
tree, from bowlder to bowlder. The wood was so thick and so 
strewn with rocks behind each of which was a German machine 
gun that it was impossible for the artillery to wipe out all those 
nests. It could be done only by the bayonet, by a desperate charge, 
and the marines, bare chested, shouting their battle cry, " E-yah- 
yip," charged straight into the murderous fight — and won. In 

295 



296 



THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 



more than one case only one man reached the machine gun, but 
with his bayonet as his only weapon he killed or captured the de- 
fenders, swung about the gun and turned it upon the German 
positions. In some cases, some Westerner accustomed to a six- 



;l^:|' " JHK[i^'P 


h ■:- 'y^'- 


^l-";. IP^P^@ 






\ . ' 
. ■■ ■ \ 

/ 



French Fictorial Service 

German Machine Gun Nest of Concrete Concealed by Trees and Under- 
brush FROM Aeroplane Observation 



shooter at close (juarters killed half a dozen Germans while they 
were thinking about getting out their revolvers. Such feats 
are not uncommon in the United States but were not understood 
by the Germans or provided for in Kultur. 



BELLEAU WOOD 297 

Day and night the fighting went on without relief, without sleep, 
often without water. For six days they were without hot food, 
but still the marines hung on. Their doggedness was extraor- 
dinary. Time after time the officers thought the limit had been 
reached. They saw their men falling asleep under shell fire, saw 
them fight on after they had been wounded, and until they had 
dropped unconscious. But the word kept coming that the lines 
must hold, and, if possible, that the lines must attack. So with- 
out water, without food, without rest they went forward. Regi- 
ments were reduced to the size of companies, companies became 
platoons, sometimes with no more than a sergeant or a corporal to 
lead them. After thirteen days of this extraordinary attack, a 
captured German officer told of a fresh advance of Germany's 
finest troops who were to be thrown into the struggle. 

There was no help coming for the Americans and men who had 
fought on their nerve alone for days fought on it still, with their 
backs to trees and bowlders or their sole shelter the ruins of villages. 
Time after time the officers sent back such messages as this : 
" Loss heavy ; difficult to get runners through ; morale excellent 
but troops about all in ; men exhausted. " Exhausted, but holding 
on ! And they continued to hold on in spite of all the Germans 
could do. Day by day their lines slowly advanced and then 
on June 24 began the final struggle. The artillery barrage literally 
tore the woods to pieces, but even its intensity could not clear them. 
With the bayonet it was finally done and on July 6 the marines were 
relieved and handed over the hard-won position to British troops. 

Once more the Americans had proved the extraordinary quality 
of their work. They had demonstrated themselves the equals of 
the best French and British troops, the superiors of the Kaiser's 
crack regiments who had been pitted against them. We know 
now that some of the finest troops of the German army had been 



298 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

sent against the Americans in order to make it impossible that they 
should win their first action. The Germans well knew that the 
moral effect upon the French and British of an American failure 
might be of real importance to them, but the Americans again 
proved themselves the better men. 



CHAPTER XLIII 

THREE AMERICAN EXPLOITS 

In July, 1918, an American division brigaded with the French 
was fighting along the Marne. A detachment of eleven men under 
Sergeant J. F. Brown was suddenly caught by a tremendous Ger- 
man artillery fire and had to take shelter. Along came the 
charging columns of Germans, too numerous to oppose, and the 
little band of Americans lay quiet and let them go on. Presently 
along came more Germans, and Brown saw that the German ad- 
vance had left him and his detachment within the enemy lines. 
He ordered his men to scatter and take care of themselves as best 
they could. No idea of surrender ever entered their heads. They 
would get back to their own lines, each for himself. They pro- 
posed to walk straight through the battle, not only through the 
German lines but through their own fire ! 

Presently in the woods he met his own captain, also alone. 
Finding that the German artillery fire was too heavy for them to 
pass through, they lay down in a thicket and decided to kill as 
many Germans as possible before they were themselves killed. By 
them processioned company after company of Germans. Presently 
they heard behind them two machine guns. Brown had a rifle, 
the captain had a revolver, so the two of them crept out to attack 
the German army. They stalked the machine gun as if it was a 
grizzly bear and attempted to charge it. The captain was killed, 
but there was by this time only one man left of the machine gun 
crew and Brown picked him off with his rifle. He now met an 

299 



300 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

American corporal, also alone, and the two of them started after 
the other German machine gun. With the rifle Brown killed the 
gun crew. Now, attracted by the shouting, appeared the eleven 
men of Brown's command, who were also looking for Germans. 
All of this, mind you, within the German lines, surrounded by 
thousands of Germans. 

Presently these thirteen Americans discovered a trench filled 
with German soldiers, armed as usual with machine guns and 
rifles, waiting to repel a counter-attack in case their own troops 
should be forced to retreat. Brown posted his twelve men around 
that trench in twelve places ; placed himself where he could rake the 
trench with his own rifle, and, when he gave the signal, they all 
opened fire. They fired until their guns became too hot to hold 
and killed they did not know how many Germans. But the 
major in command of the trench had had enough of it. He be- 
lieved himself surrounded by a large force, thought, in fact, that 
he was within the enemy lines, so he put up his hands and yelled 
"Kamerad." The thirteen Americans disarmed the trench full 
of Germans ; there were more than one hundred of them, although 
the Americans did not stop then to count them. With Brown 
and the corporal leading and the other eleven Americans in the 
rear, these thirteen doughboys started out to conduct one hundred 
prisoners back through the German and Allied lines ! They met 
other parties of Germans, who, seeing this advancing column and 
believing that somehow or other the battle had gone against them, 
promptly surrendered. The file of prisoners grew, little by little, 
until it numbered one hundred fifty-five. By some kind of 
miraculous luck they came to a place where there was a gap in the 
German advance lines and in the Allied lines as well, and they did 
get through. Strange as this tale may sound, it has been vouched 
for on the authority of well-known correspondents. 



THREE AMERICAN EXPLOITS 301 

Another tale of extraordinary self-possession is told of a single 
American in the fighting at Belleau Wood. Frank Lenert suddenly 
found himself surrounded by seventy-eight Germans and five 
officers. He was a German-American and spoke a language which 
the boches understood. They questioned him with extraordinary 
eagerness as to the details of the American attack, and he pro- 
ceeded in genuine American fashion to "string" them, and did it 
with that largeness and convincing flow of language which so 
many Americans are able to attain but which seems to be an un- 
known quantity in Germany. He told them there were eight 
regiments around them at that minute and that plenty more were 
coming. There ivas an American barrage behind the Germans 
at that time and they believed that the doughboy told the truth. 
They therefore begged the honor of surrendering. 

Anybody but an American would have betrayed himself, but the 
self-confidence of this private was entirely equal to the occasion. 
He accepted their surrender with a gravity which completely 
convinced them that everything he said was true. They threw 
their arms away, returned his rifle to him, and started to the rear 
as eighty-three prisoners. This is one of the largest totals of 
prisoners taken by a single man. His comment and explanation 
was that it was no wonder the boches believed the lies their own 
government told them when they swallowed such lies as his. 
The American practice of telling a long story with a perfectly 
straight face again and again accounts for the extraordinary tales 
which come back to us. The American joke was too much for the 
German mind. 

Another extraordinary adventure was that of the Lost Battalion. 
During the fighting in the Argonne, a battalion of American 
soldiers worked itself forward during an offensive at the end of 
September, only to find itself when day dawned with Germans on 



302 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

four sides. The Americans were in possession of a sort of ravine 
and were entirely able to defend themselves, but it was a question 
of death or surrender unless help came. They could stay there but 
they could not get out, and, having of course no food and only a 
limited supply of ammunition, they could not hold out more than 
a short time. They declined however to surrender. The Ameri- 
can division to which they belonged soon discovered their plight 
and an attack was made by the French and Americans to release 
them. While it failed, it probably saved their lives, because it 
kept the Germans too busy to attack them. 

Three more attempts at relief were made on the next day, all of 
which failed. Fourteen trips were undertaken by aeroplanes, 
however, which succeeded in dropping two tons of food and a good 
deal of ammunition in the ravine. On the third day it became clear 
that they must be rescued or they would be compelled to surrender. 
The Germans realized their plight and sent an American prisoner 
to them with a note. "Americans! you are surrounded on all 
sides. Surrender in the name of humanity ; you will be well 
treated." 

Major Whittlesey did not hesitate a second. "Go to hell," 
he shouted, and then read the note to those around him. A 
ringing cheer went up from those exhausted and hungry men, which 
the Germans heard and understood from their observation posts. 
But all goes well that ends well, for within a few hours the Ameri- 
can division broke through the German cordon and rescued the 
battalion. Four hundred and sixty-three men had been cooped 
up in the ravine and had declined to surrender to nobody knows 
how many Germans. 

It was this spirit of the American troops, this do-or-die tenacity, 
this unwillingness to surrender even before overwhelming odds, 
that dashed the hopes of the Germans as it raised those of the 



THREE AMERICAN EXPLOITS 303 

Allies. It must not be supposed that these exploits here told 
showed greater, braver, or better qualities than hundreds of others, 
but a few only could be told in a book like this and these seemed 
to be not merely remarkable but authentic. 



CHAPTER XLIV 

THE CAPTURE OF ST. MIHIEL 

The first independent operation of an American army in France 
as such was undertaken on September 12, 1918, against the famous 
German position of St. Mihiel. Hitherto the American troops 
had always fought as part of the British and French armies. 
They had occupied important posts, won important battles, but 
always supported by French or British artillery and directed by 
foreign officers. At the end of August an American army was 
organized, all parts of which were American. It was under the 
direct personal command of General Pershing and took over a 
section of the line east of Verdun. 

The importance of this sector was extraordinary. It was 
directly opposite the great city of Metz, the key to the eastern 
end of all parts of the German defense system in France. Through 
it came the great bulk of supplies that went to all parts of the 
German lines. Through it must come reenforcements. Metz 
was also the gateway to Germany and the most important part 
of the defenses of that country itself. For that reason the Germans 
had fortified this section of the line with extreme thoroughness. 

In the first year of the war they had pushed through east of 
Verdun a sort of elbow in their line at the point of which was the 
town of St. Mihiel. This elbow or salient faced Verdun on the 
east and from it an attack was possible which would cut off the 
city altogether. Verdun was no less important to the French 
than Metz was to the Germans ; it was the pivot of the French 

304 



THE CAPTURE OF ST. MIHIEL 



305 




306 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

line ; if it should fall, the whole line should have to retire. The 
French were therefore extremely anxious to wipe out this salient 
and directed against it immediately a series of great assaults. 
They failed hov/ever to make any impression, and during the four 
years of war this elbow stuck out from the German line, con- 
tinually menacing Verdun and making extremel}^ difficult any 
attack on Metz. 

The first American army took over, therefore, a very important 
problem. It had been, however, for a year or more, what was called 
a quiet sector, because one on which very little active fighting had 
taken place for a good many months. The Germans proposed 
no offensive there. Their great attack against Verdun had failed 
in 1916 and they were not likely to renew it. From that point 
of view it was perhaps a less dangerous position for the Americans 
to take charge of than some other districts. 

But the purpose of the Americans was by no means defense. 
They meant to succeed in a task at which the French had re- 
peatedly failed. Not that they felt themselves braver than the 
French or better soldiers, but they knew that the methods of 
warfare had changed in four years and General Pershing believed 
that St. ]\Iihiel, which had been too strong to be captured by the 
methods understood earlier in the war, would not be too great a 
task for the first American army in September, 1918. It was 
a great task, but not too great. The result would be extraordinary 
if it should be a success. It was the sort of task which would 
lend glory to the American army and prove to the French and 
British that the Americans, all by themselves, were entirely com- 
petent to undertake military operations of the first magnitude. 

The extent of fortifications around St. INIihiel was unusual. 
There were, as elsewhere on the German lines, trenches and miles 
of barbed wire entanglements, but there were few places where 



THE CAPTURE OF ST. MIHIEL 307 

the dugouts and underground houses were so deeply constructed 
and well built as along the sides of this famous salient. The 
positions were for the most part on the crests of hills, looking down 
into valleys across which a foe must advance, and steel and con- 
crete houses had been built inside the hills. The greatest fortress 
of all, a tall peak called Mont Sec, has been described by corre- 
spondents as towering into the air like a twenty-story building. 
From it everything was visible on a clear day for ten miles. The 
sides of this fortress were steep, covered with woods and ditches. 
Across them ran trenches and miles of barbed wire entangle- 
ments. These were defended by regular underground fortresses 
or houses located forty or fifty feet within the mountain side; 
they were comfortably, even luxuriously, furnished, and most of 
them were built with entrances from both sides of the mountain. 
On the side away from the Allied lines there were porches, tables 
at which the German officers used to drink beer, hammocks slung 
between the trees, and various other devices for making the oc- 
cupants pass the time pleasantly. Needless to say, fortresses of 
this kind were impervious to the fire of even the heaviest guns. 
High explosive shells could not blow the tops off of mountains 
nor reach fortresses fifty feet underground. The Germans had 
dug themselves in as early as 1915 and expected to stay there 
until peace was signed. 

To capture such a position by assault, General Pershing realized 
meant preparations of no ordinary type. One hundred thousand 
detailed maps were prepared covering the minutest facts of the 
whole salient. They told where every German position was and 
just what it was. These maps were corrected continually from the 
reports of the aviators up to the very morning of the battle. To 
help the artillery and infantry officers in their work forty thousand 
photographs were taken. 



308 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

Then to insure the smooth cooperation of the American forces 
after they had succeeded in penetrating the first defense, five 
thousand miles of telephone wires were laid on the borders of the 
salient before the attack, and to them six thousand telephones 
were connected the instant the American troops advanced. Be- 
hind the troops as they went forward came motor trucks un- 
reeling wires which were to continue this telephone system. Then 
the signal corps men took the reels of wire on their shoulders and 
walked with them immediately behind the attacking troops right 
up to the very firing line. As fast as the troops advanced, the 
telephone lines came after them, and in the battle-zone during 
the battle itself there was a telephone system in operation which 
would have been adequate to handle the business of a city of one 
hundred thousand people. Ten thousand men were engaged in 
operating it. INIost of the various exchanges, exactly like the 
exchanges in any American city, were on motor trucks and moved 
around as the battle changed. The signal corps had thousands 
of carrier pigeons by which messages could also be sent through 
should the telephone wires be cut or broken. But the wires held. 

Elaborate provisions w^ere made to take care of the wounded, 
including thirty-five hospital trains, sixteen thousand beds in the 
battle-zone, and fifty thousand at the base hospital. Happily, 
only ten per cent of these facilities were needed. This gives some 
idea of the extent and character of the preparations necessary 
for a major operation in modern warfare. While these arrange- 
ments represented the very acme of military perfection, it must not 
be supposed that they were superior to or different from the ar- 
rangements made by the British and French. We merely showed 
that we could do it ourselves. 

The plan of the attack was simple. General Pershing proposed 
to push in both sides of this salient or elbow, sticking out of the 



THE CAPTURE OF ST. MIHTEL 309 

line, and compel the Germans to evacuate its tip. He was going 
to push at the base of the triangle on both sides, and, by bending 
in the lines until his forces met, he would either compel the Germans 
to run in a hurry and evacuate the strongest part of the district 
without fighting or he would capture them. 

There were four hours of artillery preparation, terrific and 
intensive, intended to drive the Germans underground and de- 
stroy whatever could be destroyed on the surface. Then at 
five A.M. on September 12, the Americans, assisted by one French 
corps, advanced. They were preceded by a number of tanks, 
which could not, however, climb the mountains and were not so 
useful to them as in some other battles. But, aided by groups 
of wire cutters, they went through the lines of the German de- 
fenses very much as at Cantigny. To their own amazement, 
they carried everything with a rush and found themselves through 
the first zone of the German defenses with very small losses and in 
record-breaking time. The first push had been on the south side 
of the salient and the second had been on the northern ; both had 
succeeded. 

The American army and the world at large were electrified to 
learn on the following day that the American forces had met and 
that the salient had been wiped out. Between one hundred fifty 
and two hundred square miles of territory had been taken from 
the Germans and many villages had been released from German 
domination which had been in their hands from the very beginning 
of the war. Sixteen thousand prisoners, four hundred and forty- 
three guns, great amounts of material, ammunition, clothes, and 
food were captured. 

The speed of the Americans had been so great that considerable 
numbers of Germans had been unable to escape from the apex 
of the triangle. Eventually a good many thousands surrendered. 



310 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

Whole regiments walked out with their officers. In one ease the 
commander, after surrendering, requested that the roll be called 
in order that he might discover how heavy his losses had been. 
The whole regiment answered present except one officer and one 
private, and the commander then suggested that he should march 
his own command wherever it was wanted. The Americans ad- 
vancing to the front met the astonishing spectacle of an entire 
German regiment, marching off the battlefield under its own 
officers, and guarded only by a half dozen American cavalrymen, 
lounging in their saddles after the fashion of American cowboys 
driving a herd of cattle. 

The Americans had proved their quality. They had achieved 
what the French had been most anxious to do for four years. 
They had relieved Verdun of all apprehension and had ironed 
out one of the most important creases in the German lines. They 
had put Metz within reach of the heavy artillery and were able 
to shell the most important railroad the Germans had. General 
Pershing had every reason to be content. 

The triumphal entry into St. Mihiel was characteristic of the 
Americans and French. The American secretary of war, Mr, 
Baker, with Generals Pershing and Petain, went quietly to the 
famous little town and walked through its streets, all but un- 
accompanied, and without ceremony or signs of triumph. But 
the identity of the distinguished visitors was soon known to the 
inhabitants. They poured out to receive them, crowded around 
them, kissing Mr. Baker's hand, weeping. The sudden relief 
from the galling oppression which they had endured almost un- 
nerved them. 



CHAPTER XLV 

THE FINAL PROBLEM 

The problem which Foch had now to meet was extraordinary 
and difficult. He must carry a defensive system devised by the 
Germans to prevent the success of any possible assault and which 
represented the preparations of four years. The German High 
Command believed that at all costs they must retain the territory 
of France until peace had been signed. When they came to the 
peace table they must still hold in their hands northern France 
and Belgium. Such elaborate defenses must therefore be con- 
structed that it would be impossible to carry them. The British 
and French for this very reason deemed it essential not to end the 
war until the Germans had been driven from this very territory, 
and if possible from the whole country west of the Rhine. Other- 
wise they must redeem northern France and Belgium at the ex- 
pense of concessions in Lorraine, in Poland, in the Balkans, or in 
Italy, which they could not well afford to make. The war also 
must end in such a way that enough territory could be taken from 
the Germans to prevent them from ever again making an aggres- 
sive assault upon France and Belgium. Foch must therefore win 
the w^ar in a particular way and in a particular place, and he must 
overcome the obstacles which the Germans had created during 
four years to prevent his achieving exactly that end. 

On the map are shown the four practically parallel lines of trench 
defenses which the Germans had constructed between the French 
border and the battle line. The two anchors of this long line, 

311 



312 



THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 



which stretched from the mountains to the sea something over 
six hundred miles long, were Metz, where all four of the lines 
ended, and Lille to the north, where three of them terminated. 




1^- Line. 
Z^- LiNi^ 
3^ LiNi^ 

4^-iJ^LlNE. 

Switch Line, 



m , . 



.501550 



'AlVz: 



^E^PT. 26 



iPa-ri 



The Four German Defense Lines and First Operations of Foch 
From a sketch by the Author 



The loss of Metz would break all four lines, but the Germans re- 
garded that as unthinkable. The loss of Lille would probably 
destroy the first and second lines, but not the third and fourth, 



THE FINAL PROBLEM 313 

which were devised expressly to meet the emergency of its loss. 
The whole system was also constructed so as to provide against 
disaster by an Allied success in any particular sector. 

The crosses on the map connecting these various trench lines 
represent what were called switch lines. They were intended to 
divide the territory into compartments or rooms like the water- 
tight compartments in a ship. The loss of any one, or perhaps 
two, of them would not sink the ship. The others would keep it 
afloat. These switch lines, therefore, were to limit the success of 
the Allies; when they should carry some portion of the first 
trench lines, they would still find the Germans prepared to fight 
them and hold the remaining sections of the first lines. 

The first line, called the HindenburgLine, was strongest of all and 
was really a zone twelve miles broad at most places and comprised 
of many trench lines, one behind the other, connected by switch 
lines of various sorts on just the same principles as the larger 
system. Elaborate barbed wire entanglements had been created 
in front of all the trenches. Deep pits had been dug, covered by 
planks and sod so as to look like solid ground, into which it was 
hoped tanks would fall. Mines and bombs had been planted 
which could be exploded as the Allied troops passed. The trenches 
themselves were of concrete and were believed to be too heavy 
for the Allied artillery to destroy by any length of "preparation." 

Underground at various points were complete houses for hun- 
dreds of troops, with dormitories fitted with beds, kitchens, dining 
rooms, rest rooms, the whole lighted by electricity. In some of 
these underground houses at least the electric power was provided 
in characteristic German manner, by a treadmill worked by man 
power! They compelled prisoners to tramp round on the treadles 
for hours at a time so that the officers might have light and heat ! 

The officers' quarters along the Hindenburg Line were under- 



314 



THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 



ground, safe from shell fire, and so well constructed that they did 
survive the final attack. When the Allied troops entered them, 
they found them furnished with brass beds, comfortable chairs 
and tables, with pictures on the walls, rugs on the floor, and all the 




French Pictorial Serrice 

German Dugout Entrance with Entrances to Officers' Shelters, Hinden- 
BURG Line, 1918. This survived the final artillery preparation. 

appliances of an ordinary house. The Germans meant to live 
on the Hindenburg Line, if necessary, for years, and they proposed 
to be comfortable. They proposed also to be safe, and there- 
fore to live underground. The Allied artillery might pound the 
surface as long as it liked, for as many days and weeks as it chose, 



THE FINAL PROBLEM 



315 



but it would not disturb the real defenses in the least. This being 
true, the Germans did not see how the Hindenburg Line could be 
carried. They had also used the rivers, canals, and marshes of 
the district with great cleverness to furnish sections of the lines 
with water barriers which pre- 
vented the use of tanks, for 
the tank is a land battleship 
and does not swim. 

The problem of Foch was 
great because the Allies had 
attempted many times in the 
past years to carry sections 
of the Hindenburg Line, and, 
while at an enormous cost of 
life and effort some small gains 
had been made, no section of 
the line itself had been carried. 
The secondary defenses had 
always held, and, being twelve 
miles wide, only an extraor- 
dinary drive could pass clear 
through the zone. 

What gave Foch courage 
and confidence was the new 

technique of warfare which the Allies had developed. Trench 
warfare had been at first so new that neither the Germans nor 
the Allies had understood it. And the history of the war had been 
during its first years one of experiment with the technique of the 
new weapons. It had taken the generals time to find out what 
could not be done ; it had taken the troops time to learn how to 
execute movements which were possible. The German campaign 




French Pictorial Service 

German Shelter for Large Gun to 
Conceal it from Aeroplane Obser- 
vation 



316 



THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 



of 1918 made it clear that they had solved the question of break- 
ing through the trenches and fighting through into the open be- 
yond. Foch believed that the Allies had also solved it, and that 
the Hindenburg Line itself would offer no real obstacle. 




French Pictorial Service 

French Whippet Tanks Charging with American Troops, 1918. 

pace of infantry. 



Note slow 



The greatest difficulty to meet had been the machine guns con- 
cealed in concrete shelters. Human flesh could not stand before 
machine gun fire, and the artillery, however accurate its aim, had 
proved itself unable to destroy the kind of shelters that the Ger- 
mans had constructed. However perfect, therefore, had become 



THE FINAL PROBLEM 317 

the technique of the Allies in other ways, the concrete shelter 
with its machine guns always prevented the continuation of the 
advance. It was with this sort of arrangement that the tanks 
were intended to cope. They were to roll in upon these concrete 
shelters and clean them out. The first tanks, however, were large, 
slow, and clumsy. The German aeroplanes were quick, and 
presently the German gunners began to drop high explosives 
on the tanks, and the moment the technique of the German large 
artillery became capable of destroying the big tanks, their useful- 
ness could be only partial. Nor could they assault positions pro- 
tected by water nor yet operate in mud or in wet weather. 

The French therefore invented a new kind of tank, called the 
whippet, a small tank holding only tw^o or three men, moving 
with great rapidity, and so much lighter than the others that it 
could move over rougher and wetter ground. It was nevertheless 
sufficiently 'well armored to withstand machine gun bullets and 
swift enough to be far out of the way before large shells came over. 
Here was a method of dealing with this final obstacle. 

The new Allied attack therefore need not start with a long 
artillery bombardment of days or hours, which merely advertised 
what was coming and when. A brief but intense fire could now ac- 
complish all the destruction possible aboveground at any moment. 
Poison gas could then be started, if the w^ind was right, and both 
would keep the Germans underground. What was called a creep- 
ing or rolling barrage would then be laid down by the artillery. 
The Allied guns would fire all together and drop on a certain line 
on the German trenches a row of shells that would create a zone 
of solid fire. This would prevent the Germans from coming out 
of their dugouts and incidentally destroy the barbed wire entangle- 
ments in front of the troops. 

Behind the barrage would come the Allied infantry; slowly 



318 THE. STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

the barrage would move forward, the Allied gunners lengthening 
their range ; with the troops would be the whippet tanks, which 
would dash forward and clean out the machine guns as they re- 
vealed themselves. Thus line after line of the trenches could be 
carried. Of course, the utmost accuracy and foresight were 
necessary for any such movement. The aeroplane work must be 
perfect, must tell where the Germans were, and show the artillery 
exactly what to do. The artillery must hit exactly what it aimed 
at. The troops must move in exactly such a way to exactly such 
spots. With these methods, Foch felt sure the whole German de- 
fense system could be destroyed — and he was right. 

At a time when things looked black in the summer of 1918, 
Foch was asked by a distinguished man whether he really had a 
plan for winning the war. General Maurice, the British official 
observer, tells of the great general's reply. Laconic always and 
sparing of words, he employed only gestures. He struck out with 
his left arm, then with his right, then more rapidly with the left 
again, and finally gave a tremendous kick with his right leg. 
Three rapid blows and a kick — such was indeed his strategy. 



CHAPTER XLVI 

BREAKING THE HINDENBURG LINE 

The attacks delivered by Foch against the Germans toward the 
end of September presumed a superiority in numbers for the 
AUies, and depended upon dehvering crushing attacks at different 
parts of the German Hne, each superior in weight to the force the 
Germans had. He would also deliver a number of almost si- 
multaneous blows at various portions of the line, considerable 
distances apart so that the Germans might not be able to meet 
this strategy with their old device of drawing men from other 
sections of tne line. He must, however, if possible, surprise the 
foe, and therefore must attack without extensive collections of men 
and material which the German aviators would see and understand, 
and also without extensive artillery preparation of the old type, 
which had practically told the enemy, " I shall strike you here in 
three or four days." 

On September 26, therefore, Foch threw the French and Ameri- 
cans against the Hindenburg Line between Rheims and Verdun. 
The operation was immediately successful in penetrating the Ger- 
man lines and presently drove through the first zone of defenses 
to the open beyond. He did not wait for success on this section 
but the very day after the attack had begun in the south hurled 
the Belgians and British against the German lines between Ypres 
and the coast. He meant to strike at the two ends of the line 
so as to make reenforcement of either part as difficult as possible. 

319 



320 



THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 




BREAKING THE HINDENBURG LINE 



321 



Success in the north would outflank the other lines of defense which 
rested upon Lille. 

He had already determined that his chief strategy should be to 



Oct. 8,1918 
Di^ci-siv^ Day 



O N*^mor 




-5oi,55or 



Ve^n 



15 



The Allied Offensive — 1918 
From a sketch by the Author 



break and turn the German right wing and throw it back through 
France and Belgium on the German frontier. His object was that 
which the French and British had constantly held throughout the 



322 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

war. They must so fight it as to expel the Germans from French 
and Belgian territory. No victory would be worth winning which 
ended with the Germans on French soil. Foch must therefore aim 
his drive at the right wing, capture Lille, the terminus of all the 
German defense lines in France, and bend back the whole system 
on Metz as a pivot, very much as a door swings open. This is 
eventually what he did. Having first pushed down near the hinges 
of the door, he then hammered the lock. 

On that same day, September 27, he struck at the middle of 
the door, reaching out toward Cambrai. On September 28, he 
launched a French army against the sector just west of Rheims 
on the battle front already familiar to the French and Americans. 
The result of these four attacks, delivered with tremendous weight 
on such widely separated sections, set the whole German line rock- 
ing from the mountains to the sea. At either end the first line 
was completely broken. The Hindenburg Line had fallen at both 
ends. Being much stronger in the middle, the resistance was 
longer and further operations became essential. 

On October 8 the decisive operations of the war were launched. 
'To the British was given the honor of dealing the crushing blows 
against the center of the German line. Three armies, elaborately 
prepared and drilled, were simultaneously thrown against the 
section of the Hindenburg Line between Cambrai and St. Quentin. 
Within three days they all drove . through the entire twelve-mile 
zone of the Hindenburg Line itself, cut the second great defense 
line behind it, and chased across the open territory between the 
second and third lines, halting at the third line just south of the 
great city of Valenciennes, which was also the key to the fourth 
line. 

Meanwhile Foch redoubled the activities of the armies at either 
end of the line. To the north, the British and Belgians, reen- 



BREAKING THE HINDENBURG LINE 323 

forced by the French, broke through the final defenses of the second 
German Hne and swung down north of Lille, attacking the switch 
line which connected that city with Ghent. They therefore 
threatened the northern end of the entire German defense system, 
and if they could cut the switch line, they would compel the 
evacuation of the whole northern end of the line. That should be 
the final blow. 

In the third and fourth weeks of October the Allies began to 
reap the fruits of the great offensive. The Germans themselves 
were compelled to abandon without fighting the first sections of 
all the defense lines. They retired rapidly behind the second 
switch line which connected Ghent and Valenciennes. Lille 
was surrendered ; Douai, Cambrai, St. Quentin, all of them great 
positions on the second line of German defenses, fell without a 
blow. The entire first section of the switch line from Lille to 
Ghent was lost. The first of the water-tight compartments be- 
tween the second and third German lines had also been lost. 
The Germans now had been driven from all of the territory be- 
tween the second and third lines north of St. Quentin, though the 
other water-tight compartments between the second and third 
lines still held. They were therefore using the fourth line in 
Belgium, then the third line below Valenciennes, and below 
St. Quentin the second line. 

The last week in October they were forced to evacuate the last 
water-tight compartment between the second and third lines 
just east of St. Quentin. In the first week of November Foch 
struck hard at the third line south of Valenciennes. The British 
and Canadians on November 2 completed the operation by taking 
Valenciennes itself, and broke clean through the fourth defense 
line into the open Belgian fields beyond. At the same time, the 
Belgians and British were assailing the switch line south of Ghent 



324 



THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 



and the Americans and French were proceeding north of Rheims 
through the second Hne of the German defenses upon Sedan. This 
had been the scene of the defeat of the French armv in the Franco- 




From a sketch by the Author 



Prussian War in 1870 and its capture was a matter of great satis- 
faction to the French. 

The German Hues were now everywhere broken ; their armies 
everywhere in rapid retreat. Ludendorff early in September had 



BREAKING THE HINDENBURG LINE . 325 

counseled the German government to sue for peace, and there 
was now in the beginning of November no question whatever of 
the necessity of that measure. Bulgaria had already uncon- 
ditionally surrendered, thus throwing open the entire rear of the 
military position of the Central Empires. The Allied armies 
would be able in the following spring to begin a great campaign 
against Austria's defenses on the Danube itself. There could be 
no question of the result. Austria would be crushed beyond 
recognition. Convinced of this, the Austrians had surrendered. 
Allenby had succeeded in defeating the Turks in Asia Minor and 
Palestine and the Turks had also thrown up the sponge. Every- 
where INIittel-Europa was crumbling The great state which the 
Germans believed already created in the fall of 1917 was dis- 
solving before their eyes. 

They well knew that a conclusive final assault upon their rapidly 
retreating army had been arranged by Foch for November 13 
and 14. They therefore made haste to request terms for an 
armistice in order to save their army from destruction. The 
war was lost ; better a thousand times, they argued, to save what 
they could. Better to surrender than to be beaten flat. 

In considering the question of foregoing the destruction of the 
German army, the Allied generals were moved by the considera- 
tion that while they might refuse to accept the armistice, might 
prolong the war and destroy the German army, it would un- 
doubtedly cost many hundreds of thousands of lives and much 
suffering for the Allied peoples themselves. Beaten though it 
was, the German army was far from demoralized. Driven out 
of its defense line's of the previous years, it had behind it neverthe- 
less strong natural defenses of mountains and rivers. Behind 
them, if given to understand that Germany must fight for her 
very life, that army was capable still of prolonged resistance. 



326 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

The Germans no longer had it in their power to win the war, but 
if the AUies insisted, they did have it in their power to make the 
winning of the war infinitely costly to the Allies. Wisely, Foch 
counseled the granting of the armistice. He would spill no blood 
that could be saved. 

But he would propose to the Germans that which should make 
impossible a resumption of the war. The terms of the armistice 
insisted that the Germans surrender the remainder of the terri- 
tory they had occupied in France and Belgium and as well all of 
German}' west of the Rhine. They also surrendered the three 
most important cities and crossings of the Rhine itself — Cologne, 
Coblenz, and INIainz ; a zone sixty miles wide was drawn around 
each of these cities and beyond it the German troops must retire. 
The French, British, and American armies were then to occupy 
the entire district up to the Rhine and the three sixty-mile zones 
in addition. This placed the Germans at so great a disadvantage 
that the reopening of the war was unthinkable. They were also 
to surrender railroad cars, aeroplanes, artillery of all sort's and 
kinds, ammunition, money, enough of everything essential to the 
prosecution of the war to foreclose any attempt to begin it again. 

The Germans had really no option except to agree or to sell 
their lives as dearly as possible ; they chose to surrender. Messen- 
gers came through the French lines by arrangement and were re- 
ceived by General Foch in his private railway train, which had 
been throughout the campaign his headquarters. When the 
Germans were admitted, Foch dealt with them as Bismarck had 
dealt with the French in 1870. He compelled them to address 
him in French and spoke to them in his own language and not in 
German, just as Bismarck had compelled the French to speak Ger- 
man in order to humiliate them ; there was a poetic justice in this 
which the world was glad to see. The German emissaries re- 



BREAKING THE HINDENBURG LINE 327 

quested an armistice, but Foch compelled them to admit in actual 
words that they came to beg for one. He then read them in 
French the terms agreed upon, sternly silenced their protest that 
the terms were too severe, handed them the paper, and dismissed 
them. A courier was dispatched with the paper through the lines 
to the German headquarters at Spa and they were given three 
days in which to accept or reject the terms. The length of time 
wjiich the courier would take to go and come made the time the 
Germans had for deliberation not much more than one day. Be- 
fore the expiration of the period he returned, the German delegates 
appeared before Foch, and signified their acceptance of the terms. 
Thus on November 11, 1918, came to an end the greatest war in 
history. 

The Allied world burst into a delirium of joy. Great crowds 
surged through the streets of the principal cities in France, England, 
the United States, Canada, and Australia, shouting, singing, 
screaming, ringing bells, tooting horns. Everything that made a 
noise was useful. Not many such demonstrations are recorded 
in history. 



CHAPTER XLVII 



WHO WON THE WAR 



To the people at present alive there are few questions more 
interesting than the identity of the victor. It is something all 
are anxious to ascertain and each of the Allied nations is anxious 
— and justly so — that its own part should not be forgotten. 
In a very real sense the Belgians won the war. But for that first 
gallant struggle at Liege, but for the delay they interposed in the 
German program at the very outset, the French would have been 
overwhelmed, and, as the Germans calculated, the war would have 
been brought to an end before it could have been begun. 

Unquestionably the French army won the war. Not so much 
by reason of the battle of the Marne or of any particular engage- 
ment, but because of what the French army was. The Germans 
were entirely right : so perfect a machine as their own army 
must infallibly win against armies hurriedly put together after 
the war began. The war was saved for the Allies by the French 
army — an excellent, competent force, all but as well drilled as 
the Germans, which bore the brunt of the conflict throughout. 
In the first year the French were compelled to take the entire 
weight of the German assault, for the British army, great as its 
assistance was at the first critical moment, was too small to as- 
sume the real weight of the battle. The French artillery possessed 
a gun, the famous 75's, which was superior to anything the Ger- 
mans had. It was a light field gun, throwing a good sized shell 
and capable of being fired at an astonishing rate of speed and with 

328 



WHO WON THE WAR 329 

extraordinary accuracy. The 75 's alone checked the German army 
in the first invasion of France and won the battle of the Marne. 

In a very real sense of the word the French general staff won 
the war. It was from the outset the brains of the Allied army. 
Without any disparagement to the gallant British, Italian, and 
American officers, the great military minds on the Allied side were 
those of the French. They alone had had years of experience, 
training, and study ; they knew best the field of battle, as well 
they might ; it was their own country ; they had thought more 
carefully about methods of defense and attack. The great 
generals were, therefore, Joffre, Foch, and Petain, a trio who will 
stand out in history above all other names on the Allied side. 
But behind them, making possible the final victory, stand dozens 
of Frenchmen, whose names are not so well known, but whose 
cooperation in the French general staff furnished the real nucleus 
of the organization that wen the war. 

On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that without the 
work of the British fleet the war would have been lost at the out- 
set. It was essential that Great Britain should manufacture for 
France. ' In the first rush of the German invasion the French had 
lost the greater part of their coal mines, most of their iron mines, 
and their most important industrial section. With these had been 
lost thousands of hands who would have performed great services 
for France. Keeping the British factories at work overtime meant 
raw materials, merchant vessels must bring them, and the fleet 
must protect them. The British army had to be transported 
to France and supplied and maintained there. Germany again 
must be thoroughly blockaded ; if she could have attained access 
to the markets of the world, the war might have gone on indefinitely 
or have resulted in an Allied defeat. The British navy coped 
succesf'fi'llv with thp siibniflrinp with mines, and all the other 




Current HUt. Mag. N. Y. Times Co. 

The Territory Surrendered by the Germans at the Armistice 



WHO WON THE WAR 331 

deadly instruments which the Germans thought would of them- 
selves win the war. 

Then we must not forget that the loyalty of the British Empire 
at the very outset of the war was all-important to victory. The 
Germans had supposed that the British self-governing colonies 
would desert the moment war broke out, but as one man they rose 
to the crisis and gave their all for the Empire. Canada indeed 
contributed, if anything, a larger proportion of men and suffered 
more from casualties even than France. Australia, New Zealand, 
and South Africa were close seconds. From all poured to the 
mother country men and supplies indispensable to the conduct of 
the war. 

The Russians also won the war. If they had not moved in 
August, 1914, had not sent regiments into the battle with nothing 
but sticks in their hands and stopped the German advance with 
great piles of bodies, the Germans might still have overwhelmed 
the French and British and have won the war in the west at the 
beginning. It has seemed to most students that the Russian cam- 
paign in Poland in August and September, 1914, gave Joffre his 
opportunity at the battle of the Marne. The Germans were com- 
pelled to send enough men east to give the French a chance to 
fight with a prospect of real success. Again in 1915 and in 1916 
the Russians hurled themselves against the Germans in offensives 
which seemed impossible of success in order to lessen the pressure 
on the French and British in France. The services of the Russian 
army to victory must not be forgotten. 

Then there will be few to deny that the arrival of the British 
millions in 1915 and 1916 was a decisive event for victory. With- 
out such extensive and tireless support as the British army gave, 
the French must have been overwhelmed. The whole German 
calculation, indeed, had been based not merely on the assumption 



332 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

that the Russians would be slow and incompetent but that the 
British would be unable to create an army of any real value be- 
fore the French were exhausted. We cannot conceive of the war 
without the British army any more than we can think of it without 
the great British factories, munition works, coal mines, and fleets. 
The Allied offensives of the first three years were in large measure 
made possible by the arrival of the British and many of the im- 
portant movements in the last year of the war were executed by 
them. 

Italy's entry in 1915 was by no means without its contribution 
to the final result. Had Italy joined the Central Empires and 
assailed France in the rear of the trench line or had compelled 
France to send enough soldiers south to meet another foe, the war 
would have lasted few months indeed. The mere fact that Italy 
stood neutral in a sense made victory possible. When she entered 
the war, she completed the blockade of the Central Empires 
and stopped the smuggling which must otherwise have gone on 
through Italy as through Holland and Denmark. The Italians 
again really compelled the Germans and Austrians to keep hun- 
dreds of thousands of men in the Alps who might otherwise have 
been winning battles in France or Poland. The final campaign 
of the Italians against the Austrians in the fall of 1918 contributed 
to the rapidity and finality of the downfall of the Central Empires. 

But without the United States victory would still have been 
lost. The war could not have been finished without us. The mere 
knowledge that the Yanks were coming infused in 1917 new courage 
into the exhausted French and stubborn British. They had begun 
to fear that although the Germans could not beat them they might 
not themselves be able to beat the Germans. From the outset 
in a proper sense the United States had been a participant in the 
war. From the outset, the Allies could not have gotten on without 



WHO WON THE WAR 



333 



us. From the first weeks of the war our factories were working 
overtime making ammunition, clothing, shoes, and a thousand 
things indispensable to the maintenance of the French and British 




Current Hist. Mag. N. Y. Times Co. 

The Rearrangement of Europe to Which the Allies Pledged Themselves 



armies. Our farms were producing wheat, meat, cotton, and 
sugar, without which the British and French people must have 
starved. In a very real sense of the word the United States fed 



334 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

the Allied armies. The work of the American Red Cross and of 
the various other American organizations for the assistance of 
France was from the outset essential to the continuing of the war. 
Beyond question the American Relief fed Belgium and northern 
France while in the hands of the Germans and saved the popu- 
lation from extinction. Few historians will be so shortsighted 
as many people in the United States to-day who seem to feel that 
we did nothing of consequence toward the winning of the war 
until 1917. We were in the war from the outset and without us 
the war would not have lasted until 1917. Wars to-day are fought 
by nations and not by governments. Though we were technically 
neutral as a government, the American nation was working night 
and day for the Allies from the very beginning. There were here 
and there some exceptions, men and women, disloyal to the coun- 
try, who did their best for the Central Empires; but they were 
an inconspicuous minority. 

Then in 1917 the United States entered the war and from that 
moment the end seemed no longer a question of doubt. The 
Allies had but to hold out through 1917 and perhaps 1918, and the 
American millions in 1919 would crush the Germans out of ex- 
istence. It was as certain as the multiplication table and as sure 
as the rising of the sun. From that knowledge came a morale 
and a courage which were great factors in the war in 1917. When 
the war ended there were some two million American soldiers in 
France, a vast number of civilians supporting the army, and the 
entire American fleet was in European waters doing yeoman service 
against the submarine. American troops fought in nearly all the 
divisions of the Allied armies in the final offensives from July to 
November, 1918. An official American army was in the field 
and carried out with great success and gallantry the capture of 
the salient at St. Mihiel. 



WHO WON THE WAR 335 

Nevertheless, it must be admitted that the French and British 
dealt the German his final death blow. Only a portion of the 
American troops in France took part in the actual fighting and they 
formed only a relatively minor element in the entire Allied forces. 
The coming of the Americans did enable Foch to throw against 
the Germans without reserve all the trained French and British 
troops he had. But for the Americans he must have retained 
large numbers of experienced men as a final reserve in case his 
battle plan should miscarry. The mere presence of the iVmericans, 
despite the fact that they did not fight, was an all-important factor 
in the final battle. Without us it could not have been fought. 
The whole scheme would have been too risky to have been at- 
tempted. In as true a sense as in any other of these cases, the 
United States won the war. 

Yet it ought to be clear that the winning of the war was a com- 
plex operation, involving the assistance and cooperation of several 
nations, all of which played essential parts in the war as it took 
place. We cannot omit Belgium at the outset nor America at 
the end ; but for the P>ench and the British the war would have 
ended before the Americans arrived. The Russians, the Cana- 
dians, the Italians, and the Australians all too played their 
part. If any had to be left out, it would be difficult to know 
what the result would have been. All were indispensable to the 
final victory. 



THE EVENTS OF 1914 

Certain variations in the dates assigned events are to be found and have 
not yet been authoritatively settled. They are not however in most instances 
of substantial importance. These lists follow the Statesman's Year Book for 
European events and the list published by the Committee on Public Informa- 
tion for those relating to the United States. 
June 28. Murder of Archduke Francis Ferdinand at Serajevo. 
July 23. Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia. 
July 28. Austria- Hungary declares war on Serbia. 
July 31. German ultimatums to Russia and France. 
Aug. 1. Germany declares war on Russia and invades Luxemburg. 
Aug. 2. German ultimatum to Belgium, demanding a free passage for her 

troops across Belgium. 
Aug. 3. Germany declares war on France. 
Aug. 4. Germans enter Belgium. 
Aug. 4. Great Britain declares war on Germany. 
Aug. 4. President Wilson proclaims neutrality of United States. 
Aug. 6. Austria-Hungary declares war on Russia. 
Aug. 7. Liege occupied. 

Aug. 10. France and Great Britain declare war on Austria-Hungary. 
Aug. 16. British expeditionary force landed in France. 
Aug. 18. Russia invades East Prussia. 
Aug. 20. Brussels entered by Germans. 
Aug. 21-23. Battle of Mons-Charlecoi. Dogged retreat of French and 

British in the face of the German invasion. 
Aug. 23. Japan declares war on Germany. 
Aug. 23. Kiaochow in China bombarded by Japanese. 
Aug. 24. Fall of Namur. 
Aug. 25. Fall and destruction of Louvain. 
Aug. 25-Dec. 1.5. Russians overrun Galicia. Lemberg taken (Sept. 2) ; 

Przemysl besieged (Sept. 16 to Oct. 15, and again after Nov. 12). 

Dec. 4, Russians 3| miles from Cracow. 
336 



THE EVENTS OF 1915 337 

Aug. 26. Allies conquer Togo, in Africa. 

Aug. 26-31. Russians defeated in battle of Tannenberg. 

Aug. 28. British naval victory off Helgoland Bight, in North Sea. 

Sept. 5. Great Britain, France, and Russia sign a treaty not to make peace 
separately. 

Sept. 6-10. First battle of the Marne. 

Sept. 7. Extreme point of German advance. 

Sept. 7. Germans take Maubeuge, in northern France. 

Sept. 1 1 . Australians take German New Guinea, and other German Pacific 
island possessions. 

Sept. 12-17. Battle of the Aisne. 

Sept. 16. Russians driven from East Prussia. 

Sept. 22. Three British armored cruisers suiik by a submarine. 

Sept. 27. Successful invasion of German Southwest Africa by General Botha. 

Oct. 9. Germans occupy Antwerp, the chief port of Belgium. 

Oct. 13. Belgian government retires to Havre, which remains its seat during 
the war. 

Oct. 16-28. Battle of the Ysre. Belgians and French halt German ad- 
vance. 

Oct. 17-Nov. 15. Battle of Flander? , near Ypres, saving Channel ports. 

Oct. 20-27. German armies driven back in Poland. 

Oct. 28-Dec. S. De Wet's rebellion in British South Afr'ca. 

Nov. 1. German naval victory off the coast of Ch'le. 

Nov. 3-5. Russia, France, and Great Britain declare war on Turkey. 

Nov. 7. Kiaochow captured by the Japanese and British. 

Nov. 10-Dec. 14. Austrian invasion of Serbia. 

Nov. 10. German cruiser Emden destroyed in Indian Ocean. 

Nov. 21. Basra, on Persian Gulf, occupied by British. 

Dec. 8. British naval victory off the Falkland Islands. 

Dec, 16. German warships bombard towns on east coast of England. 

Dec. 17. Egypt proclaimed a British protectorate, imder a sultan. 

Dec. 24. First German air raid on England. 

1915 

Jan. 1-Feb. 15. Russians attempt to cross the Carpathians. 
Jan. 24. Naval skirmish off Dogger Bank, in North Sea. 
z 



338 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

Jan. 25-Feb. 12. Russians again invade East Prussia, but are defeated in the 

battle of the Masurian Lakes. 
Jan. 28. American merchantman William P. Frye sunk by German cruiser. 
Feb. 4. Germany's proclamation of "war zone" around the British Isles 

after Feb. 18. 
Feb. 10. United States note holding German government to a " strict account- 
ability" for destruction of American lives or vessels. 
Feb. 19. Anglo-French squadron bombards Dardanelles forts. 
Mar. 1. Announcement of British blockade of Germany. 
Mar. 10. British capture Neuve Chapelle, in northern France. 
Mar. 17. Russians capture Przemysl, in Galicia. 
Apr. 17-May 17. Battle of Ypres. First use of poison gas. 
Apr. 25. Allied troops land on the Gallipoli peninsula. 
Apr. 30. Ge mans invade the Baltic provinces of Russia. 
May 1. American steamship Gulf light sunk by German submarine; two 

American lost. 
May 2. Battle of the Dunajec. Russians defeated by the Germans and 

Austrians and forced to retire from the Carpathians. 
May 7. British liner Lusitania sunk by German submarine (1134 lives lost, 

114 being Americans). 
May 9-June. Battle of Artois, or Festubert (in France, north of Arras). 

Small gains by the Allies. 
May 13. American note protests against submarine policy culminating in the 

sinking of the Lusitania. Other notes June 9, July 21 ; German 

replies. May 28, July 8, Sept. 1. 
May 23. Italy declares war on Austria-Hungary. 
May 25. American steamship Nchraskan attacked by submarine. 
June 3. Przemysl retaken by Germans and Austrians. 
June 9. Monfalcone occupied by Italians. 
June 22. The Austro-Germans recapture Lemberg, in Galicia. 
July 2. Naval action between Russians and Germans in the Baltic. 
July 15. Conquest of German Southwest Africa completed. 
July 14-Sept. 18. German conquest of Russian Poland ; capture of Warsaw 

(Aug. 4), Kovno (Aug. 17), Brest-Litovsk (Aug. 25), Vilna 

(Sept. 18). 
Aug. 19. British liner A rabk sunk by submarines (44 victims, 2 Americans). 
Aug. 21. Italy declares war on Turkey. 



THE EVENTS OF 1916 339 

Sept. 1. The German ambassador, von BernstorfF, gives assurance that Ger- 
man submarines will sink no more liners without warning. 

Sept. 8. Uiiited States demands recall of Austro-Hungarian ambassador. 
Dr. Dumba. 

Sept. 25-Oct. French offensive in Champagne fails to break through German 
lines. 

Sept. 27. Small British progress at Loos, near Lens. 

Oct. 4. Russian ultimatum to Bulgaria. 

Oct. 5. Allied forces land at Saloniki at the invitation of the Greek govern- 
ment. 

Oct. 5. German government regrets and disavows sinking of^ Arabic and is 
prepared to pay indemnities. 

Oct. 6-Dec. 2. Austro-German-Bulgarian conquest of Serbia; fall of Bel- 
grade (Oct. 9), Nish (Nov. 1), Monastu- (Dec. 2). 

Oct. 13. Germans execute the English nurse, Edith Cavell, for aiding Belgians 
to escape from Belgium. 

Oct. 14. Bulgaria declares war on Serbia. 

Oct. 15-19. Great Britain, France, Russia, and Italy declare war against 
Bulgaria. 

Nov. 10-Apr. Russian forces advance into Persia as a result of pro-German 
activities there. 

Dec. 1. British under General Townshend retreat from near Bagdad to 
Kut-el-Amara. 

Dec. 3. United States government demands recall of Captain Boy-Ed and 
Captain von Papen, attaches of the German embassy. 

Dec. 6. Germans capture Ipek, in Montenegro. 

Dec. 15. Sir Douglas Haig succeeds Sir John French in command of the 
British army in France. 

Dec. 19. British forces withdraw from parts of Gallipoli peninsula. 

1916 

Evacuation of Gallipoli completed by the British. 

Fall of Cettinje, capital of Montenegro. 

Germany notifies neutral powers that armed merchant ships will be 

treated as warships and will be sunk without warning. 
Feb. 15. Secretary Lansing states that by international law commercial 

vessels have right to carry arms in self-defense. 



Jan. 


8. 


Jan. 


13. 


Feb. 


10, 



340 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

Feb. 16. Germany sends note acknowledging her liability in the Lusitania 
affair. 

Feb. 16. Russians take Erzerum, in Turkish Armenia. 

Feb. 18. Kamerun (Africa) conquered. 

Feb. 21-July. Battle of Verdun. 

Feb. 24. President Wilson in letter to Senator Stone refuses to advise Ameri- 
can citizens not to travel on armed merchant ships. 

Mar. 10. Germany declares war on Portugal. 

Mar. 24. French steamer Sussex is torpedoed without warning. 

Apr. 17. Russians capture Trebizond, in Turkey. 

Apr. 18. United States note declaring that she will sever diplomatic relations 
unless Germany abandons present methods of submarine warfare. 

Apr. 24-May 1. Insmrection in Ireland. 

Apr. 29. General Townshend surrenders at Kut-el-Amara. 

May 4. Germany's conditional pledge not to sink merchant ships without 
warning. 

May 14-June 3. Great Austrian attack on the Italians through the Trentino. 

May 19. Russians join British on the Tigris. 

May 24. Conscription bill becomes a law in Great Britain. 

May 31. Naval battle off Jutland, in North Sea. 

June 4-30. Russian offensive in Galicia and Bukowina. 

June 5. Lord Kitchener drowned. 

June 14. Allied Economic Conference at Paris. 

July 1-Nov. 17. Battle of the Somme. 

July 27. Germans execute Captain Fryatt, an Englishman, for having de- 
fended his merchant ship by ramming the German submarine 
that was about to attack it. 

Aug. 9. Italians capture Gorizia. 

Aug. 27. Italy declares war on Germany. 

Aug. 27-Jan. 15. Rumania enters war on the side of the Allies, and most of 
the country is overrun. (Fall of Bucharest, Dec. 6.) 

Aug. 29. Hindenburg takes supreme command of German armies. 

Oct. 7. German submarine appears off American coast and sinks British 
passenger steamer Stephano (Oct. 8). 

Nov. 18. Monastir retaken by Allies (chiefly Serbians). 

Nov. 20. United States protests against Belgian deportations. 

Dec. 7. Lloyd George succeeds Asquith as British prime minister. 



THE EVENTS OF 1917 341 

Dec. 12. German peace offer. Refused (Dec. 30) as "empty and insincere." 
Dec. 18. President Wilson's peace note. Germany replies evasively (Dec. 26) . 
Entente Allies' reply (Jan. 11) demands "restorations, repara- 
tions, indemnities." 

1917 

Jan. 11. The Allied governments state their terms of peace. 

Jan. 31. Germany announces unrestricted submarine warfare in specified 

zones beginning Feb. 1. 
Feb. 3. United States severs diplomatic relations with Germany. 
Feb. 24. Kut-el-Amara taken by British under General Maude. 
Feb. 25. Hindenburg's strategic retreat begins on west front. 
Feb. 26. President Wilson asks authority to arm merchant ships. 
Feb. 28. Zimmermann Note published. 
Mar. 11. Bagdad captured by British under General Maude. 
Mar. 11-15. Revolution in Russia, leading to abdication of Tsar Nicholas II 
(Mar. 15). Provisional government formed by Constitutional 
Democrats under Prince Lvoff. 
Mar. 12. United States announces that an armed guard will be placed on all 

American merchant vessels sailing through the war zone. 
Mar. 17-19. Retirement of Germans to the Hindenbiu"g Line. 
Mar. 24. Minister Brand Whitlock and American Relief Commission with- 
drawn from Belgium. 
Apr. 2. President Wilson asks Congress to declare the existence of a state 

of war with Germany. 
Apr. 6. The United States declares war on Germany. 

Apr. 8. Austria-Hungary severs diplomatic relations with the United States. 
Apr. 9-May 14. British success in battle of Arras (Vimy Ridge taken Apr. 9). 
Apr, 16-May 6. French successes in battle of the Aisne between Soissons and 

Rheims. 
Apr. 21. Turkey severs relations with United States. 
May 4. American de.stroyers begin cooperation with British navy in war 

zone. 
May 15-Sept. 15. Great Italian offensive on Isonzo front. 
May 15. General Petain succeeds General Nivelle as commander-in-chief of 

the French armies. 
May 18. President Wilson signs selective service act. 



342 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

June 7. British blow up Messines Ridge, south of Ypres, and capture 7500 

German prisoners. 
June 10. Itahan offensive in Trentino. 
June 12. King Constantine of Greece forced to abdicate. 
June 17. Portuguese troops on west front. 
June 26. First American troops reach France. 
June 29. Greece enters war against Germany and her alHes. AUenby takes 

command in Palestine. 
July 1. Russian army led in person by Kerensky, the minister of war, 

begins an offensive in Galioia, ending in disastrous retreat 

(July 19-Aug. 3). 
July 20. Kerensky succeeds Prince Lvoff as premier of Russia. 
July 31-Nov. 6. Battle of Flanders (Passchendaele Ridge) ; British successes 
Aug. 15. Peace proposals of Pope Benedict published (dated Aug. 1). United 

States replies Aug. 27; Germany and Austria, Sept. 21. 
Aug. 15. Canadians capture Hill 70, dominating Lens. 
Aug. 19-24. New Italian drive on the Isonzo front. 

Aug. 20-24. French attacks at Verdun recapture high ground lost in 1916. 
Sept. 4. Riga captured by Germans. 
Sept. 8. Luxburg dispatches ("Spurlos versenkt") published by United 

States. 
Sept. 15. Russia proclaimed a republic. 

Oct. 17. Russians defeated in a naval engagement in the Gulf of Riga. 
Oct. 26. Brazil declares war on Germany. 
Oct. 24-Dec. Great German-Austrian invasion of Italy. 
Oct. 27. Fallof Cividale; Oct. 28, fall of Gorizia ; Oct. 29, fall of Udine; 

Oct. 31, Italians reach the Tagliamento in the retreat; Nov. 4, 

British troops reach Italy ; Nov. 9, Italian line withdrawn to the 

Piave and there established. 
Germans retreat from the Chemin des Dames, in France. 
First clash of American with German soldiers. 
British troops reach Italy. 
Overthrow of Kerensky and provisional government of Russia by 

the Bolsheviki. 
Italians on the Piave. 
British capture Gaza. 
Versailles Supreme War Council established. 



Nov. 


2. 


Nov. 


3. 


Nov. 


4. 


Nov. 


7, 


Nov. 


9. 


Nov. 


9. 


Nov. 


9. 



Dec. 


3. 


Dec. 


6. 


Dec. 


6. 


Dec. 


7. 


Dec. 


9. 



THE EVENTS OF 1918 343 

Nov. 13. Clemenceau succeeds Ribot as French premier. 
Nov. 20-Dec. 13. Battle of Cambrai. 

Nov. 29. First plenary session of the Interallied Conference in Paris. Six- 
teen nations represented. Colonel E. M. House, chairman of 
American delegation. 
Conquest of German East Africa completed. 
United States destroyer Jacob Jones sunk by submarine, with loss of 

over 60 American men. 
Rumania agrees to armistice with Germany. 
United States declares war on Austria-Hungary. 
Jerusalem captured by British. 
Dec. 22. Peace negotiations opened at Brest-Litovsk between Bolshevik 

government and Central Powers. 
Dec. 28. President Wilson takes over the control of railroads. 

1918 
Jan. 8. President Wilson sets forth peace program of the United States. 
Jan. 18. Russian Constituent Assembly meets in Petrograd. 
Jan. 19. The Bolsheviki dissolve the Russian Assembly. 
Jan. 28. Revolution begins in Finland ; fighting between "White Guards" 

and "Red Guards." 
Jan. 28-29. Big German air raid on London. 
Jan. 30. German air raid on Paris. 

Feb. 1. Germany and Austria-Hungary recognize the Ukrainian Republic. 
Feb. 3. American troops officially announced to be on the Lorraine front 

near Toul. 
Feb. 5. British transport Tuscania with 2179 American troops on board 

torpedoed and sunk; 211 American soldiers lost. 
Feb. 9. Ukrainia makes peace with Germany. 
Feb. 10. The Bolsheviki order demobilization of the Russian army. Formal 

announcement that Russia was no longer a participant in the war. 
Feb. 14. Bolo Pasha condemned for treason against France; executed 

Apr. 16. 
Feb. 17. Cossack General Kaledines commits suicide. Collapse of Cossack 

revolt against the Bolsheviki. 
Feb. 18-Mar. 3. Russo-German armistice declared at an end by Germany; 

war resumed. Germans occupy Dvinsk, Minsk, and other cities. 



344 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

Feb. 21. German troops land in Finland. 

Feb. 21. British capture Jericho. 

Feb. 23. Turkish troops drive back the Russians in the northeast (Trebizond 

taken Feb. 26, Erzerum Mar. 14). 
Mar. 2. German and Ukrainian troops defeat the Bolsheviki near Kief in 

Ukrainia. 
Mar. 3. Bolsheviki sign peace treaty with Germany at Brest-Litovsk. 
Ratified by Soviet Congress at Moscow, Mar. 15. 
Finland and Germany sign a treaty of peace. 
Announcement that American troops are occupying trenches at four 

different points on French soil. 
Great German air raid on Paris, by more than fifty planes. 
German troops occupy Odessa on Black Sea. 
r. 1. First German drive of the year, on 50-mile front, extending 
to Montdidier. 
British and Japanese armies landed at Vladivostok. 
Second German drive, on a 30-mile front between Ypres and 
Arras. 
Foch commander in chief. 

Rumania signs peace treaty with the Central Powers. 
Nicaragua declares war on Germany and her allies. 
British naval force attempts to block Ostend harbor. 
May 14. Caucasus proclaims itself an independent state; but the Turks 

overrim the southern part, and take Baku Sept. 19. 
May 24. Costa Rica declares war on the Central Powers. 
May 25-June. German submarines appear off American coast and sink 19 
coast-wnse vessels, including Porto Rican liner Carolina, with loss 
of 16 lives. 
May 27-June 1. Third German drive, capturing the Chemin des Dames and 
reaching the Marne River east of Chateau-Thierry. American 
marines and French in Chateau-Thierry sector. 
May 28. American forces near Montdidier capture village of Cantigny and 

hold it against numerous counter-attacks. 
May 31. United States transport President Lincoln sunk by U-boat while on 

her way to the United States ; 23 lives lost. 
June 9-16. Fourth German drive, on 20-mile front east of Montdidier, makes 
only small gains. 



Mar. 


7. 


Mar. 


10. 


Mar. 


11. 


Mar. 13. 


Mar. 


21-A 


Apr. 


5. 


Apr. 


9-18. 


Apr. 


14. 


May 


6. 


May 


7. 


May 


9-10 



THE EVENTS OF 1918 345 

June 10. Italian naval forces sink one Austrian dreadnought and damage 
another in tlie Adriatic. 

June 11. American marines take 800 prisoners in Belleau Wood. 

June 14. Tiu"kish troops occupy Tabriz, Persia. 

June 15. Official announcement that there are 800,000 American troops in 
France. 

June 15-July 6. Austrian offensive against Italy fails with heavy losses. 

June 21. Official statement that American forces hold 39 miles of French 
front in six sectors. 

July 10. Italians and French take Berat in Albania. 

July 13. Czecho-Slovak troops occupy Irkutsk in Siberia. 

July 15-18. Anglo-American forces occupy strategic positions on the Murman 
Coast in northwestern Russia. 

July 15-18. Fifth German drive extends three miles south of the Marne, but 
east of Rheims makes no gain. 

July 16. Ex-Tsar Nicholas executed by Bolshevik. 

July 18-Aug. 4. Second battle of the Marne, beginning with Foch's counter, 
offensive between Soissons and Chateau-Thierry. French and 
Americans drive the Germans back from the Marne nearly to 
the Aisne. 

July 27. American troops arrive on the Italian front. 

July 31. President Wilson takes over telegraph and telephone systems. 

Aug. 2. Allies occupy Archangel in northern Rui-sia. 

Aug. 8-Sept. Allies attack successfully near Montdidier, and continue the 
drive until the Germans are back at the Hindenburg Line 
giving up practically all the ground they had gained this year. 

Aug. 15. American troops land in eastern Siberia. 

Sept. 3. The United States recognizes the Czecho-Slovak government. 

Sept. 12-13. Americans take the St. Mihiel salient near Metz. 

Sept. 15. Allied army under General D'Esperey begins campaign against 
Bulgarians. 

Sept. 16. President Wilson receives an Austrian proposal for a peace con- 
ference, and refuses it. 

Sept. 22. Great victory of British and Arabs over Turks in Palestine. 

Sept. 26. Americans begin a drive in the Meuse valley. 

Sept. 30. Bulgaria withdraws from the war. 

Oct. 1. St. Quentin (on the Hindenburg Line) taken by the French. 



346 THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR 

Oct. 1. Damascus captured by the British. 
Oct. 3. King Ferdinand of Bulgaria abdicates. 
Oct. 3. Lens taken by the British. 

Oct. 4. Germany asks President Wilson for an armistice and peace ne- 
gotiations; other notes Oct. 12, 20, etc.; similar notes from 
Austria-Hungary Oct. 7, and from Turkey Oct. 12. Wilson's 
replies Oct. 8, 14, 18, 23. 
Beirut taken by a French fleet. 
Cambrai taken by the British. 
Laon taken by the French. 
Ostend taken by the Belgians. 
Lille taken by the British. 
iov. 4. Allied forces (chiefly Italians) under General Diaz wnn a 

great victory on the Italian front. 
Aleppo taken by the British. 
Tiu-key surrenders. 

Serbian troops enter Belgrade after regaining nearly all of Serbia. 
Trieste and Trent occupied by Italian forces. 
Surrender of Austria-Hungary. 

President Wilson notifies Germany that General Foch has been 
authorized by the United States and the Allies to communicate 
the terms of an armistice. 
Nov. 6. Mutiny of German sailors at Kiel ; followed by mutinies, revolts, 

and revolutions at other German cities. 
Nov. 7. Americans take Sedan. 
Nov. 9. British take Maubeuge. 
Nov. 9. Abdication of the German emperor William II and the crown prince ; 

they flee to Holland Nov. 10. 
Nov. 11. Armistice signed. 



Oct. 


7. 


Oct. 


8. 


Oct. 


13. 


Oct. 


17. 


Oct. 


17. 


Oct. 


24- 


Oct. 


26. 


Oct. 


31. 


Nov. 


1. 


Nov. 


3. 


Nov. 


4. 


Nov 


5. 



INDEX 



Aeronautics, see Balloons, Aeroplanes, 
Zeppelins. 

Aeroplanes, 122-125; 203-210. 

Aisne, river, 62, 65, 66. 

Albert, King of Belgium, 195-202. 

Allenby, General, 261-264. 

Allies, 99 note, see also West Front, 
France, Belgium, Italy, Great Britain. 

Alsace-Lorraine, 12, 47, 50. 

Amiens, battle of, 273-276. 

Antwerp, fall of, 66. 

Archduke Ferdinand of Austria, murder 
of, 3-5, 16. 

Armistice, terms of, 325-328, 330. 

Army, American, condition of in 1918, 
277 ; valor of, 284 ; capture of St. 
Mihiel by, 304-310 ; real part in 
winning the war, 282, 285, 332-334. 

Army, British, 31 ; German view of in 
1914, 41 ; dispatched to France, 
54-55 ; retreat from Mons, 55-56 ; 
part in campaigns, see West Front ; 
part in winning the war, 331-332. 

Army, French, 31 ; excellence of in 
1914, 37-38 ; German view of in 1914, 
41, 48, 49; part in campaigns, see 
West Front ; part in winning the war, 
328-329. 

Army, German, description of its inva- 
sion of Belgium, 4-5 ; history of, 
17-27 ; training of for war, 29-31 ; 
German view of in 1914, 48-52 ; 
atrocities committed by in Belgium, 
74-84 ; see also East Front and West 
Front. 

Army, Russian, 31 ; German view of 
in 1914, 41, 48-49; campaign of in 
1914, 54-55 ; campaign of in 1915, 
138-145 ; causes of collapse of, 146- 
148 ; campaigns of, see also East 
Front; part in winning the war, 331. 



Artillery, part of in modern warfare, 
108-128, 146, 147, 175-178. 

Atrocities, German, 74-84; 229-233. 

Australia, part of in the war, 71-73; 
134-137, 236, 331. 

.\ustria-Hungary, attitude toward mur- 
der of Archduke, 3 ; part of in Pan- 
Germanism, 15, 16 ; part of in begin- 
ning the war, 52-53 ; relations of to 
Italy, 155-157 ; reasons for collapse 
of, 324-325 ; see also, East Front. 

Automobile, importance of in the war, 
125-126, 181-182. 

Bagdad, Railway, 15-16, 28. 

Balloons in modern warfare, 11, 114, 
122-123, 203-210. 

Beatty, Admiral, 185-188. 

Belgium, description of entry of German 
army into, 4-5 ; center of German 
railway system, 10 ; strategic position 
of, 47, 50, 51 ; German invasion of, 
52-55, 65-68 ; German atrocities 
in, 74—82 ; real policy behind atroci- 
ties in, 83-84 ; defies Germany during 
the war, 194-202 ; part in winning 
the war, 328. 

Belleau Wood, battle of, 295-298. 

Berlin, 3, 31, 48, 106. 

Bethmann-Hollweg, von, German Chan- 
cellor, 70. 

Bismarck, 21, 23, 24, 326. 

Blockade of Germany, 35, 36, 85-89, 
159-161, 166. 

Bolsheviki, 221-229. 

Brest-Litovsk, treaty of, 228. 

British Empire, part in the war, 69-73, 
331. 

Bulgaria, 106, 107, 325. 

Cambrai, battle of, 256-260. 

Canada, part in the war, 71-73, 230 ; 



347 



348 



INDEX 



gallantry of, 275 ; part in winning 

the .war, 331. 
Cantigny, first offensive of Americans, 

288-289. 
Cavalry, use of in the war, 259-260. 
Cavell, Edith, 151-154. 
Central Powers, part in war, see under 

Germany. Austria-Hungary, Turkey, 

East Front, West Front. 
Chateau-Thierry, battle of, 290-294. 
Civilization, German idea of, 6-10 ; 

Allied idea of, 43-44, 70-71, 95-98, 

231-235. 
Colonies, British, see British Empire. 
Colonies, German, 7-16, 22-24, 72-73. 
Constantinople, 15. 
Copper, 9, 10. 
Crown Prince of Prussia, 3, 7, 284. 

Dardanelles, straits of, 104-107, 132- 
137. 

East Front, war on in 1914, 60-61 ; 

in 1915, 99-107, 138-145; in 1916, 

171-174; in 1917, 213-215; in 1918, 

267-269. 
Economics of the war, 6-16, 22-24, 31- 

35. 
England, see Great Britain. 

Foch, Marshal, 65, 124, 130, 277, 278, 
280-285, 311-329. 

Food, of armies, 126 ; in Germany, 
159-161, 174. 

France, attitude of to Germany at 
outbreak of war, 4 ; German study 
of before the war, 30 ; military reasons 
for German attack on in 1914, 47- 
52; self-control of people of, 74-84; 
war in France, see West Front. 

French, Marshal, 55. 

Galicia, war in, 61, 138-145; see also 

East Front. 
Gallipoli, 72, 104-107, 132-137. 
Gasoline, 9, 12.5-126, 181-182. 
General staff, organization of described, 

124-125. 
German people, place assigned by 

Pan-Germanists in the world, 6. 



Germany, responsible for the outbreak 
of the war, 43-44 ; position of in 
1914 as seen by the leaders, 6-16 ; 
strategic position of, 12 ; measures 
to deal with, 13 ; part played by 
history of in the causes of the war, 
17-27 ; preparations for the war, 
28-38 ; intention to destroy France, 
Belgium, and Poland, 82-84 ; or- 
ganization of during the war, 159- 
161 ; conduct of war by, see West 
Front and East Front ; plans for 
winning war in 1918, 267-272 ; failure 
of final campaign by, 267-285, 311- 
328 ; reasons for defeat of, 328-336. 

Great Britain, German attitude toward, 
24-26 ; reason for entering the war, 
69-73 ; part in the war in 1914 ; 
54-56 ; part of navy of in war, 85- 
89, 329 ; part of in winning war, 
328-336. See also Army, British ; 
Navy, British ; British Empire, West 
Front. 

Greece, 174, 217. 

Guynemer, 209-210. 

Hate, Song of, 25-26. 

Hindenburg, von. Marshal, 30, 61, 138- 

145, 148, 172, 213, 215, 217. 
Hohenzollern, House of, 18. 

India, part of in the war, 71-73. 

Italia Irredenta, 156-158. 

Italy, enters the war, 107, 155-158; 
defeated in the campaign of 1917, 
218-220; difficulties met by in Alpine 
warfare, 241-243 ; part in campaign of 
1918, 290, 332 ; part of in winning the 
war, 332. 

Japan, part of in the war, 90, 91, 184. 

Jellicoe, Admiral, 184-186. 

Joan of Arc, 58. 

Joffre, Marshal, 54, 60-67, 91, 165, 329, 

331. 
Jutland, battle of, 183-187. 

Kaiser, the, of Germany, 4, 6, 17, 107, 

155, 173, 190. 
Kerensky, Premier of Russia, 226-229. 



INDEX 



349 



Kluck, von, General, 30, 64, 65. 
Kultur, definition of, 6, 7, 9. 

La Libre Belgique. 198-202. 

Lenine, 228-229. 

Liege, 47, 55, 56. 

Louvain, destruction of by the Germans, 

77-78. 
Ludendorff, von. General, 148, 270, 285. 
Lusitania, 149-151. 

Mackensen, von. General, 141-145, 148, 

173-174. 
Marines, American, 290-298. 
Marne, battle of, 58-65. 
Masurian Lakes, battle of, 61, 139. 
Merchant marine, German, 10-16. 
Mesopotamia, 15. 

Messines Ridge, capture of, 236-240. 
Mons, retreat of British from, 55-58. 

National superiority, belief of Germans 

in, 6-9. 
Navy, British, relation to the German 

navy, 11, 35; part of in the war, 

85-89, 1^3-187 ; measures of to fight 

the submarine, 244-255 ; part of in 

winning the war, 329-330. 
Navy, German, part in the war, 14, 23, 

87-89, 183-187. 
Navy, of the United States, 244-255. 
Near East, campaign in, 261-264. See 

also Bagdad Railway, Mesopotamia. 
New Zealand, part of in the war, 71-73, 

131-137, 236, 331. 
Nicholas, Grand Duke, 140-145. 

Ostend, British exploit at, 253-255. 

Palestine, campaigns in, 261-264. 

Pan-Germanism, 9-16. 

Paris, campaign of 1914 on, 47-65 ; of 
1916 on, 169-171 ; of 1918 on, 278- 
279; defense of by Foch, 230-285, 
290-294. 

Per.shing, General, 277, 304-310. 

Poland, German study of before the war, 
30, 47, 48; campaign of 1915 in, 107, 
132-137. ASee also East Front. 



Prussia, history of in relation to the war, 
17-27. 

Railroad, part in modern warfare, 125-- 
126, 146, 147. 

Rheims, cathedral, destroyed by Ger- 
mans, 80-81. 

Rumania, enters the war, 171-172 ; 
campaign against, 173-174. 

Russia, part at the outbreak of the war^ 
4-5, 52-54; Revolution in, 21.3-215, 
221-229, 267-269; for campaigna 
see East Front and Army, Russian. 

St. Mihiel, capture of, 304-310. 

Scrap of paper, 70. 

Serbia, part in the war, 3, 15, 16, 42, 

43, 52-53, 107. 
Somme, battle of, 170-171. 
South Africa, part of in the war, 71-73, 

331. 
Spy system, German, 31-34, 36-37. 
Submarine, part of in the war, 68, 87, 

88, 102-103, 149-151, 166, 215, 220, 

234, 244-255, 270, 284, 329-330. 
Sun, place in, for Germany, 7-9. 

Tanks, in the war, 256-260. 
Tannenberg, battle of, 61, 139. 
Telegraph, part of in modern warfare, 

122-125. 
Trench warfare, description of, 111-128, 

188-193. 
Triple Alliance, 14, 155-156. 
Triple Entente, 14. 
Trotsky, 228-229. 
Tsar, Nicholas II, 221-225. 
Turkey, part of in Pan-Germanism, 15- 

16 ; campaign of the Allies against in 

1915, 104-107, 132-137; in 1917, 213, 

261-264. 

Ukraine, 229. 

United States, aids Belgium, 83-84; 
enters the war, 217 ; reason for entry 
of, 230-235 ; army of takes field, 277 ; 
influence on winning of the war, 267, 
328-336 ; see also Army, American. 

Verdun, 60, 166-171, 175-182, 278-279. 



350 



INDBX 



War, the Great War, causes of, 3-43 ; 
outbreak of, 3-5 ; date of its inception, 
5 ; why begun in 1914, 39-43 ; general 
character of, 90-98, 108-128 ; history 
of in 1914, 45-99 ; in 1915, 99-107 ; 
in 1916, 165-174; in 1918, 267-285, 
311-328. 

Warfare, character of modern, 108-120. 

West' Front, war on, in 1914, 60-67 ; in 



1915, 99-107 ; in 1916, 165-171, 175- 
182; in 1917, 215-220; in 1918, 267- 
.336. 
Wilson, Woodrow, President, states 
aims of Allies, 43-44, 129, 219-235, 
277. 

Zeebrugge, British exploit at, 249-253. 
Zeppelins, 102, 103. 106, 107, 149. 



Printed in the United States of America. 



